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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case involves an appeal from a final order, dated October 8, 2005. See
Ruling and Order, dated October 8, 2005 (R. at 1420). Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to
Art. VIII, Section 5, of the Utah Constitution, Sections 78-2-2(3)0) and 78-2a-3(2)(j) of
the Utah Code, and Rules 3(a) and 4(a) of Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ISSUES, PRESERVATION AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue #1: Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment on Plaintiffs'
nuisance claims and ruling that no disputes of material fact exist and that the permits and
ordinances1 govern or otherwise bar those claims? Plaintiffs preserved this issue for
appellate review in their Memoranda in Opposition to Summary Judgment. (R. at 638,
643, 695-99.) Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment is a question
of law reviewed "for correctness/' while granting "no deference" to trial court's
conclusions. Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33, U 15, 44 P.3d 781 (emphasis added); see also
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Issue #2: Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment on Plaintiffs'
nuisance claims and ruling that the permits and Outdoor Music Ordinance "govern" and
thereby supercede state law governing those claims? Plaintiffs preserved this issue for
appellate review in their Memoranda in Opposition to Summary Judgment. (R. at 636-

1

The ordinances are collectively referred to herein as "the Outdoor Music
Ordinance" or "the Ordinance."
1

38.) Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment is a question of law
reviewed "for correctness/' while granting "no deference" to trial court's conclusions.
Auk, 2002 UT 33 at TI15 (emphasis added); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Issue #3: Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment and ruling that
Plaintiffs' common law and statutory nuisance claims are barred under U.C.A. §§ 10-860 and 10-8-76? Plaintiffs preserved this issue in their Memoranda in Opposition to
Summary Judgment, Petition for Permission to Appeal, and Memorandum in Opposition
to Defendants' Combined Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 638, 763-67, 1411-13.)
Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment is a question of law
reviewed "for correctness." while granting "no deference" to trial court's conclusions.
Auk, 2002 UT 33 at f 15 (emphasis added); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Similarly,
"[t]he correct interpretation of a statute is a question of law and is reviewed for
correctness." State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993) (emphasis added).
Thus, whether the trial court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs' nuisance claims under
Sections 10-8-60 and 10-8-76 is a question of law, which this Court reviews for
correctness. See id.
Issue #4: Did the trial court err in not striking the Outdoor Music Ordinance void
and unconstitutional? Plaintiffs preserved this issue in their Memoranda in Opposition to
Summary Judgment and Motions for Reconsideration. (R. at 647-48, 810-19, 886-87,
1413-14 n.4.) Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the Outdoor Music Ordinance

2

is constitutional, involves a question of law, which this Court reviews "for correctness,
giving no deference to the trial court." Salt Lake Citv v. Wood. 1999 UT App. 323, f 4,
991 P.2d 595 (emphasis added).
Issue #5: Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment on Plaintiffs'
takings claim and ruling that Plaintiffs "failed to exhaust.. . administrative remedies"
under Section 15-1-18 of the Park City Land Management Code? Plaintiffs preserved
this issue in their Memoranda in Opposition to Summary Judgment and Motions for
Reconsideration. (R. at 648-51, 812 n.4.) Whether the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment is a question of law reviewed "for correctness." while granting "no
deference" to trial court's conclusions. Ault, 2002 UT 33 at f 15 (emphasis added); see
also Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Similarly, "[t]he correct interpretation of a statute is a
question of law and is reviewed for correctness." Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1357 (emphasis
added). Thus, whether the trial court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs' takings claim under
Section 15-1-18 is a question of law, which this Court reviews for correctness. See id.
Issue #6: Did the trial court err in denying Plaintiffs' Motions for Reconsideration
because the court's earlier ruling was "final"? Plaintiffs preserved this issue in their
Motions for Reconsideration. (R. at 851-52, 883.) Whether a trial court's ruling is
"final," is a question of law reviewed for correction. See generally Bradbury v. Valencia,
2000 UT 50, 5 P.3d 649.
Issue #7: Did the trial court err in denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration

3

because their constitutional claims against the Outdoor Music Ordinance were not
adequately briefed when first considered by the court? Plaintiffs preserved this issue in
their Motion for Reconsideration. (R. at 886-88.) Whether the trial court erred in
denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
See Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies. 884 P.2d 1306, 1312 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Issue #8: Did the trial court err in ruling on Defendants' Motions for Summary
Judgment before answers were filed and/or discovery could be initiated or completed.
Plaintiffs preserved this issue in their Memoranda in Opposition to Summary Judgment.
(R. at 731; 976.) "This court reviews the denial ot the Rule 56(f) motion for an abuse of
discretion." Aspenwood L.L.C. v. C.A.T.. L.L.C.. 2003 UT App. 28,116, 73 P.3d 947,
cert, denied, 72 P.3d 685 (Utah 2003). However, when a trial court does not rule on a
Rule 56(f) motion, thereby failing to exercise its discretion, "'the issue of whether or not
it should have presents a legal question which is subject to de novo review.'" Crossland
Sav. v. Haten, 877 P.2d 1241, 1243 n.4 (Utah 1994) (quoting Garrett v. City & County
of San Francisco, 818 F.2d 1515 n.3 ( 9th Cir. 1987)).
Issue #9: Did the trial court err in denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendant
Barton's Supplemental Affidavit? Plaintiffs preserved this issue in their Motion to Strike
Defendant Barton's Supplemental Affidavit. (R. at 1123-28.) "A motion to strike . . . is
reviewed for under an abuse of discretion standard." Rivera v. State Farm Mut. Auto
Ins. Co.. 2000 UT 36, t 7.

4

Issue #10: Should the trial court's finding that Defendant Barton did not
contribute to the nuisance complained of by Plaintiffs during 1999 be set aside?
Plaintiffs preserved this issue throughout their case. (See, e.g., Mem in Siipp. of Prelim.
Injun. R. at 38, 48; Reif Aff. R. at 78-81, 99; Amended ( omplaint R. at 665, 669, 67475, 682-87; Mem. in Opp. to Barton's Motion for Sum. J. R. at 696-99; 959-66, 101718.) This Court reviews the trial court's findings under a "clearly erroneous" standard.
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) (emphasis added). Alternatively, when findings are based solely on
written documents and not on direct testimony, this Couri may "examine the evidence de
novo and determine the facts." In re Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916, 918 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988) (emphasis added).
Issue #11: Should costs on appeal be granted to Plaintiffs/Appellants? hu Mian I In
Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs/Appellants respectfully request
that costs be granted to them.

5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves a noise dispute, which began in 1998, over loud amplified
outdoor concerts which were held within close proximity to Plaintiffs' home.2 (Amended
Complaint at 664.) Park City Municipal Corporation authorized the concerts by issuing
permits to restaurants in 1999 and by passing an ordinance ("the Outdoor Music
Ordinance") in 2000 and which, as amended, remains in effect today. (Amended
Complaint at 665, If 26; 671, f 88.) In 1999, Randy Barton, d/b/a Wooden Dog, operated
as the concert promoter, scheduler of bands and sound controller for at least one of the
permitted restaurants. (Aff. of Barton at 665, % 25; 619, f 6.) In 2000, Park City Arts
Council operated as the sole licensee under the Outdoor Music Ordinance, and Barton,
d/b/a Mountain Town Stages, served as Park City Arts Council's program manager and
sound technician. (Aff. of Barton at 621,fflf21-23; Aff. of Charnes at 626,19; 627, f 13
Amended Complaint at 682,ffl[175-76.) Beginning in 2001, Randy Barton, d/b/a
Mountain Town Stages, operated as the sole licensee under the Ordinance. (R. at 236-45;
Aff. of Barton at 622, ^ 26; Aff. of Charnes at 627, If 15.)
As a result of Defendants' failure to abate the noise level despite Plaintiffs'
repeated complaints, Plaintiffs had no choice but to seek legal redress for their claims,
which they sought by filing a lawsuit in 2001. (Amended Complaint at 662.) Plaintiffs'
lawsuit alleges common law nuisance, statutory nuisance, and continuing, threatened or

2

Plaintiffs do not appeal the trial court's decision on their 1998 nuisance claim.
6

anticipatory nuisance. (Amended Complaint at 682-84.) Plaintiffs' lawsuit also alleges
local noise ordinance violations, permit violations, invalidation and unconstitutionality of
the Outdoor Music Ordinance, and takings. (R. at 684-86).
After Plaintiffs filed suit in 2 0 0 1 , Defendants i i IC >\ ed foi sin nmary judgment on all
of Plaintiffs' claims before any answers were filed or any discovery could be initiated or
completed. (R. at 143, 503, 611.) On August 7,2002, with the exception of Plaintiffs'
fourth cause of action for common law nuisance claim for continuing, threatened or
anticipatory nuisance, the trial court dismissed Plaintiffs' common law and statutory
nuisance claims against all Defendants, ruling that those claims were governed by the
permits and Outdoor Music Ordinance authorizing the concerts and that Utah Code Ann.
§§ 10-8-60 and 10-8-76 further governed those claims, as a matter of law. (R i ilii ig and
Order at 754-55, attached hereto as Exhibit A.) The trial court also dismissed Plaintiffs'
constitutional challenge and takings claim against the Outdoor Music Ordinance, ruling
that Plaintiffs had failed to establish that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and had failed
to exhaust administrative remedies available under § 15-1-18 of the Park City Land
Management Code. (Ruling and Order at 757.) The trial court, however, specifically
denied Barton's motion as to Plaintiffs' claim for violations of the 1999 permits. (Ruling
and Order at 756-57.) Plaintiffs sought interlocutory appeal but the Utah Supreme Court
denied Plaintiffs' petition. (Ruling and Order at 759, 799.)
Plaintiffs then filed a Motion for Clarification and/or Reconsideration. (R. at 805.)
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Plaintiffs argued, in part, that reconsideration was appropriate because the Outdoor Music
Ordinance: (1) violates the Supremacy Clause, (2) violates the Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause, (3) violates the Separation of Powers provision, (4) violates the Due Process
Clauses, (5) constitutes special legislation, (6) delegates a core governmental function, (7)
fails to meet minimal scrutiny, (8) is overinclusive and unreasonable, and (9) is repugnant
to law. (R. at 810-19.) On March 31, 2003, the trial court denied Plaintiffs' Motion for
Reconsideration as to the constitutionality of the Ordinance, stating that its earlier ruling
constituted "a final, formal judgment" and that Plaintiffs' arguments were "not
specifically briefed" when first considered by the court during summary judgment
proceedings. (Ruling and Order at 877-78, attached hereto as Exhibit B.)
Plaintiffs then filed a second Motion for Reconsideration or, in the alternative,
Certification. (R. at 880.) Plaintiffs argued in part that reconsideration was appropriate
because the trial court erred as a matter of law in denying Plaintiffs' earlier Motion for
Reconsideration on the basis that the August 7, 2002 Ruling and Order was "final" and
that Plaintiffs' arguments were "not specifically briefed" during summary judgment
proceedings. (R. at 883-89.) In the meantime, Barton filed a second motion for summary
judgment on Plaintiffs' claim for violations of the permits. (R. at 896.)3
In a Minute Entry and Order, dated July 5, 2003, the trial court acknowledged that

3

Barton attached an affidavit to his reply brief in support of his motion (R. at
1082), which Plaintiffs moved to strike. (R. at 1119.) Barton's reply brief was untimely
and was filed after the Notice to Submit for Decision was filed. (R. at 1122,fflj4-7.)
8

its earlier ruling was not "technically a final judgment," but nevertheless denied Plaintiffs'
Motion for Reconsideration because "most o f their arguments "were not adequately
briefed" when initially considered by the court. (Minute Entry aiv i >• dor at 1130,
attached hereto as Exhibit C.) ' I lie trial coi n tfin tl ler asserted that its March j i, 2003 .-\
ruling was intended to advance the "policy of furthering certainty and discouraging
piecemeal briefing." (Minute Entry and Order at 1130.) The trial court also "denied
without prejudice" Plaintiffs' Motion for Certification pending resolution U» liu ton\
second summary judgment motion. (Minute Entry and Order at 1130).
On July 14, 2003, the trial court held a hearing on Barton's second motion for
summary judgment and ruled from the bench to grant that motion. (R. at 1139,
1305:32:17-18.) The trial court also instructed Barton's counsel to prepare an order
consistent with the trial court's decision to grant Barton's motion. (R. at 1139,
1305:32:19, 25.) Barton's counsel failed to timely submit an order and failed to request
or receive a stipulated extension of time from Plaintiffs' counsel or the trial court. (R. at
1234-35.) On September 16, 2003, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Vacate and Reconsider
Summary Judgment Decision and to Renew Plaintiffs' Motion for Certification and
supporting memorandum, arguing that summary judgment should be reconsidered and
additional time for discovery should be granted because Plaintiffs' counsel 1lad located a
witness whose testimony directly contradicts Barton's testimony set forth in his affidavit
filed with his reply memo for summary judgment. (R. at 1151-76.) On October 16, 2003,

9

Plaintiffs filed a Notice to Submit in connection with their Motion to Vacate. (R. at
1226.) In the interim, Barton filed a proposed order and second proposed order, and
Plaintiffs timely objected to the form of those orders. (R. at 1177, 1229.) On October 18,
2003, the trial court signed a Minute Entry, stating that it had "signed" Barton's second
proposed order without addressing Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate, which the trial court
mistakenly believed had not been submitted for decision. (R. at 1256.)
On January 19, 2004, the trial court denied Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate and
Reconsider Summary Judgment but did not explicitly resolve Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion
for Certification. (Minute Entry and Order at 1267-68, attached hereto as Exhibit D.)
Instead, with respect to that motion, the court acknowledged that "it was not clear whether
the court previously ruled on plaintiffs' Fourth Cause of Action" but again suggested that
the court's prior rulings were "final"; thus, providing no clear resolution as to the finality
of Plaintiffs' case while suggesting that the court's order might suffice as a certification
order if one is needed. (Minute Entry and Order at 1267-68.) Plaintiffs then filed a
proposed order to certify the case for appeal. (R. at 1289.) On March 29, 2004, the trial
court declined to sign Plaintiffs' proposed order, stating that "[t]he court believes its
[January 19, 2004] Minute Entry and Order will suffice as certification, if one is needed . .
and the court now determines that it will sign no further orders unless the appellate court
to which this matter is assigned remands the matter as to the Fourth Cause of Action for
any reason." (Minute Entry and Order at 1295, attached hereto as Exhibit E.) Plaintiffs

10

thereafter filed a timely notice of appeal. (R. at 1297.)
On appeal, Plaintiffs moved for summary disposition for lack of jurisdiction and
requested a remand because the trial court had not issued a final appealable order or
judgmen

at 1306.) On Septeml r lu, z004, tlle I Jtah Court i

- : oals dismissed

the case for lack of jurisdiction and remanded for clarification by the trial court as to the
status of Plaintiffs' fourth cause of action. (Memorandum Decision at 1306-07.)
Plaintiffs then filed a Renewed Motion for Certification

I

^1.)

On December 15, 2004, while Plaintiffs5 Renewed Motion for Certification was
pending, the trial court ruled that it "never clearly dismissed" Plaintiffs' fourth cause of
action and directed the parties to agree to dismissal of that action, without prejudice, or to
submit a proposed order certifying the matter for appeal. I

t 1329.) Defendants then

filed for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' fourth cause of action (R. at 1331, 1371, 1377),
and the trial court ordered the case stayed pending a resolution attempt. (Minute Entry at
1340.) Plaintiffs then filed a combined motion to vacate the stay, enter an order of
certification, and stay Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (R. at 1342.)
On June 5, 2005, the trial court issued a Minute Entry again noting that "it has
never clearly dismissed plaintiffs' Fourth Cause of Action" and further instructing
Plaintiffs to respond to Defendants' motion for summary judgment, and denying
Plaintiffs' motion to stay Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (R. at 1400.) On
June 27, 2005, Plaintiffs timely filed their memorandum in opposition to Defendants'

11

motion for summary judgment. (R. at 1403-16.) Defendants filed no reply memoranda
(R. at 1417), and on June 12, 2005 Plaintiffs submitted the motion for decision. (R. at
1417).
On October 8, 2005, the trial court entered an order acknowledging that
"[Plaintiffs] may well be right" in arguing that "the law does not bar the Fourth Cause of
Action, and [that] the court's August 2002 ruling was in error that must be reversed, so
[that] it should not justify dismissal of the remaining claim." (Ruling and Order at 1420
(emphasis added), attached hereto as Exhibit F.) Nevertheless, without further
explanation, the court concluded to "hold to its view" set forth in its August 7, 2002
ruling and granted Defendant Barton's motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs'
fourth cause of action. (Ruling and Order at 1420.) Plaintiffs timely appealed. (R. at
1422.)

12

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Plaintiffs are longtime residents and owners of property located in the Old

Town district of Park City, Utah. (Amended Complaint at 663,ffif8-12.)
2.

Plaintiffs support the arts and enjoy music. (Aff. of Reif - o5,fflf3-4.)

3.

Plamtiff Reif is a classically trained flutist and she also teaches flute lessons.

(Aff. of Reif at 65, f 3.)
4.

Plaintiffs' property parallels lower Main Street, which includes recently

devel . • •• private property (i.e., 1

azas) on both sides of tl le street that are occi lpied •

by (or have been occupied by) restaurants and other businesses. (Aff. of Whaley at 87, f
10; Amended Complaint at 663-64, t l 13-14.)
5.

The Plazas are known as the Town Lift and Summit Watch plazas.

(Amended Compia^
6.

oo4,)] 14.)

Lower Main Street and the Plazas did not exist and were not contemplated

when Plaintiff Whaley purchased Plaintiffs' property over three decades ago. (Amended
Complaint at 663, ]f 12.)
7.

Plaintiffs are the closest, permanent, year-round residents to the Plazas.

(Amended Complaint at 664, ^ 17.) Plaintiffs' property is located less than 150 feet from
the Town Lift plaza and less than 380 feet from the Summit Watch plaza. (Amended
Complaint 664, T| 18.)
8.

Main Street and Plaintiffs' property are located at the bottom of a steep
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mountain canyon (Aff. of Whaley at 87, ^ 11), and the Plazas are higher in elevation than
Plaintiffs' property. (Aff. of Whaley at 88, ^ 17.)
9.

Before 1998, amplified outdoor music did not exist and was not allowed in

the lower Main Street area. (Amended Complaint at 664, ^ 19.)
10.

Beginning in the summer of 1998, Park City Municipal Corporation allowed

amplified outdoor music at the Plazas (Amended Complaint at 664, % 19), and Plaintiffs
complained to the City that the excessive volume created by those concerts was unduly
disturbing, but the City did nothing to resolve Plaintiffs' concerns. (Amended Complaint
at 664,fflf21-23.)
11.

In 1999, Park City Municipal Corporation continued to allow amplified

outdoor music at the Plazas. (Amended Complaint at 664, % 26.) The City accomplished
this by issuing permits to three (3) restaurants in the lower Main Street area. (Amended
Complaint at 665, t 26.)
12.

Defendant Barton, d/b/a the Wooden Dog, scheduled, arranged, booked

and/or produced bands for the 1999 outdoor concerts. (Amended Complaint at 665, ^ 25;
Barton's Admission (Letter to the Editor) at 1026.) Defendant Barton has specifically
admitted to arranging for musicians, providing the sound amplification, operating under
the authority granted by the City through the permits, knowing of complaints from nearby
residents and, due to those complaints, having the permits revoked by the City. (Barton's
Admission (Letter to the Editor) at 1026.)
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13.

Defendant Barton's involvement as producer of the bands for the 1999

concert was well documented in the media. (R. at 962, <f 5; Barton's Admission (Letter to
the Editor) at 1026.)
14.

Defendant Barton acted as promoter for the 1999 concert series and

personally advertised the concerts in the media as "the Wooden Dog concert series." (R.
at 962, Tf 6; R. at 1168, 1170, 1173.) Defendant Barton also promoted the concerts on his
website. (R. at 962, f 7; R. at 1158-59.)
15.

As a result of the 1999 permits that were issued by the City, Plaintiffs were

unduly disturbed by the outdoor music allowed at the Plazas. (Amended Complaint at
665-664128-41.)
16.

Such intrusions occurred nearly every day and every night. (Amended

Complaint at 665,129.)
17.

Plaintiffs were subjected to ten (10) hours of excessive noise on Sundays,

three (3) hours on Tuesdays, four (4) hours on Fridays, and six (6) hours on Saturdays.
(Amended Complaint at 665-66, Yl 31-34.)
18.

With respect to the Sunday hours in particular, the City's Police Chief,

Lloyd D. Evans stated in a memorandum dated July 1, 1999: "I believe that the number of
hours requested [by the 1999 outdoor music permit applicants] is extreme and not in the
best interest of the business and residential neighbors of these establishments."
(Amended Complaint at 667, ^ 55.)
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19.

The City extended the hours of operation over the Chiefs objections.

(Amended Complaint at 667,ffl[56.) As a result, the Sunday concerts were allowed
between 11:00 a.m. and 9:00 p.m., but they frequently exceeded that limitation.
(Amended Complaint at 665, U 31; R. at 964-65,ffl[16-17.)
20.

Plaintiffs' ability to sleep, rest, relax, work, study, read, or do anything that

required concentration was impossible as a result of the loud intrusive noise. (Amended
Complaint at 666,ffif35-39.)
21.

Plaintiffs could not engage in normal conversation or enjoy a meal together

because the music was so loud. (Amended Complaint at 666, Tj 38.)
22. Plaintiff Reif even resorted to using earplugs, but to no avail. (Amended
Complaint at 666, Tf 36.)
23.

Plaintiffs' only relief resulted when they left their home and returned after

the music ceased. (Amended Complaint at 666, ^| 40.)
24.

It was enormously stressful and inconvenient for Plaintiffs to be forced from

their home. (Amended Complaint at 666, If 41.)
25.

Defendant Barton contributed to the nuisance complained of by Plaintiffs.

(R. at 965, If 19.)
26.

Plaintiffs called the City and complained repeatedly. (Amended Complaint

at 666-67,fflf43- 49.)
27.

Plaintiffs' voices became so familiar to police dispatchers that they would
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call Plaintiffs by their first names before Plaintiffs identified themselves. (Amended
Complaint at 667, % 49.)
28.

On at least one occasion, the police agreed with Plaintiffs that the music was

too loud but said they could do nothing about it because a "permit" had been issued to
allow it. (Amended Complaint at 667, f 47.) One officer also told Plaintiffs that filing a
lawsuit was their only recourse. (Amended Complaint at 667, ^f 47.)
29.

Defendant Barton knew or had reason to know of Plaintiffs' complaints, but

he did nothing to amend his behavior as sound manager and/or music producer for the
restaurants. (R. at 963-64,fflf10-12.)
30.

No relief resulted despite Plaintiffs' incessant complaints to the City.

(Amended Complaint at 667, ^f 50.)
31.

The 1999 concerts did not abide by the volume and time limitations set forth

in the permits. (Amended Complaint at 667, f 52.)
32.

The music played at the Plazas in 1999 violated at least three conditions of

the permits: (1) "[s]ound levels on all amplified sound will remain at a reasonable level
[so] as not to unduly disturb the surrounding neighborhood," (2) "[t]he applicants will
confine the event activity to those areas indicated in the site plan," and (3) "[t]he
applicants will confine the hours of th[e] event[s] to the time frame indicated on the
application." (Amended Complaint at 667, ^J 52.)
33.

As sound manager and/or music producer for the 1999 concert series,
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Defendant Barton's conduct was governed by all three of the permit conditions noted
above, and he failed to comply therewith. (R. at 964-65, ^ 16-17.)
34.

The 1999 concerts violated at least three Park City noise ordinances;

specifically, Park City Municipal Code §§ 6-3-7, 6-3-8(J)(2), and 6-3-9(A). (Amended
Complaint at 667,^51.)
35.

The City issued at least two citations for noise violations resulting from the

1999 concert series. (R. at 964, If 13.)
36.

The City eventually "revoked the permits" at the end of the 1999 summer

season. (R. at 1005, ^f 3.) This was due in part to Defendant Barton's failure to comply
with the conditions of the permits. (R. at 1005, f 3.)
37.

At the close of the 1999 summer season, Barton authored and published a

"Letter to the Editor" in the Park Record newspaper in which he admitted his involvement
in the 1999 concerts and his involvement in and knowledge of the revocation of at least
one of the permits. (R. at 1026.)
38.

Plaintiffs were not aware of Barton's "Letter to the Editor" until 2003 when

they found it while preparing to defend a second motion for summary judgment in which
Barton claimed he was not involved in the 1999 concerts after he had already admitted his
involvement in the 1999 concerts during an earlier summary judgment proceeding. (R. at
1017.)
39.

After the 1999 summer season ended, the City again started to consider the
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issue of outdoor music concerts in the lower Main Street area. (Amended Complaint at
670, H 79.)
40.

Plaintiffs voiced their objections to the City after learning that amplified

outdoor music might again be allowed within close proximity to their home. (Amended
Complaint at 670, f 80.)
41.

On April 13, 2000, Plaintiffs delivered a notice of claim to the City.

(Amended Complaint at 674, U 103.)
42.

On June 1, 2000, the City passed a special ordinance, Ordinance 00-36

(codified at Park City, Utah, Code § 4-8A (2000)), governing outdoor music (heretofore
referred to as the "Outdoor Music Ordinance" or the "Ordinance"). (R. at 826-33,
attached hereto as Exhibit G.)
43.

The Outdoor Music Ordinance was limited to the same privately owned

Plazas as Plaintiffs had complained about the year prior; namely, the Town Lift and
Summit Watch plazas. (R. at 829.)
44.

The Outdoor Music Ordinance authorized amplified music at a much higher

volume level and for a longer period of time than, and for just as many days per week, as
the year prior. (Amended Complaint at 671-72, ^ 89-90.)
45.

The permitted volume alone was increased to 90 decibels, which resulted in

a 25 decibel increase over the year prior. (Amended Complaint at 671-72, ^} 89.)
46.

The increase in volume was authorized based on a flawed noise study,
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which was conducted by person(s) who were not certified in the area of expertise in which
they purported to give advice to the City. (Aff. of Sola at 105, ^ 7; 106-09, Tflj 14-19.)
47.

Park City Arts Council (the "Arts Council") was the sole licensee under the

Outdoor Music Ordinance passed in 2000. (Amended Complaint at 682, If 175.)
48.

In 2001, when this litigation began, the Arts Council had been a dissolved

non-profit corporation for over ten years, and was unlicenced as a business before, during
and after enactment of the Outdoor Music Ordinance. (Amended Complaint at 673, fflf
94-95; R. at 136.) Thus, the Ordinance purports to vest authority in a non-existent entity
that is not properly licensed to do business in the city. (Amended Complaint at 673, fflf
94-95; R. at 136.)
49.

The Outdoor Music Ordinance required the Arts Council to "hire" a

program manager and sound technician. (R. at 831.)
50.

Barton, d/b/a Mountain Town Stages, served as the Arts Council's program

manager and sound technician. (Amended Complaint at 673, ^ 93; id at 674-75, If 11112; idL at 682,1f 176.)
51.

Mountain Town Stages was not a recognized non-profit corporation during

the summer of 2000. (Aff. of Barton at 622, f 25.)
52.

Park City Arts Council financed all activities conducted under the Outdoor

Music Ordinance passed in 2000. (Aff of Charnes at 626,ffl[9-10.)
53.

The Outdoor Music Ordinance passed in 2000 authorizes the Arts Council
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to sponsor the concerts and Barton to act as the Arts Council's manager and regulator of
those events. (Amended Complaint at 673, ^| 93.)
54.

The Ordinance delegates the City's power to regulate noise and nuisance

activities to a private individual and a private entity; namely Barton and the Arts Council.
(Amended Complaint at 672, f 91.)
55.

In furtherance of the City's delegation of power to regulate noise and

nuisance activities, the City bought, purchased and/or acquired a decibel meter reader,
which the City gave or lent to Defendants Barton and the Arts Council to use in their
respective roles as regulators of the noise they created. (Amended Complaint at 672, ^f
91.)
56.

During the summer and fall of 2000, as a result of the noise created by

outdoor concerts near Plaintiffs' home, Plaintiffs were again regularly and unreasonably
disrupted. (Amended Complaint at 675-76,fflf113-32.)
57.

The loud and continuous noise that emanated from the Plazas made

Plaintiffs' basic life activities impossible or unenjoyable. (Amended Complaint at 675, ^j
115.)
58.

Plaintiffs were unable to carry on conversation, enjoy meals together, watch

television, read, work, sleep or rest while the music was playing. (Amended Complaint at
675, t l 120-25.)
59.

Plaintiffs closed their windows and doors, but doing so made no appreciable
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difference. (Amended Complaint at 676, f 124.)
60.

Plaintiffs were also prevented from enjoying their own selection of music,

and Plaintiff Reif was prevented from practicing her flute. (Amended Complaint at 676,
11 126-27.)
61.

The noises created by amplified outdoor music concerts made impossible

Plaintiffs' ability to use and enjoy their property. (Amended Complaint at 675-76, ff
113-32.)
62.

Plaintiffs' were only able to seek relief by leaving their home and returning

after the music ceased. (Amended Complaint at 676, f 132.)
63.

This experience has been exasperating and enormously inconvenient for

Plaintiffs. (Amended Complaint at 677,fflf133-34.)
64.

Plaintiffs were forced to endure the concerts almost every day and/or night

of the summer and fall seasons. (Amended Complaint at 675, Iff 113-14, 116-19).
65.

Plaintiffs' property value has decreased as a result of the noise. (Amended

Complaint at 680, f 165)
66.

Plaintiffs complained numerous times to Barton and the City, but no volume

adjustment was made. (Amended Complaint at 677,ffl[136-40.)
67.

Plaintiffs complained for three years, but Defendants ignored Plaintiffs'

concerns and objections. (Amended Complaint at 666-70,fflj43-50; 668,fflf58-66; 669, If
72; 680,1fl[ 80, 82-83; 672, f 97; 674,fflf103-104; 677,1ft 136-40; 678,f150; 680; 1ft
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166-68; 6 8 1 4 173.)
68.

Despite Plaintiffs' continuous complaints, Defendants did nothing to abate

the noise level. (Amended Complaint at 668-669,fflf64, 67; 667,fflf136-37, 140.)
69.

Plaintiffs have been exasperated and enormously stressed by Defendants'

continuous disregard for their concerns. (Amended Complaint at 666, ^f 41; 677, ffl[ 13335.)
70.

The City passed amended Outdoor Music Ordinances in 2001, 4 2002, and

71.

Plaintiffs' continuing nuisance claim continues to present day (Amended

2003.5

Complaint at 684,1186.)
72.

Barton, d/b/a Mountain Town Stages, was the licensee under the

ordinances passed after the Outdoor Music Ordinance enacted in 2000. (R. at 243;
Amended Complaint at 682,1177; 684,1 186.)
73.

There are real and substantial harms associated with loud, continuous noise.

(R. at 655.) Such harms include: risk of cancer, stress, sleeping disorder, pregnancy
complications, hearing loss, and premature death. (R. at 655.)
74.

Plaintiffs have had to continue to suffer emotional and physical harm as a

result of Defendants' tortious conduct. (R. at 655.)
4

See Ordinance 01-16 (codified at Park City, Utah, Code § 4-8A (2001). (R. at
236-45). A copy of this ordinance is attached hereto as Exhibit H.
5

This ordinance remains in effect today.
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75.

On May 1, 2001 and June 22,2001, respectively, Plaintiffs filed a

Complaint and an Amended Complaint against Defendants. (R. at 1, 662.)
76.

Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint alleges common law nuisance (claim one),

statutory private nuisance (claim two), statutory public nuisance (claim three), continuing,
threatened or anticipatory nuisance (claim four), violation of local noise ordinances (claim
five), violation of permits (claim six), unconstitutionality of the Outdoor Music Ordinance
(claim seven), and taking of property (claim eight). (R. at 682-86.)
77.

In May and June 2001, Defendants filed separate motions for summary

judgment, and Plaintiffs timely responded, arguing that issues of material fact existed and
that Defendants were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (R. at 634; 638; 695-99;
731.) Plaintiffs also objected because no answers had been filed and Plaintiffs had not an
opportunity to conduct discovery. (R. at 731.)
78.

On June 3, 2002, after considerable delay,6 the trial court held a hearing on

the summary judgment motions, and Plaintiffs' and Defendants' counsel submitted the
motions on the briefs. (R. at 1304.)7
6

The trial court scheduled a hearing on the summary judgment motions for
October 2, 2001, but Barton's counsel requested a delay one day before the scheduled
hearing. The trial court then rescheduled the hearing; however, Barton's counsel again
objected. The trial court then rescheduled the hearing for April 18, 2002, but a
scheduling conflict with the trial court's schedule prevented the hearing from going
forth.
7

As noted in Plaintiffs' earlier pleading before the appellate court, several days
later the trial court forwarded the "complete" record to an out-of-state law school intern
for assistance in drafting a research "memo" which would presumably act as a guiding
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79.

In a Ruling and Order, dated August 7, 2002, the trial court dismissed

Plaintiffs5 first, second, third, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth causes of action against
Park City Municipal Corporation, and dismissed Plaintiffs' first, second, third, fifth, and
seventh causes of action against Barton and Park City Arts Council. (R. at 753-57.) Over
Plaintiffs' objections, the trial court's Order was issued before discovery was conducted
or answers were filed in the case. (R. at 731-32.)
80.

The trail court's ruling did not address Plaintiffs' fourth cause of action for

continuing, threatened or anticipatory nuisance but specifically denied Barton summary
judgment on Plaintiffs' sixth cause of action for violations of the permits. (R. at 753-57.)
81.

On August 26, 2002, Plaintiffs timely filed a Petition for Interlocutory

Appeal. (R. at 759.)
82.

On October 23, 2002, the Utah Supreme Court denied Plaintiffs' Petition

aid or otherwise influence the trial court's decision to grant or deny summary judgment
in this case. See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs/Appellants' Motion for Summary
Disposition, filed previously herein, at 13-14. Lincoln Nehring, the son of then Presiding
Judge (now Justice) Ronald E. Nehring, assisted the trial court at this phase of the case.
See id. For the reasons outlined in Plaintiffs' earlier pleading, this was inappropriate,
and Judge Hilder should have voluntarily recused himself from the case due to these
circumstances. Cf. Parker v. Conners Steel Co.. 855 F.2d 1510, 1525 (11th Cir. 1988)
("A law clerk, as well as a judge, should stay informed of circumstances that may raise
the appearance of impartiality or impropriety. And when such circumstances are present
appropriate actions should be taken.")
Plaintiffs further note that after they brought this issue to the attention of the
appellate court, the court docket in this case was altered or otherwise revised to remove
any reference that the case was handled in the manner noted.
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for Permission to Appeal. (R. at 799.)
83.

On December 23, 2002, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Clarification and/or

Reconsideration. (R. at 805.)
84.

Plaintiffs argued, in part, that reconsideration was appropriate because the

Outdoor Music Ordinance: (1) violates the Supremacy Clause, (2) violates the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause, (3) violates the Separation of Powers provision, (4) violates
the Due Process Clauses, (5) constitutes special legislation, (6) delegates a core
governmental, and (7) is repugnant to law. (R. at 810-19.)
85.

Defendants did not raise any substantive arguments against the

constitutional arguments raised in Plaintiffs' Motion for Clarification and/or
Reconsideration. (See R. at 836-39.)
86.

In a Ruling and Order, dated March 31, 2003, the trial court granted

Plaintiffs' Motion for Clarification but denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration,
stating that its earlier ruling was "final" and that Plaintiffs' arguments were "not
specifically briefed" when initially considered by the court. (R. at 877-78.)
87.

On April 15, 2003, Plaintiffs filed a second Motion for Reconsideration (or,

in the alternative, Certification). (R. at 880.)
88.

On May 9, 2003, Barton filed a second motion for summary judgment on

Plaintiffs' sixth cause of action for violations of the permits, arguing that he could not be
held liable because he merely "rented sound equipment" and he "never operated the
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equipment, or booked the bands." (R. at 901, ^ 4-5.) Barton's affidavit was attached to
this motion, which states, in pertinent part: ". . .1 began booking and promoting concerts
in the Park City area in November 1997. .. .In the Summer of 1999,1 was approached by
Park City Brewing Company & Smokehouse and [was] asked to provide sound and to
book musicians for the restaurant. .. .In late August 1999, Park City Brewing Company
& Smokehouse's permit was revoked by Park City." (R. at 913,fflf3, 6-7 (emphasis
added).)
89.

On May 27, 2003, Plaintiffs timely filed a Memorandum in Opposition to

Defendant Barton's Motion for Summary Judgment, attaching thereto a variety of sources
acknowledging the extent of Barton's involvement in the 1999 summer concerts,
including Barton's own affidavit and memorandum in support of his first motion for
summary judgment. (R. at 959-1016.)
90.

On May 29, 2003, Plaintiffs filed a Supplemental Memorandum in

Opposition to Defendant Barton's Motion for Summary Judgment, attaching thereto a
"Letter to the Editor" authored by Barton and published in the Park Record on September
1, 1999. (R. at 1917.) In that letter, Barton makes the following admission:
This summer I have arranged for musicians and provided the
sound amplification for Park City Brewing and Smokehouse
and the Town Lift Plaza. We were operating under a special
outdoor music permit provided by the city. Last week that
permit was rescinded due to complaints received from
residents (one individual in particular living near the plazaf)].
We were invited to a meeting at City Hall to discuss the
complaints and the future of outdoor amplified music. We
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were given a reprieve by the city and allowed to continue
under new restrictions . . . .
(R. at 1920-21; 1026 (emphasis added).)
91.

On June 16, 2003 Barton untimely filed a reply memorandum in support of

summary judgment and attached thereto Barton's supplemental affidavit asserting that he
"never . . . operated the sound equipment... [or] booked any performers . . . during the
summer of 1999." (R. at 1060; 1083, ff 3-4.)
92.

On June 23, 2003, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Strike Defendant Barton's

Supplemental Affidavit. (R. at 1119.) Plaintiffs argued that the supplemental affidavit
should be stricken because it: (1) is not permitted under Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of
Judicial Administration and Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) was
untimely filed under Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration; and (3)
contradicts Defendant Barton's prior statements and is riddled with untruths. (R. at 112328.)
93.

In a Minute Entry and Order, dated July 5, 2003, the trial court denied

Plaintiffs' second Motion for Reconsideration and denied "without prejudice" Plaintiffs'
Motion for Certification, pending a ruling on Defendant Barton's motion for summary
judgment. (R. at 1130.)
94.

Barton filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike

Barton's Supplemental Affidavit on July 10, 2003; however, Plaintiffs did not receive a
copy of that memorandum until the eve of the hearing scheduled for July 14, 2003. (R. at
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1133; 1177; 1230.)
95.

On July 14,2003, the trial court held a hearing on Barton's Motion for

Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendant Barton's Supplemental
Affidavit. (R. at 1139.) That hearing was specially scheduled to accommodate Barton's
counsel's impending birth. At the hearing, the trial court ruled from the bench to deny
Plaintiffs' motion and to grant Barton's motion. (R. at 1305:32:17-18.) The trial court
also instructed Barton's counsel to prepare an order consistent with the court's decisions
in the case. (R. at 1305:32-33:25, 1.) Barton's counsel made no request for an extension
of time in which to file the order. (R. at 1305:33:2.) At the close of the hearing, the trial
court instructed Plaintiffs to take their case to a different judge if the case is remanded
after appeal. (R. at 1305:32:22-23.)
96.

Barton's counsel failed to timely prepare the order as instructed by the trial

court and, thereafter, Plaintiffs' counsel prepared the order and presented it to trial court.
(R. at 1177; 1179; 1154.)
97.

On September 16, 2003, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Vacate and Reconsider

Summary Judgment Decision and to Renew Plaintiffs' Motion for Certification and
supporting memorandum, arguing that summary judgment should be reconsidered and
additional time for discovery should be granted because Plaintiffs' counsel had located a
witness whose testimony directly contradicts Barton's testimony set forth in his affidavit
for summary judgment. (R. at 1153.)
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98.

On October 16, 2003, Plaintiffs filed a Notice to Submit in connection with

their Motion to Vacate. (R. at 1226.)
99.

In the interim, Barton filed a proposed order and second proposed order,

and Plaintiffs timely objected to the form of those orders. (R. at 1177; 1229.)
100.

On October 18, 2003, the trial court signed Barton's second proposed order

without addressing Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate, which the trial court mistakenly believed
had not been submitted for decision. (R. at 1255; Minute Entry at 1256 ("The court
awaits a Notice to Submit regarding the subsequent motion that has apparently been
filed."))
101.

On December 5, 2003, Plaintiffs' counsel sent a letter to the trial court and

opposing counsel, clarifying that a Notice to Submit on Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate had
been filed before the trial court's October 18, 2003 Minute Entry, and requested a
decision on that motion "at [the trial court's] earliest convenience."
102.

On December 31, 2003, the trial court clerk called Plaintiffs' counsel to

request "courtesy copies" of all pleadings relevant to Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate, and
Plaintiffs' counsel delivered those copies to the trial court on January 5, 2004.
103.

On January 19, 2004, the trial court denied Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate but

did not explicitly resolve Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Certification. (R. at 1267.) The
court's ruling stated that "it was not clear whether the court previously ruled on plaintiffs
Fourth Cause of Action." (R. at 1267.) The court concluded by inviting Plaintiffs to file
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an order to certify the case for appeal if they did not believe that the court's order would
serve as such an order. (R. at 1268.)
104.

Plaintiffs thereafter filed a proposed order to certify the case for appeal. (R.

at 1279; 1289.)
105.

On March 29, 2004, the trial court declined to sign Plaintiffs' proposed

order, stating that "[t]he court believes its [January 19, 2004] Minute Entry and Order will
suffice as certification, if one is needed .. . and the court now determines that it will sign
no further orders unless the appellate court to which this matter is assigned remands the
matter as to the Fourth Cause of Action for any reason." (R. at 1295.) Plaintiffs
thereafter filed a timely notice of appeal. (R. at 1297.)
106.

On appeal, Plaintiffs moved for summary disposition for lack of

jurisdiction and requested a remand because the trial court had not issued a final
appealable order or judgment. (R. at 1304.) On September 10, 2004, the appellate court
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction and remanded for clarification by the trial court
as to the status of Plaintiffs' fourth cause of action. (R. at 1307.) Plaintiffs then filed a
Renewed Motion for Certification. (R. at 1313.)
107.

On December 15, 2004, while Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Certification

was pending, the trial court ruled that it "never clearly dismissed" Plaintiffs' fourth cause
of action and directed the parties to agree to dismissal of that action, without prejudice, or
to submit a proposed order certifying the matter for appeal. (R. at 1329.) Defendants
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then filed a motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs5 fourth cause of action (R. at
1331; 1368; 1374), and the trial court ordered the case stayed pending a resolution
attempt. (R. at 1340.) Plaintiffs then filed a combined motion to vacate the stay, enter an
order of certification, and stay Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (R. at 1355;
1350.)
108.

On June 5, 2005, the trial court issued a Minute Entry again noting that "it

has never clearly dismissed plaintiffs' Fourth Cause of Action" and further instructing
Plaintiffs to respond to Defendants' motion for summary judgment, and denying
Plaintiffs' motion to stay Defendant Barton's motion. (R. at 1400.) On June 27, 2005,
Plaintiffs timely filed their memorandum in opposition to Defendants' motion. (R. at
1403.) Defendants filed no reply memoranda (R. at 1417), and on June 12, 2005
Plaintiffs submitted the motion for decision. (R. at 1417.)
109.

On October 8, 2005, the trial court entered an order acknowledging that

"[Plaintiffs] may well be right" that uthe law does not bar the Fourth Cause of Action, and
[that] the court's August 2002 ruling was in error that must be reversed, so [that] it should
not justify dismissal of the remaining claim." (R. at 1420 (emphasis added).)
Nevertheless, without further explanation, the court concluded to "hold to its view" set
forth in its August 7, 2002 ruling and granted Defendant Barton's motion for summary
judgment as to Plaintiffs' fourth cause of action. (R. at 1420.) Plaintiffs appealed. (R. at
1422.)
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110. Plaintiffs now appeal the trial court's rulings as they pertain to Plaintiffs'
claims from 1999 forward.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court's grant of summary judgment should be reversed because issues of
material fact exist and, as a matter of law, the permits and Outdoor Music Ordinance do
not govern Plaintiffs' nuisance claims, the permits and Outdoor Music Ordinance do not
(and cannot) supercede state law governing Plaintiffs' claims, U.C.A. §§ 10-8-60 and 108-76 do not (and cannot) govern Plaintiffs' nuisance claims, the Outdoor Music
Ordinance is void and unconstitutional, no exhaustion of administrative remedies is
required for a per se takings claim and § 15-1-18 of the Park City Land Management
Code is inapplicable to this case.
The trial court's denial of Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration should be
reversed because the trial court committed clear error when declaring that its earlier ruling
was "final" and abused its discretion when denying Plaintiffs' motion because they had
inadequately briefed their constitutional arguments against the Outdoor Music Ordinance
when first considered by the trial court during summary judgment proceedings. Similarly,
the trial court's decision not to grant Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration on their
constitutional claims against the Ordinance should be reversed because the trial court
abused its discretion when declining not to consider Plaintiffs arguments because they had
not been briefed during an earlier summary judgment proceeding.
The trial court grant of summary judgment should be reversed because the answers
had not been filed and/or discovery had not been completed. Alternatively, summary
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judgment should be reversed because the trial court failed to address Plaintiffs' Rule 56(f)
objection on the issue of discovery when the trial court issued its first ruling granting
summary judgment.
The trial court's denial of Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendant Barton's
Supplemental Affidavit filed with his reply brief in support of summary judgment should
be reversed, and the trial court's findings that Barton did not contribute to the nuisance
complained of by Plaintiffs during 1999 should be set aside.
Plaintiffs/Appellants should be granted costs on appeal, pursuant to Rule 34 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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ARGUMENTS
I.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE ISSUES
OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST AND, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE
PERMITS AND OUTDOOR MUSIC ORDINANCE DO NOT GOVERN OR
OTHERWISE BAR PLAINTIFFS' NUISANCE CLAIMS
The trial court's ruling should be reversed and Plaintiffs' nuisance claims should

be reinstated because issues of material fact exist and the permits and Outdoor Music
Ordinance do not govern or otherwise bar Plaintiffs' nuisance claims as a matter of law.
Summary judgment is appropriate only when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). A party seeking summary judgment bears the
burden of establishing that no material fact remains for trial. See Gerbich v. Numed, Inc.,
1999 UT 37, f 12, 977 P.2d 1205. The evidence of the nonmoving party should be taken
as true, and all justifiable inferences should be drawn in its favor. £ee K&T, Inc. v.
Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 629 (Utah 1994). If, upon examination of the record, the court
finds that any material issue remains in dispute, the motion for summary judgment must
be denied. See id.
A. Issues of Material Facts Preclude Summary Judgment
Plaintiffs allege in their affidavits that outdoor music that is held within close
proximity to their home constitutes a nuisance resulting in an inability to enjoy normal
daily activities such as conversing, eating, resting, relaxing, reading and working. See
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Aff. of Whaley at 84,ffl[27-41, 71-88,102; see also Aff. of Reif at 64,ffl[27-41, 72-89.
The affidavit of Plaintiffs' noise expert further supports their claim of nuisance and
suggests that their complaints are in fact reasonable under the circumstances. See Aff. of
Sola at 104,ffif20-24. Defendants failed to file any affidavits challenging these affidavits.
Accordingly, an issue of material fact should have precluded the trial court's grant of
summary judgment.8 (See Ruling and Order at 754 ("the facts are not in dispute").
B. As a Matter of Law. Plaintiffs' 1999 Nuisance Claims Should be
Reinstated
As a matter of law, Plaintiffs' nuisance claims (arising in the summer of 1999)
should be reinstated because the permits do not govern or otherwise bar Plaintiffs' claims.
A permit constitutes a mere privilege to perform a certain act. A permit does not (and in
fact cannot) license the creation of a private nuisance. See 58 Am. Jur. 2d Nuisances §
454 (2002) ("[A] city cannot legally authorize anyone to create a private nuisance.").
Further, a permit "does not carry with it immunity for private injuries which may result
directly from the exercise of the powers and privileges conferred [thereunder]." IdL § 453.
Thus, even if the permit conditions are not violated, "no one can justify the commission of
a nuisance under . . . a license." Id. § 455.

8

The trial court also erred in granting summary judgment because no answers had
been filed at the time of the court's ruling. "When a trial court has for consideration a . .
. motion for summary judgment before the [answer] . . . has [been filed], the summary
judgment should not be granted unless it is clear that an issue of material fact can not be
presented." Beacher Higher Power Corp. v. Granados, 717 So.2d 563, 565 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1998); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).
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A permit does not insulate wrongdoers from suit for private nuisance, particularly
in this circumstance, where the alleged conduct unreasonably "interferes with a person's
[or persons'] [use or] enjoyment of property." Black's Law Dictionary 1094 (7th ed.
1999).9 Likewise, a permit does not insulate wrongdoers from suit for public nuisance
"when the private plaintiff has suffered damages different from those of society at large"
and the alleged conduct is "unreasonable." Van Erickson v. Sorensen. 877 P.2d 144, 149
(Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994). Defendants have
unreasonably interfered with Plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of their property (Amended
Complaint at 665-667, Tffi 28-50), Plaintiffs have also suffered damages different from
those of society at large (Amended Complaint at 683, ^ 184), and Defendants' conduct is
unreasonable insofar as it is "intentional, negligent, reckless, or ultrahazardous." Van
Erickson, 877 P.2d at 149; see also Amended Complaint at 684, ^ 184. Therefore, the
trial court erred as a matter of law in granting Defendants summary judgment on the basis

9

It can scarcely be argued that any habitual noise whether
produced by skilled musicians . . . [or otherwise], which is so
loud, continuous, insistent, and not inherent to the character
of the neighborhood, and unusual therein, that normal men,
women, and children, when occupying their own homes,
however distant, are seriously incommoded that they cannot
sleep, study, read, converse, or concentrate until it stops, is
not an unreasonable, unlawful, invasion of their rights.
Anne Arundel County Fish & Game Conservation Ass'n v. Carlucci, 573 A.2d 847, 85253 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990) (internal quotations & citation omitted), cert, denied. Fish
& Game Ass?n v. Carlucci, 580 A.2d 218 (Md. 1990).
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that the "permits govern" Plaintiffs' nuisance claims. (Ruling and Order at 755.)
Accordingly, Plaintiffs' 1999 nuisance claims should be reinstated.
C. As a Matter of Law, Plaintiffs9 2000 et seqq. Nuisance Claims Should be
Reinstated
As a matter of law, Plaintiffs' nuisance claims (arising in the summer of 2000 and
thereafter) should be reinstated because the Outdoor Music Ordinance does not govern or
otherwise bar Plaintiffs' claims. A municipal license does not (and in fact cannot) justify
the creation or maintenance of a private nuisance. See supra. Thus, the fact that a
municipality authorized certain acts does not insulate the actors from suit for private
nuisance. See 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 24(c) (1998); see also 58 Am. Jur. 2d Nuisances §
112(2002).
Similarly, an ordinance does not insulate wrongdoers from suit for private
nuisance, particularly in this circumstance, where the alleged conduct unreasonably
"interferes with a person's [or persons'] [use or] enjoyment of property." Black's Law
Dictionary 1094 (7th ed. 1999); see also infra n.9; accord Van Erickson. 877 P.2d at 149.
Defendants have unreasonably interfered with Plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of their
property. (Amended Complaint at 675-77,ffl[113-140.) Plaintiffs have also suffered
damages different from those of society at large (Amended Complaint at 683, f 184), and
Defendants' conduct is unreasonable insofar as it is "intentional, negligent, reckless, or
ultrahazardous." Van Erickson, 877 P.2d at 149; see also Amended Complaint at 684, f
184. Therefore, the trial court erred as a matter of law in granting Defendants summary
39

judgment on the basis that the Outdoor Music Ordinance "govern[s]" Plaintiffs' nuisance
claims. (Ruling and Order at 755.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs' 2000 et seqq. nuisance
claims should be reinstated. Cf. Hobbs v. Smith, 493 P.2d 1352, 1354-55 (Colo. 1972)
(rejecting claim that "when legislative authorities, by zoning ordinances, permit an act or
a particular use of land, a court has no authority to enjoin [or grant damages to an
aggrieved party as a result of] a public or private nuisance"); see also Davis v. J.C.
Nichols Co. & Harwood Operating Co., 761 S.W.2d 735, 742 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)
(holding that "noise pollution [and other effects of land use] may give rise to a common
law nuisance quite apart from any . .. ordinance - if the use which engenders them is
unreasonable").
II.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE
TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN RULING THAT THE
PERMITS AND OUTDOOR MUSIC ORDINANCE SUPERCEDE STATE
LAW GOVERNING PLAINTIFFS' NUISANCE CLAIMS
As a matter of law, the trial court's ruling should be reversed and Plaintiffs'

nuisance claims should be reinstated because the permits and Outdoor Music Ordinance
do not (and in fact cannot) supercede state law governing Plaintiffs' nuisance claims.
State law always preempts or abrogates conflicting local law. See City of Fort Worth v.
McDonald, 293 S.W.2d 256, 258 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) (holding that no city ordinance
could supercede state law). In this case, Plaintiffs' nuisance claims are recognized by
state statute and common law. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-38-1 (2002) (setting forth cause

40

of action for private nuisance)10; Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-803 (Supp. 2003) (setting forth
cause of action for public nuisance)11; see also Brough v. Ute Stampede Ass'n. 105 Utah
446, 142 P.2d 670, 673 (1943) (recognizing cause of action for continuing or anticipatory
nuisance).
The permits and Outdoor Music Ordinance, insofar as they are intended to directly
or indirectly bar Plaintiffs' nuisance claims, conflict with state statute and common law
governing Plaintiffs' nuisance claims, and therefore they are void. See Citvof Fort
Worth. 293 S.W.2d at 258: see also Allgood v. Larson. 545 P.2d 530, 532 (Utah 1976)
("The . . . ordinance . . . cannot exceed . . . state law."). Thus, the trial court's ruling that
the permits and Outdoor Music "rule" and Sections 78-38-1 and 76-10-80312 "do not
apply" is clear error and Plaintiffs' nuisance claims should be reinstated. (Ruling and
Order at 755.)13

10

Section 78-38-1 provides: "an action [for private nuisance] maybe brought by
any person whose property is injuriously affected, or whose personal enjoyment is
lessened by the nuisance." Utah Code Ann. § 78-38-1(6) (2002).
11

Section 76-10-803 provides a cause of action for "[a] public nuisance . . .
which act or omission . . . annoys, injures, or endangers the comfort, repose, health, or
safety of three or more persons . . . or . . . in any way renders three or more persons
insecure in life or use of property." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-803(l)(a), (e) (2003).
12

The trial court's ruling refers to § 78-10-803; however, the correct section is
§ 76-10-803.
13

In sum, as one court recognized: "The antagonism between the ordinance and
the law is as emphatic as that between life and death. . . .The law of the state must
prevail." City of Fort Worth. 293 S.W.2d at 259 (internal quotations omitted). The same
holds true for the permits. Cf. kL Therefore, Plaintiffs' nuisance claims should be
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III.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE
TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN RULING THAT
PLAINTIFFS' COMMON LAW AND STATUTORY NUISANCE CLAIMS
ARE BARRED UNDER U.C.A. §§ 10-8-60 AND 10-8-76
The trial court's ruling that Plaintiffs' common law and statutory nuisance claims

are barred under Sections 10-8-60 and 10-8-76 of the Utah Code should be reversed
because the trial court misinterpreted those statutes and incorrectly dismissed Plaintiffs'
nuisance claims. "The correct interpretation of a statute is a question of law and is
reviewed for correctness." Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1357 (emphasis added). Thus, whether
the trial court erred in barring Plaintiffs' nuisance claims under Sections 10-8-60 and 108-76 is a question of law, which this Court reviews for correctness. See id.
Plaintiffs' right to sue for nuisance is recognized by state statute, and the City has
no authority to circumvent this right which is protected by the state and federal
constitutions. Specifically, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-38-1 and 76-10-803 set forth the
statutory basis for a nuisance claim and Utah law recognizes that these statutes apply to a
continuing or threatened nuisance. See Brough, 142 P.2d at 673. The Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the Utah and United States Constitutions protect and preserve
the statutory right to sue for nuisance, which simply cannot be stripped from Plaintiffs by
a mere utterance by the City that the complained of activity does not constitute a nuisance,
whether per se or otherwise. This rule of law was recognized many decades ago in

reinstated as a matter of law.
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Eastern Oil Refining Co. v. Court of Burgesses ofWallingford, 11 Conn. Supp. 285
(Conn. Super 1942), 1942 WL 901, *6, affd 36 A.2d 586 (Conn. 1944), where the court
therein held that "what is not a nuisance cannot be conclusively declared [by a municipal
corporation] as such because it is a question of fact." A leading municipal law treatise
supports the same conclusion, stating that "[w]hether something is in law a nuisance is a
judicial question and it cannot be foreclosed by any determination of local governing
body or board." 2 Antieau on Local Gov't Law § 29.07[2], at 29-70.
Further, nothing relied upon in the trial court's prior ruling; in particular, neither
section 10-8-60 nor section 10-8-76 of the Utah Code changes this. Indeed those sections
are entirely inapplicable to this case, and the trial court's prior reliance on those sections
to dismiss Plaintiffs' nuisance claims was error. Sections 10-8-60 and 10-8-76 provide no
legal basis whatsoever for granting Defendants' motions for summary judgment, and as a
matter of law those decisions should be reversed.
A. Section 10-8-60 Does Not Apply
Title 10 of the Utah Code Ann. grants limited authority to cities, and any authority
not expressly granted thereunder is expressly reserved to the state. Pursuant to the powers
granted under Title 10, cities have the authority to declare and abate nuisances. See Utah
Code Ann. § 10-8-60 (2003). The plain and unambiguous language of Section 10-8-60
allows for nothing more: "[Cities] may declare what shall be a nuisance, and abate the
same, and impose fines upon persons who may create, continue or suffer nuisances to
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exist." Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-60 (2003). The City in this case did not "declare" a
nuisance; nor did it "abate" a nuisance so declared. Rather, the City merely asserted that a
particular activity, i.e., outdoor music, is not a nuisance.14
Section 10-8-60 does not grant authority to a city to declare that something is not a
nuisance, or, worse, cut off a claimant's statutorily recognized claim for nuisance as the
City asserts in this case. Indeed these principals are well recognized in the law. See 6A
McQuillin on Municipal Corporations § 24.67, at 198 (3d ed. 1997) ("A municipal
corporation cannot legalize as not a nuisance that which is a nuisance per se or at common
law, per accidens or in fact, or under state statute."). See also Weber v. Springville City,
725 P.2d 1360, 1367 (Utah 1986) (holding that city ordinance, enacted under Section 108-60, cannot prevent civil nuisance actions); accord Rantapaa v. Black Hills Chair Lift
Co., 2001 SD 111, Tf1f 23, 25, 633 N.W.2d 196 (supporting same). Simply stated, section
10-8-60 provides no support for summary judgment; its application is limited to
circumstances not presented by this case; and well established law requires that Plaintiffs'
nuisance claims survive Defendants' motions for summary judgment.

14

For clarification, the City actually stated that outdoor music "is not a nuisance
per se" However, for brevity and clarity, Plaintiffs do not focus on the City's "per se"
qualification because that is entirely irrelevant because Plaintiffs' nuisance claims are not
per se claims.
A separate reason for reversal is that the trial court erred in focusing on nuisance
per se, because Plaintiffs claims are based on nuisance in fact. See Bielecki v. City of
Port Arthur, 12 S.W.2d 976, 977-78 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929) (limiting city's authority
to declare what is a nuisance per se, not what is a nuisance in fact).
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B. Section 10-8-76 Does Not Apply
Section 10-8-76 has no application to this case because it too pertains only to
abatement and does not grant authority to cities to circumvent a plaintiffs right to sue for
nuisance by declaring that a particular act is not a nuisance. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-876 (2003). Section 10-8-76 merely states: "[Cities] may prevent the ringing of bells,
blowing of horns and bugles, crying of goods by auctioneers and others, and the making
of other noises, for the purposes of business, amusement or otherwise, and prevent all
performances and devices tending to the collection of persons on the streets or sidewalks
of the city." Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-76 (2003). The City did not abate or even "prevent"
any of the things that are specifically limited to city streets or sidewalks in Section 10-876. Rather, the City merely asserted that a particular activity, i.e., outdoor music that is
played on "private" and not on public property, is not a nuisance.
Section 10-8-76 does not grant authority to cities to abate nuisances on private
property. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-76 (2003). Neither does it allow cities to abate
private nuisances. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-76 (2003). See also 2 Antieau on Local
Gov't Law § 29.07[1], at 29-67 (stating that u[a] private nuisance . . . is not subject to
governmental abatement"). Further, even if it allowed these things, it does not grant
authority to cities to declare that something is not a nuisance and thereby extinguish a
claimant's statutorily recognized claim for nuisance. Simply stated, Section 10-8-76
provides no support for the City's actions herein, and its application is limited to
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circumstances not presented by this case. Plaintiffs' nuisance claims survive Defendants'
motions for summary judgment as a matter of well settled law, and the trial court erred in
ruling to the contrary.
IV.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE
OUTDOOR MUSIC ORDINANCE IS VOID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL
As a matter of law, the Outdoor Music Ordinance should be stricken as void and

unconstitutional and Plaintiffs' nuisance claims should be reinstated. Whether the trial
court erred in ruling that the Outdoor Music Ordinance is constitutional, involves a
question of law, which this Court reviews "for correctness, giving no deference to the trial
court." Wood, 1999 UT App. 323, % 4. As explained herein, the Outdoor Music
Ordinance is void and unconstitutional because it: (A) violates the Supremacy Clause and
constitutes a per se taking in violation of the Takings Clause; (B) violates the Separation
of Powers provision; (C) violates the Due Process Clauses; (D) constitutes special
legislation; (E) delegates a core municipal function; and (F) is repugnant to law.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully ask this Court to reverse the trial court by declaring
the Outdoor Music Ordinance void and unconstitutional and reinstating Plaintiffs'
nuisance claims.
A. The Outdoor Music Ordinance Violates the Supremacy Clause and
Constitutes a per se Taking in Violation of the Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause
The Outdoor Music Ordinance is unconstitutional because it violates the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution and its parallel under the Utah Constitution.
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The Supremacy Clause states that federal law "shall be the supreme Law of the Land."
U.S. Const, art. VI, cl. 2; see also Utah Const, art. I, § 3 (stating same). Plaintiffs5
property rights are protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Fifth
Amendment provides, in relevant part, that "[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation." U.S. Const, amend. V. The Fifth Amendment is
made applicable to states and their political subdivisions through the Fourteenth
Amendment, which prohibits any state or political subdivision from "depriving] any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." See First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles. 428 U.S. 304, 310 n.4,107 S.
Ct. 2378, 2383 n.4, 96 L. Ed. 2d 250, 260-61 n.4 (1987); see also Utah Const, art. I, § 7
("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.").
Plaintiffs' rights are "supreme" and therefore are superior to any other rights or interests
asserted by Defendants in this case. U.S. Const, art. VI; see also McOuade v. Tuscon
Tiller Apartments. Ltd.. 543 P.2d 150, 152 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975) (holding plaintiffs
property rights of use and enjoyment outweigh defendants' interest in holding loud
concerts); accord Hude v. Commonwealth. 423 A.2d 15, 17 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980)
(stating that playing of "loud music . . . is not a fundamental right"). Accordingly, it
would be contrary to the constitutional guarantees afforded Plaintiffs "if through . . .
ordinance . .. [their] property could be taken, injured, or destroyed . . . for the benefit of
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[another person or entity]." Mazeika v. American Oil Co.. 118 A.2d 142, 143 (Pa. 1955)
(internal quotations & citation omitted).
The Outdoor Music Ordinance violates the Supremacy Clause because, as the City
has asserted throughout this litigation, the Ordinance -- either directly or indirectly -forecloses Plaintiffs' ability to sue under state and federal law. Park City Municipal
Corporation cannot foreclose Plaintiffs' rights to sue under state and federal law. See
Utah Const, art. I, § 1 ("All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and
defend their lives and liberties"); Utah Const, art. I, § 11 ("[E]very person, for an injury
done to . . . [his or her] property . . . , shall have remedy by due course of law").
Furthermore, to foreclose Plaintiffs' right to sue under state and federal law constitutes a
per se taking requiring just compensation under the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. See U.S. Const, amend. V; U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1; Utah Const, art. I,
§ 22; Utah Const, art. I, § 7; see also Bormann v. Board of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309,
321 (Iowa 1998) (holding that ordinance forbidding claim under state law constitutes
unconstitutional taking of right to bring nuisance action), cert, denied, Girres v. Bormann,
525 U.S. 1172, 119 S. Ct 1096, 143 L. Ed. 2d 96 (1999). Following the argument
asserted and defended by the City throughout this litigation, the Outdoor Music Ordinance
is unconstitutional because it violates the Supremacy Clause of both the U.S. and Utah
Constitutions and constitutes a per se taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause.
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B. The Ordinance Violates the Separation of Powers Provision
The Outdoor Music Ordinance constitutes an unconstitutional violation of the
Separation of Powers provision. Under the Separation of Powers, government is divided
into three distinct branches: "the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial." Utah
Const, art. V, § 1. Under this provision, "no person charged with the exercise of powers
properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any function appertaining
to either of the others." Id. Because Park City Municipal Corporation is a political
subdivision of the state, see Utah Const, art. XI, § 1 (recognizing local governments), it
must abide by the constitution's Separation of Powers provision and may not pass
ordinances that are "repugnant to law." Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-84(1) (2003).
But Park City Municipal Corporation has followed neither federal nor state law in
this case. Park City Municipal Corporation has argued throughout this litigation that the
Outdoor Music Ordinance forecloses Plaintiffs5 ability to sue under state and federal law.
Park City Municipal Corporation cannot foreclose Plaintiffs' rights to sue under state and
federal law. See supra Section III. Yet Park City Municipal Corporation has attempted to
play judge and jury in this case by deceiving the trial court that the City has the authority
to foreclose Plaintiffs' nuisance claims. Park City Municipal Corporation has no right to
dictate the viability or validity of Plaintiffs' nuisance claims, because the questions posed
by Plaintiffs' claims are specifically reserved for the Judiciary through the Separation of
Powers provision. See Weber. 725 P.2d at 1367; see also Begnaud v. Camel Contractors,
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Inc., 721 So. 2d 550, 554 (La. Ct. App. 1998) ("The determination of the existence of a
nuisance is a question of fact" to be determined by the "trier of fact"). Accordingly, the
Outdoor Music Ordinance should be stricken as an unconstitutional violation of the
Separation of Powers provision set forth in the Utah Constitution.
C. The Ordinance Violates the Due Process Clauses
The Outdoor Music Ordinance constitutes an unconstitutional violation of the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Due Process Clauses
guarantee that "No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." The Outdoor Music Ordinance is unconstitutional because it violates the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution and its parallel under the Utah Constitution.
The Supremacy Clause states that federal law "shall be the supreme Law of the Land."
U.S. Const, art. VI, cl. 2; see also Utah Const, art. I, § 3 (stating same).; see also U.S.
Const, amend. XIV; see also Utah Const, art. I, § 7. Park City Municipal Corporation
provided no notice that it intended to restrict Plaintiffs' constitutionally protected rights to
sue under state and common law. In addition, Park City Municipal Corporation provided
no opportunity to be heard regarding its intention to restrict Plaintiffs' constitutionally
protected rights to sue under state and common law. Accordingly, the Outdoor Music
Ordinance violates Plaintiffs' guarantees afforded by the Due Process Clauses and should
be stricken as unconstitutional.
D. The Ordinance Constitutes Special Legislation
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The Outdoor Music Ordinance constitutes unconstitutional special legislation. The
Utah Constitution states: "No private or special law shall be enacted where a general law
can be applicable." Utah Const. Art. VI, § 26. "[SJpecial legislation relates either to
particular persons, places, or things or to persons, places or things which, though not
particularized, are separated by any method of selection from the whole class to which the
law might, but for such legislation, be applied." Colman v. State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622,
636 (Utah 1990) (citation omitted).
The Outdoor Music Ordinance is not a general law because it does not "appl[y] to
and operate[] uniformly upon all members of a[] class of persons, places, or things." Id.
Rather, it specifically authorizes and attempts to insulate Barton, the "program manager"
and "sound technician," from creating and maintaining a nuisance at two venues near
Plaintiffs' home. (See R. at 224 (identifying "program manager" and "sound
technician"); see also R. at 223 (identifying two venues).) The Outdoor Music Ordinance
also specifically recognizes Park City Arts Council15 as the "licensee of the events." (R. at
832.) The Outdoor Music Ordinance does not "appl[y] equally to all persons embraced in

15

At the time this lawsuit began, Park City Arts Council was a dissolved nonprofit corporation for over ten years, and was unlicensed before, during and after
enactment of the Outdoor Music Ordinance. (R. at 52; 136.) To be sure, Park City Arts
Council was a corporation that was involuntarily dissolved on 12-31-1985. See
www.utah.gov/serv/bes (R. at 136.) Later, that name was registered as a DBA to JoAnna
Charnes. However, Charnes's DBA expired on 3-9-1999. Then, after this lawsuit was
filed, Attorney Dwayne Vance registered the name as a DBA. An ordinance authorizing
such an organization is "merely a scheme to private individuals for pecuniary gain" and
therefore is void. Brought 142 P.2d at 673.
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a class founded upon some natural, intrinsic, or constitutional distinction" but "confers
particular privileges or imposes peculiar disabilities, or burdensome conditions in the
exercise of a common right; upon a class of persons arbitrarily selected, from the general
body of those who stand in precisely the same relation to the subject of the law." Cohnan,
795 P.2d at 636.
Park City Municipal Corporation's classification and designation is unreasonable
because it allows two specific entities; namely, Barton and Park City Arts Council, to
operate in a harmful manner not allowed by others in the community. In so doing, the
City attempts to insulate Barton and Park City Arts Council from suit by specifically
exempting their conduct from the City's general noise ordinance. See R. at 227. The
City's classification is also unreasonable because it requires Plaintiffs and others similarly
situated to contend with and to bear the burdens of Defendants' tortious conduct. This
form of discrimination (and in this case it is a dual form of discrimination based on who
the ordinance benefits and who it burdens) is what the special legislation provision was
intended to prevent. See Coleman 795 P.2d at 636 (discussing standard for reviewing
special legislation argument). Accordingly, the Outdoor Music Ordinance should be
stricken as unconstitutional special legislation.
E. The Ordinance Delegates a Core Municipal Function
The Outdoor Music Ordinance constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of a core
function or power to a private person or entity; namely, Barton and Park City Arts
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Council. The Utah Constitution prohibits municipalities from delegating "any municipal
function." Utah Const, art. VI, § 28: see also Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 848
(Utah 1994) ("Core functions or powers of the various branches of government are clearly
nondelegable under the Utah Constitution."). "[Governmental functions of a municipal
corporation include the promotion of public peace, health, safety, and morals." 56 Am.
Jur. 2d Municipal Corporations, Etc. § 183 (2000). Policing noisome activity, enforcing
noise ordinances, and responding to noise complaints all constitute governmental
functions. See Decker v. Fish. 126 F. Supp. 2d 342, 346 (D. Vt. 2000) ("[T]here can be
little question that police work is a quintessential governmental function.").
Here, the City delegated its governmental function to police noisome activities to
Barton and Park City Arts Council. The City accomplished its delegation by allowing
Barton and Park City Arts Council to self-govern their activities under the Ordinance,
and, in doing so, exempted Defendants' activities from the general noise ordinance,
thereby effectively and entirely eliminating the City's policing role. (Amended Complaint
at 672, T| 91.) In furtherance of its delegation, the City bought, purchased and/or
otherwise acquired a decibel meter reader, which the City gave or lent to Barton and Park
City Arts Council to use in their respective roles as regulators of the noise which they
created. (Amended Complaint at 672, U 91.) As further evidence of its delegation, the
City stopped responding to Plaintiffs' noise complaints and instead directed Barton to
"mediate" Plaintiffs' concerns. (Amended Complaint at 677-78, Iffi 141-43, 153.) As
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explained herein, the City's actions constitute an unconstitutional delegation of a core
governmental function or power in violation of the Utah Constitution. Therefore, the
Outdoor Music Ordinance should be stricken as unconstitutional.
F. The Ordinance is Repugnant to Law
The Outdoor Music Ordinance is repugnant to law. Under our hierarchal system of
government, Park City Municipal Corporation is a political subdivision of the state. See
Utah Const, art. XI, § 1 (recognizing local governments). As such, the City must abide by
the constitution and may not pass ordinances that are "repugnant to law." Utah Code
Ann. § 10-8-84(1) (2003). Section 10-8-84 of the Utah Code states that cities
may pass all ordinances and rules, and make all regulations,
not repugnant to law, necessary for carrying into effect or
discharging all powers and duties conferred by this chapter,
and as are necessary and proper to provide for the safety and
preserve the health, and promote the prosperity, improve the
morals, peace and good order, comfort, and convenience of
the city and its inhabitants, and for the protection of property
in the city.
Id. (emphasis added). As explained herein, the Outdoor Music Ordinance is "repugnant
to law" because it: (1) violates the Supremacy Clauses of both the U.S. and Utah
Constitutions and constitutes a per se taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause, (2) violates the Separation of Powers provision set forth in article V, section 1, of
the Utah Constitution, (3) violates the Due Process Clauses of both the U.S. and Utah
Constitutions, (4) constitutes special legislation in violation of article VI, section 26, of
the Utah Constitution, and (5) delegates a core governmental function or power, in
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violation of article VI, section 28, of the Utah Constitution. In addition, the Outdoor
Music Ordinance is void because it infringes upon Plaintiffs' fundamental rights to use
and enjoy their property,16 and it fails to satisfy minimal scrutiny and is overinclusive.17
Therefore, the Ordinance should be stricken as void.18
16

"[W]henever an ordinance infringes on a fundamental right, it must be justified
by a compelling government interest." 62 CJ.S. Municipal Corporations § 285 (1999);
see also 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal Corporations, Etc. § 315 (2000). The City has no
compelling interest in allowing loud, amplified music to infringe upon Plaintiffs'
fundamental rights. Thus, the Outdoor Music Ordinance is void.
17

Minimal scrutiny requires that a rational relationship exist between the
governmental means (i.e., the Ordinance) and the governmental ends sought to be
achieved (i.e., music in the lower Main Street area). See State v. Powell, 496 So. 2d
1188 (Fla. 1988). There is no rational relationship between the Outdoor Music
Ordinance and the governmental ends sought because the Ordinance allows an excessive
decibel level to substantially and unreasonably impact nearby property owners. In short,
the Ordinance allows much more noise than is necessary to accomplish its purpose.
Thus, the Ordinance is overinclusive and void. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60,
38 S.Ct. 16(1917).
18

Notwithstanding numerous Constitutional provisions discussed herein, history
and tradition are replete with support for Plaintiffs' position in this case. See 1 Richard
R. Powell, Powell on Real Property § 2.02, at 2-3 n.l (Michael Allan Wolf, ed., 2001)
(the right to use and enjoy property is one of the essential sticks in the bundle of rights);
8 Thompson on Real Property, Thomas Edition § 67.03, at 92 (David A. Thomas ed.,
1994) (stating that the ancient Latin maxim', "sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas"
teaches that one should not use one's land so as to injure the property of another);
McQuade, 543 P.2d at 153 (applying ancient Latin maxim, "sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas" to loud concerts and affirming trial court's decision to enjoin conduct harmful to
nearby residents); Aesop's Fables 124 (Wordsworth Ed. Ltd., 1994) (teaching lesson,
through the story of the "The Grasshopper and The Owl," that those who repeatedly
disregard consideration for others' comforts deserve their just deserts). In short, "[n]o
man has a right to take from another the enjoyment of the reasonable and essential
comforts of life, and, consequently, cannot commit acts on . . . premises calculated to
interfere with the reasonable enjoyment by others of their home." Anderson v. Guerrin
Sky-Way Amusement Co.. 29 A.2d 682, 684 (Pa. 1943). To the extent that the
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V.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE REVERSED AS TO PLAINTIFFS'
TAKINGS CLAIM BECAUSE THERE IS NO EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES REQUIRED FOR A PER SE TAKINGS
CLAIM AND P.C.L.M.C. § 15-1-18 IS INAPPLICABLE TO THIS CASE
As a matter of law, the trial court's ruling as to Plaintiffs' eighth cause of action for

takings should be reversed because Plaintiffs are not required to exhaust administrative
remedies and Section 15-1-18 of the Park City Land Management Code does not apply to
this case. As stated above, the Outdoor Music Ordinance constitutes a per se taking of
Plaintiffs' rights to sue under state and federal law. There is no exhaustion of
administrative remedies required for a per se takings claim. See generally
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church. 482 U.S. at 319-21. Accordingly, the trial
court erred as a matter of law in dismissing Plaintiffs' takings claim. Therefore,
Plaintiffs' takings claim should be reinstated and, if the Court invalidates the Outdoor
Music Ordinance, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court also remand this issue to
the trial court for a determination of damages19 that occurred before the ultimate

interference is committed under the guise of a permit or ordinance, that so-called
authorizing instrument is void and unconstitutional and all the actor(s) thereunder are
accountable for their conduct.
Defendants herein "set[] in motion the forces which . . . cause[d] the [nuisance]"
complained of, and they "participate^] in the creation or maintenance of a nuisance." 58
Am. Jur. 2d Nuisances 112 (2002). In so doing, Defendants contributed to, aided and
abetted in the commission of a nuisance. 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 74 (1998). But for
Defendants' conduct, the nuisance would not have occurred. Accordingly, Defendants
should be held responsible.
19

In this context, the damage constitutes the many years Plaintiffs were prevented from
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invalidation of the challenged legislation. Id.
In addition, Section 15-1 -18 of the Park City Land Management Code is
inapplicable to this case. Section 15-1-18 states that "[a]ny Owner of private Property
who believes that his/her Property is proposed to be "taken" by an otherwise Final Action
of the City may Appeal the City's decision to the Takings Appeal Board within thirty (30)
days after the decision is made." Utah, Park City, Land Management Code § 15-1-18(C)
(emphasis added), cited in full at R. 649. An "Owner" is defined as "[a]ny [p]erson, or
group of [p]ersons, having record title to the [p]roperty sought be developed or
subdivided and [his or her] agent. I d § 15-15-1.132. Plaintiffs (either in whole or in
part) are not the record owners, and they do not seek to develop or subdivide their
property through this action. Further, a "Final Action" is defined as "[t]he later of a final
vote or written decision on a matter." Id § 15-15-1.74. Matters which are covered by
Section 15-1-18 include applications for amendments to the Land Management Code and
Zoning Map. See id. § 15-1-7(A). Plaintiffs' case is not premised on an application to
amend the Land Management Code and Zoning Map. Thus, Section 15-1-18 has no
bearing in this case. Accordingly, the trial court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs' takings
claim because they "failed to exhaust all administrative remedies available . . . to them

enforcing their constitutional rights and the legal fees Plaintiffs incurred in attempting to
enforce their rights, including those fees incurred on this appeal. Cf First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church, 482 U.S. at 319-21.
In addition, damages should also be assessed for the resulting nuisance.
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under §15-1-18." (Ruling and Order at 757.)
VI.

THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS FOR
RECONSIDERATION ON THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
AGAINST THE ORDINANCE CONSTITUTES CLEAR ERROR
BECAUSE THE COURT'S EARLIER RULING WAS NOT "FINAL"
The trial court committed clear error when denying Plaintiffs' Motions for

Reconsideration. The trial court's denial constitutes clear error because the court
erroneously ruled that is prior ruling was "a final, formal judgment." (Ruling and Order
at 878.) A final judgment is "[a] court's last action that settles the rights of the parties and
disposes of all issues in controversy, except for an award of costs (and, sometimes,
attorney's fees) and enforcement of judgment." Black's Law Dictionary 847 (7th ed.
1999). An order that does not "dispose of all parties and claims to an action," including a
determination of attorney fees, is not a final order." Bradbury, 2000 UT 50, f 10
(emphasis added).
The trial court's August 7, 2002 Ruling and Order did not dispose off all parties
and claims to this action. The trial court's August 7, 2002 Ruling and Order also did not
"direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or
parties" pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Utah R. Civ. P.
54(b) (emphasis added). Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Motions for Reconsideration were a
reasonable and permissible means of asking the trial court to revise its earlier grant of
summary judgment. See generally Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1185 (Utah 1983),
subsequent history omitted. Therefore, the trial court's decision to deny Plaintiffs
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reconsideration on the basis that the August 7, 2002 Ruling and Order represented a final
judgment is clear error and should be reversed. See Sears. Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey,
351 U.S. 427, 437, 76 S. Ct. 895, 900-01, 100 L. Ed. 1297 (1956) ("The District Court
cannot, in exercise of it discretion, treat as 'final' that which is not 'final' . . ..").
VII.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING
PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION ON THEIR
CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS AGAINST THE OUTDOOR MUSIC
ORDINANCE
The standard governing a trial court's decision to grant or deny a Rule 54(b)

motion for reconsideration is as follows:
A court can consider several factors in determining the
propriety of reconsidering a prior ruling. These may include,
but are not limited to, when (1) the matter is presented in a
'different light' or under 'different circumstances;' (2) there
has been a change in the governing law; (3) a party offers new
evidence; (4) 'manifest injustice' will result if the court does
not reconsider the prior ruling; (5) a court needs to correct its
own errors; and (6) an issue was inadequately briefed when
first contemplated by the court.
Trembly, 884 P.2d at 1311. This rule serves to ensure that cases are justly and
expeditiously resolved in the trial court, Timm, 851 P.2d at 1185, because those courts are
"responsible for carrying [cases] forward as efficiently and expeditiously as possible
consistent with fairness and thoroughness in administering justice." Hanks v.
Christensen. 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 P.2d 564, 566 (Utah 1960).
Plaintiffs' Motions for Reconsideration were properly before the trial court under
all but the second and third provisions noted above. (R. at 805-33; 882-90). The trial
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court, nevertheless, denied Plaintiffs reconsideration because they had not adequately
briefed their constitutional challenges against the Outdoor Music Ordinance when first
considered by the court during summary judgment. (Minute Entry and Order at 1130.)
A court that fails to exercise its discretion to address a matter inadequately briefed
when initially considered, will result in reversal on appeal, so long as the error is not
harmless. C£ State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58,f33 n.4, 27 P.3d 1115 (stating that an abuse of
discretion results when the trial court "exceed[s] the range of discretion allowed for [by
law]"); see also Holladav Duplex Mgmt. Co. v. Howells. 2002 UT App. 125, f 1 n.2, 47
P.3d 104 (discussing harmless error). Reversible error (or harmful error) is "[a]n error
that affects a party's substantive rights or the case's outcome." Black's Law Dictionary
563 (7th ed. 1999).
The trial court's decision in this case is harmful because it affects Plaintiffs'
substantive and constitutionally protected rights, and it acts as a further bar to prevent
Plaintiffs from pursuing their nuisance claims against all Defendants involved herein.
Because the trial court exceeded the range of discretion allowed for by law, c£ Mead.
2001 UT 58 at ^ 33 n.4, and thereby committed harmful error, the trial court's denial of
Plaintiffs' Motions for Reconsideration should be reversed.
VIII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE ANSWERS WERE FILED OR
DISCOVERY COULD BE INITIATED OR COMPLETED
Summary judgment should generally be denied before the answers are filed and
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discovery is completed, lest it be shown with absolute certainty that no issue of material
fact exists. See generally Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The various affidavits on file by
Plaintiffs absolutely refute Defendants' assertions that no nuisance existed or was
otherwise created by Defendants' past and continued conduct. (See Aff. of Whaley at 84102; Aff. of Reif at 64-82: see also Aff. of Sola at 104-11; Aff. of Cline at 1164-76.)
Accordingly, the trial court's rulings should be reversed to the extent they pertain to any
unanswered claims. Likewise, the trial court's rulings should be reversed as to all claims
because a material fact exists which should have precluded summary judgment.
During the first round of summary judgment motions Plaintiffs argued that
summary judgment was inappropriate, in part, because they had not had an opportunity to
initiate or complete discovery. (R. at 731.) The trial court's subsequent ruling failed to
address this issue. (See R. at 753-57.) When a trial court does not rule on a Rule 56(f)
motion, thereby failing to exercise its discretion, "the issue of whether or not it should
have presents a question which is subject to de novo review." Crossland Sav., 877 P.2d at
1243 n.4 (Utah 1994) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Plaintiffs affidavits cited
above set forth the basis for their nuisance claims, and Plaintiffs should have been given
an opportunity to develop their case further through discovery documentation and/or
deposition testimony from Defendants and others because that potentially could produce
evidence further supporting Plaintiffs' claims or that could lead to evidence suggesting
that Defendants' rendition of the facts was false. Similarly, Plaintiffs' Rule56(f) Motion
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should have been granted as it pertained to Defendant Barton's violation of the 1999
permits. For these reasons, the trial court erred in issuing summary judgment before the
answers were filed and discovery could be initiated or completed.
IX.

THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISIONS TO DENY PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
TO STRIKE BARTON'S SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT AND TO GRANT
BARTON'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFFS'
CLAIM FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE 1999 PERMIT SHOULD BE
REVERSED
The trial court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike

Barton's Supplemental Affidavit, and therefore that decision should be reversed. "A
motion to strike . . . is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard." Rivera. 2000 UT
36, ^f 7. The trial court's decision should be reversed because (1) Barton's supplemental
affidavit is not permitted under Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration
and Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, (2) the supplemental affidavit was
untimely filed, (3) Defendant Barton filed the supplemental affidavit after the Notice to
Submit had already been submitted to the trial court, (4) Plaintiffs were unfairly surprised
since they received Defendant Barton's reply memo in support of his supplemental
affidavit only one day prior to the hearing on Barton's Motion for Summary Judgment
and they did not have time to conduct proper discovery to rebut it, (5) Plaintiffs had
requested additional time to conduct discovery, but the trial court denied them that
opportunity, (6) Plaintiffs subsequently found a witness whose testimony directly
contradicts the statements made in Defendant Barton's Supplemental Affidavit, but they
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were prevented from deposing that person because the trial court denied Plaintiffs' Rule
56(f) motion, even though Barton's counsel had failed to draft and timely file a proposed
order for the court to sign after the court had ruled from the bench to grant Defendant
Barton's motion, (7) the supplemental affidavit contradicts Defendant Barton's prior
statements and is riddled with untruths, and (8) fairness and justice would not be served
unless Plaintiffs are allowed an opportunity to overcome the statements made in
Defendant Barton's supplemental affidavit.
X.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS THAT BARTON DID NOT
CONTRIBUTE TO THE NUISANCE COMPLAINED OF BY PLAINTIFFS
DURING 1999 SHOULD BE SET ASIDE AS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS OR,
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, UNDER A DE NOVO STANDARD OF REVIEW
The trial court's findings of fact that Barton did not contribute to the nuisance

complained of by Plaintiffs during 1999 should be set aside as clearly erroneous. See
generally Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) (setting forth "clearly erroneous" standard). "A finding is
clearly erroneous if it is against the great weight of the evidence or if the court is
otherwise definitely and firmly convinced that a mistake has been made." Bountiful v.
Riley, 784 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989). Further, "a finding is clearly erroneous if it is
without adequate evidentiary support or is induced by an erroneous view of the law."
Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d213, 216 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Evidence supporting the trial court's findings
1. Defendant Barton "rented" his sound equipment to the Park City Brewing
Company during the summer of 1999. (Supp. Aff. of Barton at 1083, ^ 2.)
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2. Defendant Barton "never actually operated the sound equipment during the
performances at the Town Lift during the summer of 1999." (Supp. Aff of Barton at
1083, t 3.)
3. Defendant Barton "never actually booked any performers for the Brewing
Company during the summer of 1999." But he did "provide . . . the names of several
potential performers." (Supp. Aff. of Barton at 1083, f 4.)
4. Defendant Barton's "only involvement with the 1999 summer concerts was "to
provide necessary equipment...." (Supp. Aff. of Barton at 1083, f 5.)
Evidence contradicting the trial court's findings
1. "In the summer of 1999, [Randy Barton] was approached by Park City Brewing
[Company] & Smokehouse to provide sound and book musicians for the restaurant."
(Aff. of Barton at 619, f 6.)
2. "Randy Barton . . . was hired by Park City Brewing [Company] & Smokehouse
to provide sound and book musicians for the restaurant." (Mem. in Supp. of Barton's
Motion for Sum. J. at 532.) Acting in this capacity, Randy Barton served as the "agent"
or "employee" of the Smokehouse. (Mem. in Supp. of Barton's Motion for Sum. J. at
532.)
3. Park City's local newspaper, the Park Record, reported during the summer of
1999 that "Randy Barton[,] producer for the Wooden Dog concert series,... is arranging
the musicians for the Brewing Company" and that he was "miffed that the city might bend
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to just a few people who are complaining about the performances." (R. at 1000.)
4. Defendant Barton published an admission in 1999 as a "Letter to the Editor" in
which he publically admitted his involvement in the Park City Brewing Company &
Smokehouse's 1999 concert series, publically admitted being governed by Park City
Brewing Company & Smokehouse's permit, and publically admitted violating the
conditions of the permit governing his activities:
This summer I have arranged for musicians and provided the
sound amplification for Park City Brewing and Smokehouse
and the Town Lift Plaza. We were operating under a special
outdoor music permit provided by the city. Last week that
permit was rescinded due to complaints received from
residents (one individual in particular living near the plaza[)].
We were invited to a meeting a City Hall to discuss the
complaints and the future of outdoor amplified music. We
were given a reprieve by the City and allowed to continue
under new restrictions . . . .
(R. at 1026 (emphasis added).)
5. It was common knowledge that Defendant Barton was actively involved with the
Park City Brewing Company & Smokehouse's 1999 concert series and that he in fact
arranged, booked, and/or produced bands and acted as sound manager as Plaintiffs allege
in their complaint. (R. at 1143.)
6. Plaintiffs' attorney located an individual whose testimony directly contradicts
Defendant Barton's testimony set forth in his Supplemental Affidavit. In particular, this
individual stated that he was booked by Randy Barton during the summer of 1999 and
that Randy Barton controlled the volume at the 1999 Town Lift plaza performances at
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which the individual performed. (R. at 1154.)
7. Defendant Barton booked the bands, controlled the sound equipment, and was
fully aware of Plaintiffs' complaints. (Aff. of Cline at 1164-65.) This information is
based on the personal knowledge of one of the musicians who played several times at the
Town Lift plaza during the 1999 summer season.
8. Defendant Barton advertised the 1999 Town Lift plaza concerts in the media
and on his website as the "The Wooden Dog Concert Series." (R. at 960, If 4; 962,ffl[6-7;
1158; 1168; 1170; 1173.)
9. Defendant Barton failed to comply with the conditions of the permits. (R. at
965.)
10. Defendant Barton's failure to comply with the conditions of the permits
resulted in unreasonably loud and intrusive noise which harmed Plaintiffs. (R. at 965.)
11. Defendant Barton contributed to the nuisance complained of by Plaintiffs. (R.
at 965.)
When viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings
below, they are legally insufficient to support the trial court's finding that Defendant
Barton was not an integral part of the nuisance complained of by Plaintiffs. Indeed the
only evidence supporting this conclusion is a self-serving and untimely affidavit filed by
Defendant Barton himself, which is completely inconsistent with Defendant's earlier
statements contained in his published admission and affidavit, and which was
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subsequently disputed by Plaintiffs' attorney's affidavit. Accordingly, the trial court's
findings should be set aside as clearly erroneous. See Bountiful, 784 P.2d at 1175; see
alsoHoth,799P.2dat216.
In the alternative, the trial court's findings of fact should be set aside under a de
novo standard of review because those findings were based solely on written documents
and not on direct testimony from Defendant Barton. The trial court's ruling was not
based on direct testimony from which the trial court could have made a determination of
Defendant Barton's credibility. Under these circumstances, "this court is in as good a
position as the trial court to examine the evidence de novo and determine the facts." In re
Infant Anonymous. 760 P.2d at 918.
If the Court chooses to review this issue under a de novo standard of review, the
Court should find that Defendant Barton was inextricably linked to the 1999 concerts held
at the Town Lift plaza or, in the alternative, that this issue should be remanded for full
and proper discovery to determine the extent of Defendant Barton's actual involvement.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiffs respectfully request:
A. That Plaintiffs' nuisance claims be reinstated against all Defendants;
B. That the Outdoor Music Ordinance be stricken as void and unconstitutional;
C. That Plaintiffs' takings claim be reinstated against Defendant Park City
Municipal Corporation, and that the case be remanded to the district court for a
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determination of damages, payable by the City to Plaintiffs, to include the time Plaintiffs
were prevented from enforcing their constitutionally protected rights to be free of
nuisances and the legal fees they incurred, including those fees incurred on this appeal;
D. That the trial court's denial of Plaintiffs' Motions for Reconsideration be
reversed;
E. That Plaintiffs shall be permitted to conduct discovery after all answers are filed
by all Defendants;
F. That Defendant Barton's Supplemental Affidavit shall be stricken;
G. That the trial court's findings regarding Defendant Barton's involvement in the
1999 concerts be set aside or, in the alternative, that the Court find that Barton was
inextricably linked to those events; and
H. Pursuant to Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, costs incurred in
this appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 34(a) (allowing appellant costs if judgment or order is
reversed, or if judgment or order is affirmed, reversed in part, or vacated).
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J _ l day of September, 2007.
CRIPPEN & CLINE, L.C.

/ j

By_^
Russell A. Cline
Attorney for Appellants
10 West 100 South, Suite 425
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)539-1900
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Exhibit A

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RONALD WHALEY and
MELANIE A. REIF,

RULING AND ORDER

Plaintiffs,
PARK CITY MUNICIPAL
CORPORATION, et al,
Defendants.

Civil No. 0106000122
Judge Robert K. Hilder

The defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment were scheduled for oral argument, but
after a conflict delayed one of the attorneys, counsel stipulated that the motions could be
submitted on the memoranda. Now, having fully considered the arguments and the law, the court
enters the following Ruling and Order:
I. Statement of Facts
In this action the Plaintiffs, Ronald R. Whaley and Melanie A. Reif, assert that by
permitting or by playing outdoor music the defendants, Park City Municipal Corporation, Park
City Arts Council, and Randy Barton, caused a nuisance under statute and theories of common
law. Further, the Plaintiffs assert that the city ordinance permitting outdoor music is void.
In 1999 Park City issued a number administrative permits allowing outdoor music to
several downtown restaurants including the Park City Brewing Company and Smokehouse,
Dynamite Dom's, and Jambalaya. Defendant Randy Barton was hired by these restaurants to
book bands and perform sound control. The plaintiffs assert that the music played as a result of
these permits caused a nuisance and that Park City failed to enforce the conditions of the permits.
U J j /u3

In June of 2000 Park City passed an "outdoor music ordinance" permitting concerts at the
Summit Watch plaza and the Town Lift plaza. Defendant Park City Arts Council was in charge
of issuing permits for the concerts. Defendant Randy Barton received permits to promote several
concerts on the square. The Plaintiffs assert that the ordinance is void and the music performed
created a nuisance.
II. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Presently before the Court are the defendants', Park City Municipal Corporation's, Park
City Arts Council's, and Randy Barton's Motions for Summary Judgment. As to all material
issues, the evidence is undisputed. The parties' main dispute is one of what law should rule: the
Park City Municipal Noise Ordinance or the State of Utah nuisance statute and/or Common Law
theories of nuisance. In a situation where the facts are not in dispute, as here, the case is well
suited for Summary Judgment.
III. Analysis
A. The Plaintiffs' First, Second, Third, and Seventh causes of action are an improper
attempt to challenge the validity of Park City's Outdoor Music ordinance and are
dismissed as a matter of law.
The Plaintiffs' first, second, third, and seventh causes of action are tied to the argument
that Park City's Municipal Code and administrative permits are invalid. However, the Utah Code
has expressly given municipalities like Park City the authority to determine what is and is not a
nuisance. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-60 (2001) grants to municipalities the authority to "declare
what shall be a nuisance, and abate the same." Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-76 (2001) directly
addresses the issue of noise abatement and states that a city "may" prevent noises. This section
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implies that noise is not a general and non-curable nuisance. Id. Park City used this power to
determine what is a nuisance when it passed it passed Title 4, Chapter 8 A of the Municipal Code
of Park City (MCPC) and permitted outdoor music pursuant to administrative permits.
The Plaintiffs' argue that Park City's "outdoor music" ordinances conflict with the Utah
State Code nuisance statutes and under the concept of 'supremacy' the Utah State Code should
overrule the MCPC. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-38-178-10-803 (Supp. 2000). However, this
argument is flawed. A basic tenet of statutory interpretation is that a statute should be read in a
manner that it makes sense. The power granted to municipalities in Utah Code Ann. Title 10,
Chapter 8 (e.g.§ 10-8-60, and -76) to regulate nuisance and noise, would be rendered
meaningless if the Utah Code "Nuisance" statute applied in this situation. Therefore, the court
holds that Title 4, Chapter 8A MCPC and administrative permits allowing outdoor music rule
and Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-38-178-10-803 does not apply.
The Plaintiffs' seventh cause of action, alleging that the outdoor music ordinance is void,
fails because the Plaintiffs have failed to meet the facial burden required for such an attack. In
challenging the facial validity of an ordinance the plaintiff must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid. State v. Herrera, 993. P.2d 854,
857, n.2 (Utah 1999). All presumptions are in favor of the ordinance's validity,
constitutionality, and reasonableness and the Court maintains a strong reluctance to proclaim a
legislative action facially unconstitutional. In fact, any reasonable doubts concerning legislation
must be resolved in favor of constitutionality. Id. at 860.

In the present case the plaintiff fails

to meet this burden.
Because Title 4, Chapter 8 A of the MCPC and the City issued administrative permits
govern this circumstance, and Utah Code Ann. § 78-38-1 and § 78-10-803 do not apply, the

Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment are granted regarding the Plaintiffs' first, second,
third and seventh Causes of Action.
B. Plaintiffs' fifth cause of action is dismissed as a matter of law.
The Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants, Randy Barton and the Park City Art Council,
violated MCPC §§ 6-3-7, 6-3-8-(J)(2), and 6-3-9(B). The Plaintiffs further argues that the
Defendant Park City Municipality Corp. failed to enforce these statutes. However, because Park
City lawfully issued administrative permits allowing outdoor music and later passed Title 4,
Chapter 8A of the MCPC, MCPC §§ 6-3-7, 6-3-8-(J)(2), and 6-3-9(B) do not apply. Therefore,
the Defendants Motions for Summary Judgment regarding Plaintiffs' fifth cause of action are
granted.
C. Plaintiffs' sixth Cause of Action is dismissed against Defendants Park City Municipal
Corp. and the Park City Arts Council as a matter of law. Defendant's, Randy Barton,
Motion for Summary Judgment regarding Plaintiffs' sixth Causes of Action is denied.
Park City Municipal Corp.'s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted because Park City
is immune from such claims under the Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-1
to -38. The failure to suspend or revoke a permit is expressly enumerated as a governmental
function that is protected by the act. Id § 63-30-10(l)(c)).
The Park City Art's Council Motion for Summary Judgment is granted because the
Plaintiffs' fail to claim that the Council had any involvement with the permit issuing process or
violated any of the permit conditions.
Randy Barton's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied because there is a dispute of
material fact of whether his actions violated the conditions of the permit and whether those
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actions constituted a nuisance. This question is limited to Randy Barton's possible violation of
the conditions of the permits issued in 1999.
D. Plaintiffs' eighth Cause of Action, unlawful taking of property under the U.S.
Constitution and Utah Constitutions, is dismissed for lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
The plaintiffs' have failed to exhaust all the administrative remedies available. The
Plaintiffs have administrative remedy for alleged takings available to them under § 15-1-18 of the
MCPC. Therefore, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Home v. Utah Dep't of Public
Safety, 962 P.2d 95 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
IV. Summary
Based upon the foregoing: IT IS ORDERED THAT, Park City Municipal Corporation's
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in its entirety. Park City Arts Council's Motion for
Summary Judgment is granted in its entirety. Randy Barton's Motion for Summary Judgment is
granted in part, Plaintiffs' first, second, third, fifth, seventh, and eighth Causes of Action are
dismissed. Randy Barton's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied in regard to the Plaintiffs'
sixth cause of action.
DATED this 7th day of August, 2002.

BY THE COURT:
#cf> SUMMIT
Robert K. Hilder, District Co^pM&^
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Exhibit B

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COJJRTIN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE?(SFtff AH

COUPT -VJW.IT
r

°

RONALD R. WHALEY and
MELANIE A. REIF,
RULING AND ORDER
Plaintiffs,
vs.
PARK CITY MUNICIPAL
CORPORATION, et ah,

Civil No. 010600122

Defendants.

Judge Robert K. Hilder

Plaintiffs5 Motion for Clarification and/or Reconsideration is before the court for
decision. Judge Lubeck, the judge presently assigned to Summit County, appropriately referred
the matter to Judge Hilder, who entered the Ruling at issue.
The Ruling that plaintiffs wish to revisit is the court's Order granting Summary Judgment
as to all defendants on all claims, except for defendant Randy Barton as to plaintiffs' Sixth cause
of action. The Ruling and Order was entered August 7, 2002, and it dismissed all claims except
the one reserved against Mr. Barton, with prejudice and on the merits.
As for the clarification portion of the Motion, the court agrees that the Ruling may not be
unequivocal in addressing alleged violations by Randy Barton in 1998, but in the posture of the
case, it should be clear that the court has only preserved claims for 1999 or later. The only
claims preserved against Barton are premised on an alleged violation of permits, and plaintiffs'
sole claim alleging violation of permits is the Sixth cause of action. That claim is expressly
premised on permits issued in 1999; therefore, it should be clear, based on plaintiffs' own
pleading, that 1998 is not at issue. If there was an earlier permit-based claim, it has not been
plead.
Everything else plaintiffs seek is a reconsideration, and this court must deny that Motion,
because it is not proper at this stage of the proceeding. The court understands that the phrase
"there is no provision in Utah law for a motion to reconsider," or some variant on that phrase, is
routinely uttered, but as any active litigator or judge knows, it is primarily honored in the breach.
Courts often revisit rulings. Case law supports the practice in certain circumstances, and it is
1
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often in everyone's interest to fix an error before it goes any further, but there is a point where
the ruling must be final. The court believes that caselaw and the status of this case militate
against reconsideration.
One of the cases cited as authority for the proposition that court's may change a ruling is
Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), but the court finds the
critical language to be as follows: "a judge is free to change a ruling until a final decision is
formally rendered." Id. at 1311 (emphasis added). This court concurs. For example, an interim
evidentiary ruling may be changed, and a ruling denying a motion to dismiss or for summary
judgment, pending further discovery and or trial, may be changed if new evidence or an
argument presented in a new light persuades the court to revise its thinking. But, once the ruling
disposes of the case, either as to one party, or as to all, that is a final decision, on the merits, and
such a decision can only be changed by an appropriate motion to amend, set aside or alter
judgment, or perhaps on a motion for new trial and, of course, on appeal. In each case, certain
time and procedure rules apply. In the case of a final, formal judgment, those rules cannot be
circumvented by styling the motion as one for reconsideration, or there would be no certainty in
any rulings.
In this case, the mere circumstance that one claim against one defendant has not been
resolved does not change the finality of a dismissal on the merits as to the other defendants. It is
unfortunate that plaintiffs cannot resolve their disagreement with this court's rulings by
interlocutory appeal, but the unavailability of that course, and the resulting delay, do not justify
this court in revisiting and possibly undoing a final judgment.
In addition, even if reconsideration was available, the court is concerned that the majority
of plaintiffs' argument as presented now, while it was plead in the briefest terms in the Seventh
cause of action, by plaintiffs' own admission that theory was not specifically briefed in the
memorandum opposing summary judgment. Even if the judgment entered was not final as to all
but Barton (and these newly developed claims do not concern Barton), the court would be very
reluctant to encourage such a piecemeal approach to briefing.
For the reasons stated the Motion for Reconsideration be and hereby is DENIED. The
Motion to Clarify is GRANTED as set forth above. This signed Ruling shall be the ORDER of
the court and no further Order is required.
DATED this 31st day of March, 2003.
By the Cou

Robert K£ Hilder, DistxitrrCburt'Jiijdge^

l^i

SUMMIT Vg,

V&\ COUNTY/^

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 010600122 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Mail

Mail

Dated

this

d a y of

NAME
RUSSELL A CLINE
ATTORNEY PLA
10 WEST 100 SOUTH
#425
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101
THOMAS A. DALEY
ATTORNEY DEF
P.O. BOX 14 8 0
PARK CITY UT 84 060
CHRISTINA I MILLER
ATTORNEY DEF
PO Box 682800, 2200 N Park
Ave
Building D, Suite 200
PARK CITY UT 84 0 98
DWAYNE A VANCE
ATTORNEY DEF
P.O. BOX 682800
22 0 0 NORTH PARK AVENUE
PARK CITY UT 84068

<JL

2003.

Deputy C o u r t

Page 1

(last)

Clerk

UUJ 6 /3

Exhibit C

3RD DISTRICT CT- SILVER SUMMIT COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RONALD R WHALEY,
Plaintiff,

MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER

vs .

Case No: 010600122

PARK CITY MUNICIPAL CORPORATIO,
Defendant.

Judge: ROBERT K HILDER
Date: 07/05/2003

Clerk: rhilder
Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration or Certification is before
the court for decision. As to reconsideration, the court and
plaintiffs' counsel may be confusing the issue because of differing
emphases as to the posture of the case. In its March 31, 2003,
Ruling, the court did not mean to suggest that there is technically
a final judgment that not only gives a right of appeal, but that
would start the appeal period running. The court was addressing
the matter more as a policy of furthering certainty and
discouraging piecemeal briefing.
In this case, as to all but Mr.
Barton, the court ordered dismissal almost one year ago now. This
court will not lightly re-visit a dismissal, and that is
particularly true when most of the reasons advanced for
reconsideration were not adequately briefed for the initial motion.
The court believes that reconsideration is discretionary, not
mandatory, and it is not warranted in this case. On the other
hand, the court fully understands plaintiffs' desire to obtain
appellate review.
If Mr. Barton's Motion for Summary Judgment was
not now awaiting decision, the court would grant the request for
certification, but under the circumstances, the court DENIES the
Motion to Reconsider, and DENIES the Motion for Certification, but
the latter Motion is denied without prejudice to renewal after the
court decides Mr. Barton's Motion. Because that is a dispositive
Motion, the court believes oral argument would assist decision, and
the court's clerk will contact counsel to s e t a hearing date as
soon as possible. This signed Minute E n t ^ ^ P ^ ^ i . be the ORDER of
the court and no further Order is requij
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Exhibit D

3RD DISTRICT CT- SILVER SUMMIT COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RONALD R WHALEY,
Plaintiff,

:
: MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER

vs.

:

Case No: 010600122

PARK CITY MUNICIPAL CORPORATIO, : Judge: ROBERT K HILDER
Defendant.
: Date: 01/19/2004

Clerk: rhilder
Plaintiffs' Motion to vacate and Reconsider Summary Judgment
Decision is before the court for decision. The court does not
understand plaintiffs' repeated assertion that discovery could not
be pursued because various (indeed, many) motions were filed
through the first two-plus years of this case's life. An
attorney's planning meeting and a discovery schedule were required,
but why could not that have occurred, concurrently with the
progress of the many motions? Even if that is a valid concern, by
the date of argument on Mr. Barton's last Motion for Summary
Judgment, plaintiffs' had NO admissible evidence on the critical
issues, and despite repeated colluquy between counsel and the
court, plaintiffs could not identify what they might find if the
court treated their discovery concern as a Rule 56 (f) request for
time to pursue discovery. That hearing occurred July 14, 2003, and
the court granted Mr. Barton's Motion, because the record contained
no evidence that would support his personal liability. Then, four
days later (as is now revealed to the court) plaintiffs' counsel
apparently found a witness. This event is urged as newly
discovered evidence, but it meets at most one of the criteria to
make it such. Like virtually all of the "evidence" presented in
opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment (and the other
documents attached at this time, with the possible excepion of the
affidavit of counsel), what is offerred even now is not evidence in
an admissible form. In addition, while the evidence, if it was
admissible evidence, might be material and competent, it manifestly
would not change the result. For these reasons, the Motion to
Vacate, etc. is hereby DENIED. Mr. Barton's request for fees is
hereby DENIED. The court is struggling with the Motion to certify
for appeal, mainly because it is not clear whether the court
previously ruled on plaintiffs' Fourth Cause of Action. If the
claim is deemed dismissed along with the other claims, no
Page 1
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Case No: 010600122
Date:
Jan 19, 2004
certification is needed, but if it is not dismissed, the court
agrees that this apparently prospective claim does not affect the
final nature of the court's ruling as to all other claims, and the
court specifically states the the dismissal orders entered to this
date are not subject to revision. Plaintiffs may prepare an
appropriate certification Order if they believe this Minute Entry
and Order will not suffice.
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Exhibit E

3RD DISTRICT CT- SILVER SUMMIT COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RONALD R WHALEY,
Plaintiff,

:
: MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER

vs.

:

Case No: 010600122

PARK CITY MUNICIPAL CORPORATIO, : Judge: ROBERT K HILDER
Defendant.
: Date: 03/29/2004

Clerk: rhilder
Pursuant to this court's Minute Entry and Order dated January 19,
2004, plaintiffs have submitted an Order purportedly certifying all
issues for appeal under Rule 54(b), URCP. Both Park City and Mr.
Barton object to the form of the Order. Their objections are
well-taken. The court's invitation was quite narrow. The court
believes its Minute Entry and Order will suffice as a
certification, if one is needed, although the court continues to
believe that there is no such need. Plaintiffs, however, have
proposed a much more inclusive Order that greatly enlarges the
court's ruling, and the court now determines that it will sign no
further orders unless the appellate court to which this matter is
assigned remands the matter as to the Fourth Cause of Action for
any reason. This signed Minute Entry is the ORDER of the court and
no further Order is required.

Judg?
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3RD DISTRICT CT- SILVER SUMMIT COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RONALD R WHALEY,
Plaintiff,

RULING AND ORDER

vs,

Case No: 010600122

PARK CITY MUNICIPAL CORPORATIO,
Defendant.

Judge: ROBERT K HILDER
Date: 10/08/2005

Clerk: rhilder
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment or Motion to Dismiss
plaintiffs' Fourth Cause of Action is before the court for
decision. As the court clerk apparently explained to counsel,
while the Motion was submitted in July, 2005, it sat on a clerk's
desk in Summit County until the assigned Salt Lake judge personally
reviewed the docked in late September after growing uneasy that the
matter was still pending. On being contacted, counsel represented
that the matter could be submitted on the memoranda. The court has
reviewed the memoranda and prior rulings carefully. As convoluted
as this matter has become, it is nevertheless clear that both sides
recognize that the court's ruling on this Cause of Action depends
largely on how the court views its 2002 ruling three years later.
Defendants argue that there can be no claim for prospective or
continuing nuisance, or injunctive relief, because the legal basis
was rejected by this court in 2002. Plaintiffs do not expressly
agree that the court's prior ruling bars the Fourth Cause of
Action, but in the spirit of courageous advocacy, counsel argues
that the law does not bar the Fourth Cause of Action, and the
court's August 2002 ruling was error that must be reversed, so it
should not justify dismissal of the remaining claim. Counsel may
well be right, but this court holds to its view, and for the
reasons stated by defendants, now GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss the
Fourth Cause of Action. By this action, the entire matter will be
in the hands of the appellate court where the legal questions may
be decided with the minimum of additional delay. No jEurtheS^Prder
is required.
A$U^"
-v?:^X
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I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 010600122 by the method and on the date
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NAME
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ATTORNEY PLA
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POB 148 0
PARK CITY UT 84060-1480
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PARK CITY UT 84068
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EXHIBIT B

ORDINANCE 00-36
AN ORDINANCE AMENDING TITLE 4, CHAPTER 8 OF THE
MUNICIPAL CODE OF PARK CITY REGULATING MASTER FESTIVAL
LICENSING; BY ADDING A NEW SUB-CHAPTER 8A REGULATING PUBLIC
OUTDOOR MUSIC PLAZAS; AND AMENDING SECTION 6-3-10, OF TITLE 6,
HEALTH, NUISANCE ABATEMENT, NOISE BY CREATING AN EXEMPTION
FOR SUCH OUTDOOR MUSIC PLAZAS
WHEREAS, Utah Code Annotated ("UCA") § 10-8-73 and 10-8-76 give the City
the power to regulate and prohibit public demonstrations, processions and other street or
otherwise public performances which may interfere with public order or otherwise create a noise
nuisance; and
WHEREAS, UCA § 10-8-84 allows the City to pass all ordinances and rules, and
make all regulations, not repugnant to law, necessary for carrying into effect or discharging all
powers and duties conferred by Chapter 8 of UCA Title 10 which are necessary and proper to
provide for the safety and preserve the health, and promote the prosperity, improve the morals,
peace and good order, comfort and convenience of the City and its inhabitants, and for the
protection of property in the city; and
WHEREAS, UCA § 10-8-60 gives the City the right to declare what constitutes a
public nuisance, and provide for the abatement of the same, and impose fines upon persons who
may create, continue or suffer nuisances to exist; and
WHEREAS, the City Council received a petition supporting outdoor music, but
also heard from several area residents who objected to amplified music; and
WHEREAS, the City Council received recommendations based upon the findings
and experiences of a volunteer citizen committee, and a University of Utah class concerning the
effects and regulation of noise and the construction of sound mitigating stages, to properly set
forth reasonable regulations and time limits to substantially mitigate the effects of such music
upon neighboring residents and businesses; and
WHEREAS, the Community Development Department recommended the
restrictions herein based upon the Department's noise measurements around the neighborhood
and other parts of the City; and
WHEREAS, the City commissioned an independent noise study by Spectrum

0Ui,JJ

Acoustical Engineers along Park Avenue and the study concluded that music performed pursuant
to the restrictions herein should be compatible with the existing background and traffic noise of
the neighborhood; and

WHEREAS, the plazas authorized herein are within the Historic Commercial
Business ("HCB") zoning district, where noisy commercial operations, businesses and public
master festivals/parades are common; and
WHEREAS, the adjoining neighborhood to the west of the Town Lift Plaza is
primarily residential, however the neighborhood is separated from the plaza by Park Avenue, is
adjacent to ski runs with permitted but not yet installed snow making with noise levels as high as
85 decibels, and Park Avenue is along a primary municipal transit route with existing noise
levels as high as 90 decibels. The snow making decibel limitation was established after
extensive on-site testing and analysis with the City staff and officials; and
WHEREAS, licensing and zoning are legitimate and reasonable means of time,
place and manner regulations to ensure that outdoor music performers comply with reasonable
regulations and to ensure that performers do not knowingly allow their music to become a
nuisance to nearby residences and businesses, nor create public disorder; and
WHEREAS, the City Council received convincing testimony that outdoor music
performances, because of their very nature, have a positive effect on both the existing businesses
around them and the community at large, causing enhanced resort atmosphere and business
patronage; and
WHEREAS, as a result of these findings and testimony, the City Council finds
that public outdoor music in the specified plazas is not a nuisance per se, but if performed
consistently with the regulations contained herein, is reasonably within the standard of comfort
prevailing in the areas of and adjacent to the plazas defined herein, promotes the arts and cultural
enhancement in the community, and is consistent with pending Master Festival Licensing section
4-8-5; and
WHEREAS, the City Council finds that outdoor music, if unregulated, may have
serious objectionable operational characteristics particularly when located in close proximity to
residential neighborhoods, thereby contributing to increased noise, pedestrian traffic and
downgrading the quality of life in such adjacent residential areas; and
WHEREAS, the City Council desires to minimize and control these adverse
effects and thereby preserve the property and character of surrounding neighborhoods, deter
unreasonably large pedestrian crowds, protect the citizens from increased noise, preserve the
quality of life, and protect the health, safety and welfare of the citizenry; and

Ord. 00-36
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WHEREAS, the time, place and manner restrictions of this ordinance are required
to protect legitimate and important governmental interests and are reasonably related to achieve
the protection of those interests with the minimum interference necessary to rights protected by
state and federal constitutional provisions; and
WHEREAS, implementation of the Ordinance eliminates approximately nine
potential venues for non-master festival licensed outdoor music; and
WHEREAS, the City Council finds that barring all amplified events and music
would be over broad and arbitrary; and
WHEREAS, the City Council held work sessions with public input on this matter
as regularly scheduled meetings on November 18, 1999, and February 10, 2000, and public
hearings on March 2, 2000, March 30, April 13, and May 18, 2000.
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF PARK CITY, UTAH,
AS FOLLOWS:
SECTION 1. FINDINGS. The recitals above are incorporated herein as findings by the City
Council, the legislative body of Park City.
SECTION 2. AMENDMENT. The Municipal Code of Park City is hereby amended by
adding the following Chapter 8a to Title 4:
CHAPTER 8A - PUBLIC OUTDOOR MUSIC PLAZAS
4- 8A-1. TITLE FOR CITATION.
This section shall be known and may be referred to as the Public Outdoor Music Plaza
Ordinance.
4- 8A- 2. PURPOSE: REASONABLE LICENSING PROCEDURES.
It is the purpose and object of this section that the City establish reasonable and uniform
regulations governing the licensing and manner of operations of Public Outdoor Music Plazas in
Park City. This section shall be construed to protect the legitimate and important governmental
interests recognized by this Chapter in a manner consistent with constitutional protections
provided by the United States and Utah Constitutions. The purpose of these regulations is to
provide for the regulation and licensing of Public Outdoor Music Plazas within the City in a
manner which will protect the property values of surrounding businesses and neighborhoods, and
residents from the potential adverse secondary effects, while providing to those who desire to
perform in and patronize Public Outdoor Music Plazas the opportunity to do so. The purpose of
this Chapter is to prevent and control the adverse effects of Public Outdoor Music Plazas and
Ord. 00-36
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thereby to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens and guests of Park City, protect
the citizens from increased noise, preserve the quality of life, preserve the property values and
character of the surrounding neighborhoods.

4- 8A- 3. APPLICATION OF PROVISIONS.
This section imposes regulatory standards and license requirements on certain activities, which
are characterized as "Public Outdoor Music Plazas." It is not the intent of this Chapter to
suppress any speech activities protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Utah, but to impose content-neutral
regulations which address the adverse secondary effects of Public Outdoor Music Plazas. This
Chapter is intended to supersede any other related ordinances including, but not limited to, Title
6 Chapter 3, Noise, of the Municipal Code; and Chapter 7 (including pending Municipal Code §
15-2-6.10(B)(4)) of the Park City Land Management Code, as amended.
4-8A-4. DEFINITIONS.
For the purpose of this Chapter, the following words shall have the following meanings:
(A)
AMPLIFIED EVENT OR MUSIC. An event or music utilizing an amplifier or other
input of power so as to obtain an output of greater magnitude or volume through speakers or
other electronic devices.
(B)
PUBLIC OUTDOOR MUSIC PLAZA. The following plazas used for public
performances and outdoor music;

(C)

(1)

Town Lift Plaza as shown on Exhibit A; and

(2)

Summit Watch Marriot Plaza as shown on Exhibit B.

STAGES. The raised and semi-enclosed platforms that are designed to attenuate sound,
in a form substantially similar to as depicted in Exhibit C or as otherwise approved by
Special Events staff.

4- 8A- 5. MASTER FESTIVAL LICENSE; REVIEW PROCEDURE.
The City Council hereby grants Master Festival Licenses for each of the plazas in Section 4. The
Licenses shall be subject to all regulations and conditions of this Chapter. The Licenses shall be
valid as of June 1, 2000 and shall expire October 1, 2000, unless renewed by the City Council.
The City Council may not renew said licenses until after a public hearing and receipt of a staff
evaluation of the prior year's compliance with this Chapter. Renewal shall be granted in the sole
judgment of the City Council based upon compliance with the regulations herein, community
Ord. 00-36
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impacts, and so long as such decision is not arbitrary and capricious. No licensee nor performer
shall accrue any vested rights under this revocable license.

4- 8A- 6. PROGRAM LIMITS AND CATEGORIES.
Each Stage may be programed for not more than four days per week, and of those four days, only
one program day may be a weekend day (Saturday or Sunday). The categories of programming
allowed at Public Outdoor Music Plazas are:
(A) Amplified Event or Music: This type of event shall be programmed for no more than 2
days a week at each plaza, only one of which may be a weekend day (Saturday or Sunday).
Amplified Music shall be limited to no more than 5 hours of total performance time on each of
those two days (breaks are not included in total time but warm-up and rehearsals are).
(B)
Non-amplified music and events: Programming for music and events such as poetry
readings, dance, or other events that require no amplification.
4-8A-7. GENERAL REGULATIONS.
(A)
The program manager, or his/her designee, shall provide on-site management for each
event.
(B)
A sound technician shall provide on-site noise monitoring for each event with music,
Amplified or otherwise, and any Amplified Event.
(C)
For Amplified Events or Music, a sound limiter will be placed on the sound system that
maintains the sound at an A-weighted sound level adjustment and maximum decibel level of 90,
as measured twenty five (25) feet from the stage. Non-amplified music and events shall not
exceed a maximum decibel level of 90, as measured twenty five (25) feet from the stage. The
data currently available to the City indicates that a maximum decibel level of 90 satisfies the
purpose of this ordinance. The City may amend this ordinance consistent with newly acquired
data.
(D)

All events shall be open to the public and free of charge.

(E)
Power controls. A timer device will be installed that shuts the power of the stage and
sound system off at 8:00 p.m.
(F)
Time: All performances, regardless of type, are permitted only between noon (12:00
p.m.) and 8 p.m.
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(G)
No event shall exceed 250 people unless a separate Master Festival License is granted for
that event.

(H)
The Police Department or other proper City official shall have access at all times to all
plazas under this Chapter, and may make periodic inspection of said premises whether the officer
or official is in uniform or plain clothes.
(I)
All events shall take place only on authorized Stages and shall have clean-up services
directly following each event so as to leave the plazas in a clean and litter free manner.
4-8A-8. ALCOHOL.
It is unlawful for the licensee or any person or business to allow the sale, storage, supply, or
consumption of alcoholic beverages on the Public Outdoor Music Plazas, unless licensed
pursuant to Chapters 4-6 of Title 4, as applicable.
4- 8A-9. LICENSE HOLDER; PROGRAM BOARD
(A)
The Park City Arts Council will be the licencee of the events and will own the Stages.
The Arts Council will hire a program manager, approved by the City, said approval not to be
unreasonably withheld. The program manager will be responsible for general management of
each plaza and on-sight oversight for each event. Agreements with the individual property
owners will be provided to the City Special Events Department by the program manager.
(B)
The Arts Council will appoint an independent Programming Board, consisting of five
residents of Park City (community and arts). The Programming Board will schedule the
selection and times of events. Nothing herein shall allow the City to regulate the content or
otherwise censor plaza productions or speech. The Arts Council shall at all times hold the City
harmless and indemnify the City for all claims, actions and liability arising from the Arts
Council's use of the Public Outdoor Music Plazas. The Arts Council shall maintain its own
liability insurance, with the City listed as an additional insured in a form approved by the City
Attorney.
(C)
Nothing in this Chapter shall be interpreted to create a contract or implied-contract
between the City and any performer, or plaza owner.
4- 8A-10. ON-GOING COMPLIANCE EVALUATION.
(A)
The City Special Events Department will appoint an independent neighborhood review
group of at least three area residents which will be contacted weekly by the City Special Events
staff and the program manager to receive comments and concerns. A phone number will also be
Ord. 00-36
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available at each venue so that individuals may phone in comments. Based upon such
comments, the Special Events staff may issue additional conditions consistent with the intent of
this Chapter to the program manager. A summary of, and recommended response to comments
will be forwarded to the City Council within seven days of the end of each month of operation, or
sooner if requested by«the program manager to resolve any issue. At the end of the season, the
Special Events staff will forward a final recommendation to the City Council, with proposed
changes, if any, prior to renewal of the licenses granted herein.
(B)
The Police Chief, or his/her designee, may suspend the Licenses granted herein and
schedule a revocation hearing before the City Council at the next regularly scheduled City
Council meeting for any of the following causes:
(1)
Any violation of this Chapter as evidenced by a citation issued by the Police
Department.
(2)

Any violation of law or City ordinance.

(3)
Upon any other evidence that the Program Manager or entertainer constitutes a
hazard or nuisance to the health, safety, or welfare of the community.
4-8A-11. TRANSFER LIMITATIONS.
The Master Festival Licenses granted under this Chapter are not transferable without the written
consent of the Mayor, It is unlawful for an individual to transfer a Public Outdoor Music Plaza
master festival license without City approval as provided herein. If any transfer of the
controlling interest in a Public Outdoor Music Plaza license occurs without City approval, the
license is immediately null and void and the Public Outdoor Music Plaza shall not operate until a
separate new license has been properly issued by the City as herein provided. The City will not
unreasonably withhold consent of transfer provided the proposed Licensee is a non-profit
organization within Park City, meets all the criteria of this Chapter, and demonstrates experience
managing special events.
4-8A-12. PLAZAS LICENSES IN LIEU OF ADMINISTRATIVE PERMITS FOR
OUTDOOR MUSIC AND OUTDOOR SPEAKERS.
The Master Festival Licenses granted under this Chapter are in lieu of any Administrative
Conditional Use Permit for outdoor music (including outdoor speakers) pursuant to the existing
Land Management Code and pending ordinance MCPC § 15-2-6.10(B)(4) . The Community
Development Department shall not issue any outdoor music permits in the Historic Commercial
Business (UHCB") zoning district north of Heber Avenue. The City may still issue outdoor
music permits in conjunction with an approved Master Festival License.

Ord. 00-36
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SECTION 3. AMENDMENT. Section 6-3-10, of Title 6, Health, Nuisance Abatement, Noise,
is hereby amended to add the following to as an exemption to Chapter 3, Noise:
(J) Noise resulting from a duly licensed and operated Public Outdoor Music Plaza pursuant to
Title 4, Chapter 8a of the Municipal Code of Park City.
SECTION 4. SEVERABILITY. If any phrase, clause, sentence, paragraph, or section of this
Ordinance is declared unlawful by a Court of competent jurisdiction, such decision shall not
affect any of the remaining phrases, clauses, sentences, paragraphs, or sections of this Ordinance.
SECTION 5. EFFECTIVE DATE. This ordinance shall become effective upon publication.

PASSED AND ADOPTED this 1st day of June, 2000.
PARK CITY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION

Ord. 00-36
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ORDINANCE 01-16
AN ORDINANCE AMENDING TITLE 4, CHAPTER 8A
REGULATING PUBLIC OUTDOOR MUSIC PLAZAS
WHEREAS, Utah Code Annotated ("UCA") Sections 10-8-73 and 10-8-76 give
the City the power to regulate and prohibit public demonstrations, processions and other street or
otherwise public performances which may interfere with public order or otherwise create a noise
nuisance; and
WHEREAS, UCA Section 10-8-84 allows the City to pass all ordinances and
rules, and make all regulations, not repugnant to law, necessary for carrying into effect or
discharging all powers and duties conferred by Chapter 8 of UCA Title 10 which are necessary
and proper to provide for the safety and preserve the health, and promote the prosperity, improve
the morals, peace and good order, comfort and convenience of the City and its inhabitants, and
for the protection of property in the City; and
WHEREAS, UCA Section 10-8-60 gives the City the right to declare what
constitutes a public nuisance, and provide for the abatement of the same, and impose fines upon
persons who may create, continue or suffer nuisances to exist; and
WHEREAS, the City Council received a petition supporting outdoor music, but
also heard from several area residents who objected to amplified music; and
WHEREAS, the City Council received recommendations based upon the findings
and experiences of a volunteer citizen committee, and a University of Utah class concerning the
effects and regulation of noise and the construction of sound mitigating stages, to properly set
forth reasonable regulations and time limits to substantially mitigate the effects of such music
upon neighboring residents and businesses; and
WHEREAS, the Community Development Department recommended the
restrictions herein based upon the Department's noise measurements around the neighborhood
and other parts of the City; and
WHEREAS, on June 1, 2000, the City Council of Park City adopted Ordinance
00-36, regulating Outdoor Music Plazas at the Town Lift Plaza and Summit Watch Marriot
Plaza; and
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WHEREAS, amplified events and music operated at the Town Lift Plaza and
Summit Watch Marriot Plaza in accordance with Ordinance 00-36; and
WHEREAS, the Neighborhood Review Group, an independent review committee
appointed to monitor ongoing compliance with Ordinance 00-36, delivered a positive
recommendation and review of performance under the ordinance; and
WHEREAS, the Public Outdoor Music locations authorized herein are within the
City limits, in areas where noisy commercial operations, businesses and public master
festivals/parades are common; and
WHEREAS, licensing and zoning are legitimate and reasonable means of time,
place and manner regulations to ensure that outdoor music performers comply with reasonable
regulations and to ensure that performers do not knowingly allow their music to become a
nuisance to nearby residences and businesses, nor create public disorder; and
WHEREAS, the City Council received convincing testimony that outdoor music
performances, because of their very nature, have a positive effect on both the existing businesses
around them and the community at large, causing enhanced resort atmosphere and business
patronage; and
WHEREAS, as a result of these findings and testimony, the City Council finds
that public outdoor music in the specified location is not a nuisance per se, but if performed
consistently with the regulations contained herein, is reasonably within the standard of comfort
prevailing in the areas of and adjacent to the locations defined herein, promotes the arts and
cultural enhancement in the community, and is consistent with pending Master Festival
Licensing section 4-8-5; and
WHEREAS, the City Council finds that outdoor music, if unregulated, may have
serious objectionable operational characteristics particularly when located in close proximity to
residential neighborhoods, thereby contributing to increased noise, pedestrian traffic and
downgrading the quality of life in such adjacent residential areas; and
WHEREAS, the City Council desires to minimize and control these adverse
effects and thereby preserve the property and character of surrounding neighborhoods, deter
unreasonably large pedestrian crowds, protect the citizens from increased noise, preserve the
quality of life, and protect the health, safety and welfare of the citizenry; and
WHEREAS, the time, place and manner restrictions of this ordinance are required
to protect legitimate and important governmental interests and are reasonably related to achieve
the protection of those interests with the minimum interference necessary to rights protected by
state and federal constitutional provisions; and
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WHEREAS, the City Council finds that barring all amplified events and music
would be over broad and arbitrary; and
WHEREAS, the City Council held work sessions with public input on this matter
as regularly scheduled meetings on March 19, 2001, and May 3, 2001.
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF PARK CITY, UTAH,
AS FOLLOWS:
SECTION 1. FINDINGS. The recitals above are incorporated herein as findings by the City
Council, the legislative body of Park City.
SECTION 2. AMENDMENT. Title 4, Chapter 8 A of the Municipal Code of Park City is
hereby amended as follows:
CHAPTER 8A - PUBLIC OUTDOOR MUSIC PLAZAS
4-8A-1. TITLE FOR CITATION.
This section shall be known and may be referred to as the Public Outdoor Music Plaza
Ordinance.
4- 8A- 2. PURPOSE: REASONABLE LICENSING PROCEDURES.
It is the purpose and object of this Chapter section that the City establish reasonable and uniform
regulations governing the licensing and manner of operations of Public Outdoor Music Plazas in
Park City. This Chapter section shall be construed to protect the legitimate and important
governmental interests recognized by this Chapter in a manner consistent with constitutional
protections provided by the United States and Utah Constitutions. The purpose of these
regulations is to provide for the regulation and licensing of Public Outdoor Music Plazas within
the City in a manner which will protect the property values of surrounding businesses and
neighborhoods, and residents from the potential adverse secondary effects, while providing to
those who desire to perform in and patronize Public Outdoor Music Plazas the opportunity to do
so. The purpose of this Chapter is to prevent and control the adverse effects of Public Outdoor
Music Plazas and thereby to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens and guests of
Park City, protect the citizens from increased noise, preserve the quality of life, preserve the
property values and character of the surrounding neighborhoods.
4- 8A- 3. APPLICATION OF PROVISIONS.
This Chapter section imposes regulatory standards and license requirements on certain activities,
which are characterized as "Public Outdoor Music Plazas." It is not the intent of this Chapter to
suppress any speech activities protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
3ofl0

States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Utah, but to impose content-neutral
regulations which address the adverse secondary effects of Public Outdoor Music Plazas. This
Chapter is intended to supersede any other related ordinances including, but not limited to, Title
6 Chapter 3, Noise, of the Municipal Code; and Chapter 7 (including pending Municipal Code
^Section 15-2-6.10(B)(4)) of the Park City Land Management Code, as amended.
4-8A-4. DEFINITIONS.
For the purpose of this Chapter, the following words shall have the following meanings:
(A)
AMPLIFIED EVENT OR MUSIC. An event or music utilizing an amplifier or other
input of power so as to obtain an output of greater magnitude or volume through speakers or
other electronic devices.
fB)
PUBLIC OUTDOOR MUSIC PLAZA. The following plazas used for public
performances and outdoor music:
(!•)

Town Lift Plaza as shown on Exhibit A; and

(2)

Summit Watch Harriot Plaza as shown on Exhibit D.

f€)(B) STAGES. The raised and semi-enclosed platforms that are designed to attenuate sound,
in a form substantially similar to as depicted in Exhibit C or as otherwise approved by
Special Events staff.
4- 8A- 5. MASTER FESTIVAL LICENSE; REVIEW PROCEDURE.
The City Council hereby grants Master Festival Licenses for each of the Public Outdoor Music
Plazas in Section 46. The Licenses shall be subject to all regulations and conditions of this
Chapter. The Licenses shall be valid as of June 1, 2000 2001 and shall expire October 1,
29002001, unless renewed by the City Council. The City Council may not renew said licenses
until after a public hearing and receipt of a staff evaluation of the prior year's compliance with
this Chapter. Renewal shall be granted in the sole judgment of the City Council based upon
compliance with the regulations herein, community impacts, and so long as such decision is not
arbitrary and capricious. No licensee nor performer shall accrue any vested rights under this
revocable license.
4- 8A- 6. PROGRAM LIMITS AND CATEGORIES.
Each Stage may be programed for not more than four days per week, and of those four days, only
one program day may be a weekend day (Saturday or Sunday). The categories of programming
allowed at Public Outdoor Music Plazas arc:
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(A) Amplified Event or Music This type of event shall be programmed for no more than 2
days a week at each plaza, only one of which may be a weekend day (Saturday or Sunday)
Amplified Music shall be limited to no more than 5 hours of total performance time on each uf
those two days (breaks are not included in total time but warm-up and rehearsals are)
(B)
Non-^amplified music and events: Programming for music and events such as poetiy
readings, dance, or other events that require no amplification
4- 8A- 6. PUBLIC OUTDOOR MUSIC PLAZAS
The following locations, dates, and times may be piogrammed by Mountain Town Stages foi
public performances and outdoor music
(A)

PARTY ON THE PLAZA
(1)
LOCATION On Summit Watch Plaza between Dynamite Dom's and Picasso's
Appioved plans are on file with the Special Events Department
(2)
OPERATION D AYS/HOURS/MONTHS This Stage may be progi ammed
Tuesdays, Fridays, and Saturdays from 5 00 PM to 8 00 PM fiom June 12th through
Septembei 30th A timer device will be installed that shuts the power of the stage and
sound system off at 8 00 PM
(3)
TYPE OF MUSIC Amplified and Acoustic For Amplified Events or Music on
Summit Watch Plaza, the program manager shall be responsible to ensure that the sound
system maintains the sound at an A-weighted sound level adjustment and maximum
decibel level of 90, as measured twenty fi\e (25) feet in front of the stage
(4)
SPECIAL EVENTS This Public Outdoor Music Plaza may also be
programmed for a maximum of four (4) additional week-nights during the summer for
special events from 5 00 PM to 8 00 PM, provided these special events do not conflict
with any City-sponsored or duly licensed Master Festival as appioved by the Special
Events Department

(B)

DEER VALLEY NEAR MCHENRY^ GRILL
(1)
LOCATION Deer Valley near McHenry's Grill Approved plans aie on file
with the Special Events Department
(2)
OPERATION D AYS/HOURS/MONTHS This Stage may be programmed
Wednesdays, Thuisdays, Saturdays, and Sundays from 11 30 AM to 2 30 PM, from June
27th through September 9th A timer device will be installed that shuts the power of the
stage and sound system off at 2 30 PM
5 of 10
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(3)

TYPE OF MUSIC. Amplified and Acoustic.

(4)
SPECIAL EVENTS. This Public Outdoor Music Plaza may also be
programmed for a maximum of four (4) additional weekdays during the summer for
special events from Noon to 6:00 PM, provided these special events do not conflict with
any City-sponsored or duly licensed Master Festival as approved by the Special Events
Department.

(C)

PARK CITY MOUNTAIN RESORT AT MOOSE'S PUB & GRILL
(1)

LOCATION. Park City Mountain Resort at Moose's Pub & Grill. Approved
plans are on file with the Special Events Department.

(2)
OPERATION DAYS/HOURS/MONTHS. This Stage may be programmed
Saturdays and Sundays from Noon to 6:00 PM, from June 30th through September 9th.
A timer device will be installed that shuts the power of the stage and sound system off at
6.00 PM .
(3)

TYPE OF MUSIC. Amplified and Acoustic.

(4)
SPECIAL EVENTS. This Public Outdoor Music Plaza may also be
programmed for a maximum of four (4) additional weekdays during the summer for
special e\ents from Noon to 6:00 PM, pro\ided these special e\ents do not conflict with
any City-sponsored or duly licensed Master Festival as approved by the Special Events
Department.
(D)
ADDITIONAL LOCATIONS; ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW. Additional Public
Outdoor Music Plaza locations may be administratively approved by the Special Events
Department for programming by Mountain Town Stages of public perfonnances and outdoor
music pursuant to the criteria set forth herein. No additional Public Outdoor Music Plaza
location shall be administratively approved unless the proposal fully complies with all of the
following criteria:
(1)
No more than m o (2) additional Public Outdoor Music Plaza locations maybe
administratively approved;
(2)
No proposed location may occupy or othen\ise compromise any public parking
space(s), whether for use by performers, attendees, or other amenities directly
connected to programming pursuant to this Chapter;
(3)
The proposed location must include sufficient area to accommodate performers,
MTS staff, and anticipated attendees without interfering with pedestrian or
vehicular traffic or otherwise impairing any public right of way;
(4)
No proposed location shall be approved unless located within the HRC, HCB, RC,
6ofl0
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(5)
(6)
(7)

RCO, GC, or LI Districts, and in no case shall a proposed location be approved
within one hundred feet (100') of a residential neighborhood;
No additional Public Outdoor Music Plaza location shall be programmed prior to
June 1, nor after September 30, 2001;
Additional Public Outdoor Music Plaza locations may be programmed no more
than three (3) days or evenings per week; and
No additional Public Outdoor Music Plaza location may be programmed for more
than five (5) hours in any day, and m no event shall programming commence prior
to 11:30 AM nor end later than 8:00 PM.

4- 8A-7. GENERAL REGULATIONS.
(A)
The program manager, or his/her designee, shall provide on-site management for each
event.
(B)
A sound technician shall provide on-site noise monitoring for each event with music,
Amplified or otherwise, and any Amplified Event.
(C)
Except as otherwise provided at Subsection 6(A) herein, for Ftrr Amplified Events or
Music, a sound limitcr will be placed on the program manager shall be responsible to ensure that
the sound system maintains the sound at an A-weighted sound level adjustment and maximum
decibel level of 95 90, as measured thirty five feet (35') twenty five (25) feet fromin front of the
stage. Non-amplified music and events shall not exceed a maximum decibel level of 90, as
measured twenty five (25) feet from the stage. The data currently available to the City indicates
that a maximum decibel level of 95 90 satisfies the purpose of this ordinance. The City may
amend this ordinance consistent with newly acquired data.
(D)

All events shall be open to the public and free of charge.

fE)
rower Controls: A timer device will be installed that shuts the power of the stage and
sound system off at 8:00 PM .
(F)
TIME. All performances, regardless of type, arc permitted only between noon (12:00
PM) And 8 PM
fG)(E) No event shall exceed 250 people unless a separate Master Festival License is granted for
that event.
(H}(F) The Police Department or other proper City official shall have access at all times to all
Public Outdoor Music Plazas plazas under this Chapter, and may make periodic inspection of
said premises whether the officer or official is in uniform or plain clothes.
f£)(G) All events shall take place only on authorized Stages and shall have clean-up services
7ofl0
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directly following each event so as to leave the plazas in a clean and litter free manner.
4- 8A-8. ALCOHOL.
It is unlawful for the licensee or any person or business to allow the sale, storage, supply, or
consumption of alcoholic beverages at on the Public Outdoor Music Plazas, unless licensed
pursuant to Chapters 4-6 of Title 4, as applicable.
4- 8A-9. LICENSE HOLDER; PROGRAM BOARD
(A)
Mountain Town Stages (MTS) The Park City Arts Council will be the licencee of the
events and will own the Stages. MTS The Arts Council will hire a program manager, approved
by the City, said approval not to be unreasonably withheld. The program manager will be
responsible for general management of each Public Outdoor Music Plaza and on-sight oversight
for each event. Agreements with the individual property owners will be provided to the City
Special Events Department by the program manager.
(B)
Mountain Town Stages shall schedule events in accordance with the regulations set forth
in this Chapter. The Ails Council will appoint an independent Programming Doard, consisting of
five residents of Park City (community and arts). The Programming Doard will schedule the
selection and times of events. Nothing herein shall allow the City to regulate the content or
otherwise censor Public Outdoor Music Plaza productions or speech. Mountain Town Stages
The Arts Council shall at all times hold the City harmless and indemnify the City for all claims,
actions and liability arising from Mountain Town Stage's the Arts Council's use of the Public
Outdoor Music Plazas. Mountain Town Stages The Arts Council shall maintain its own liability
insurance, with the City listed as an additional insured in a form approved by the City Attorney.
(C)
Nothing in this Chapter shall be interpreted to create a contract or implied-contract
between the City and any performer, or Public Outdoor Music Plaza owner.
4- 8A-10. SUSPENSION .AND REVOCATION-ON-GOING COMPLIANCE
EVALUATION.
(A)
The City Special Events Department will appoint an independent neighborhood review
group of at least three area residents which will be contacted weekly by the City Special Events
staff and the program manager to receive comments and concerns. A phone number will also be
available at each venue so that individuals may phone in comments.—Dascd upon such
comments, the Special Events staff may issue additional conditions consistent with the intent of
this Chapter to the program manager. A summary of, and recommended response to comments
will be forwarded to the City Council within seven days of the end of each month of operation, or
sooner if requested by the program manager to resolve any issue. At the end of the season, the
Special Events staff will forward a final recommendation to the City Council, with proposed
changes, if any, prior to renewal of the licenses granted herein.
8ofl0
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fBfThe Police Chief, or his/her designee, may suspend the Licenses granted herein and schedule
a revocation hearing before the City Council at the next regularly scheduled City Council
meeting for any of the following causes:
(A)

Any violation of this Chapter as evidenced by a citation issued by the Police Department.

(B)

Any violation of law or City ordinance,

(C)
Upon any other evidence that the Program Manager or entertainer constitutes a hazard or
nuisance to the health, safety, or welfare of the community.

4- 8A-11.

TRANSFER LIMITATIONS.

The Master Festival Licenses granted under this Chapter are not transferable without the written
consent of the Mayor. It is unlawful for an individual to transfer a Public Outdoor Music Plaza
Master Festival License without City approval as provided herein. If any transfer of the
controlling interest in a Public Outdoor Music Plaza license occurs without City approval, the
license is immediately null and void and the Public Outdoor Music Plaza shall not operate until a
separate new license has been properly issued by the City as herein provided. The City will not
unreasonably withhold consent of transfer provided the proposed Licensee is a non-profit
organization within Park City, meets all the criteria of this Chapter, and demonstrates experience
managing special events.
4-8A-12. PLAZAS LICENSES IN LIEU OF ADMINISTRATIVE PERMITS FOR
OUTDOOR MUSIC AND OUTDOOR SPEAKERS.
The Master Festival Licenses granted under this Chapter are in lieu of any Administrative
Conditional Use Permit for outdoor music, including outdoor speakers, pursuant to the existing
Land Management Code and pending ordinance MCPC ^Section 15-2-6.10(B)(4). The City may
still issue outdoor music permits in conjunction with an approved Master Festival License.
SECTION 3. SEVERABILITY. If any phrase, clause, sentence, paragraph, or section of this
Ordinance is declared unlawful by a Court of competent jurisdiction, such decision shall not
affect any of the remaining phrases, clauses, sentences, paragraphs, or sections of this Ordinance.
SECTION 4. EFFECTIVE DATE. This ordinance shall become effective upon publication.
PASSED AND ADOPTED this 10th day of May, 2001.

PARK CITY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
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Attest:

,1>h£f

M. Scott, City Recorder
Approved as to Form:

Mark D. HamngtorCCity Attorney
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Exhibit I

Russell A. Cline (4298)
CRIPPEN & CLINE, L.C.

10 West 100 South, Suite 425
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)539-1900
Telefax: (801)322-1054
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

Ronald R. Whaley and Melanie A. Reif

AFFIDAVIT OF
RONALD R. WHALEY

Plaintiffs,
vs.
Park City Municipal Corporation,
Randy Barton, d/b/a The Wooden Dog and
Mountain Town Stages, and
Park City Arts Council, a nonprofit
corporation

Civil No.:
Judge Robert K. Hilder

Defendants,

STATE OF UTAH
County of Summit

|
:ss
|

The undersigned, being duly sworn, hereby states the following:
1.

My name is Ronald R. Whaley.

2.

I am a plaintiff in the above named case; I have personal knowledge of the facts
contained in this affidavit; and I am competent to testify to the statements made

00084

herein.
3.

I am a licensed real estate broker in the State of Utah; I have worked as a Park
City real estate agent for the past 25 years; I list and sell real estate throughout
Summit County; and I am very familiar with Old Town1 properties, market values,
and the circumstances and/or conditions that influence those values.

4.

From approximately 1983 to 1993,1 served on the Park City Planning
Commission. During that time, I became very familiar with Park City's policies
on planning and zoning issues. Before, during, and after my tenure, I witnessed
Park City ("City") defend quality of life issues through its economic and policy
decisions, e.g., the City invested monies and efforts to preserve the neighborhood
characteristics of the entire community, especially Old Town.

With respect to noise problems, I witnessed the City Council vehemently defend
residents who lived close to Main Street against noise intrusions by Main Street
businesses. Specifically, during my tenure on the Planning Commission, we dealt
with at least four major noise problems created by bars and restaurants on Main
Street.2 In resolving each problem, the City firmly supported eliminating the
noise that emanated from Main Street businesses and degraded the peace and
quiet of nearby residents.

I

The term "Old Town" is used by local realtors to refer to properties in the Historic
District of Park City.
2

These included: (1) noise from the Club-Alamo; (2) noise from the Memorial Building;
(3) noise from Cisero's; and (4) noise from El Cheapo.

OOySj

With these experiences in mind, I cannot explain the City's decisions, over the
past three summers, to allow continued and projected noise from lower Main
Street activities to impact nearby residents such as Melanie A. Reif and myself.
Especially given the fact that during the approval process of lower Main Street,
the City repeatedly considered the preclusion of activities resulting in continued
and projected noise. The City then agreed that NO restaurant/bar would be
allowed on the west side of lower Main Street. Yet, over the past several years,
restaurants and/or bars have occupied nearly all of the west side of lower Main
Street. This departure from eliminating noise intrusions on private residents has
resulted in problematic land use issues, which were routinely addressed during the
approval process. Unfortunately, the City's failure to protect private residents
from noise has resulted in a degradation of the quality of life for residents living
close to bars and restaurants on lower Main Street.

Approximately six years ago, longtime Park Avenue residents, Bernice and Betty
Watts, complained to the City about excessive noise emanating from the Broken
Thumb sports bar, which was located across the street from the Watts' home. The
intensity of the bar-related activities so close to the Watts' residence ultimately
drove them out of Old Town, where they had lived for over twenty years, despite
the fact that the City's policies purported to preclude the Broken Thumb and
businesses like it, from degrading the peace and quiet of nearby residents. The
Wattes received no meaningful noise mitigation from the City, and, later, the City
3
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bought the Watts' home for approximately $1,000,000 to settle the dispute.

Today, the City's assistant attorney resides in the home previously owned by the
Wattes, and the Broken Thumb is no longer located in Old Town. Yet, as set
forth in this affidavit and accompanying Complaint, the City continues to provide
no meaningful noise mitigation to Old Town residents who live near the lower
Main Street area, namely Ms. Reif and myself.
At all times relevant to this action, I have resided at 819 Park Avenue, Park City,
Summit County, Utah, and since 1991, Ms. Reif has resided at the same address.
I purchased our home in 1974.
Our home is a duplex located on the west side of Park Avenue and facing east.
Ms. Reif and I live in the rear of our home.
Our property is zoned Historical Residential Commercial (HRC) in the front and
Historical Residential (HR1) in the rear.
Our home is adjacent to the lower section of Main Street in the historic district of
Park City.
Both Main Street and our property are located at the bottom of a steep mountain
canyon.
A steep hillside abuts the rear of our property. Woodside Avenue is situated atop
that hillside and runs parallel to the rear of our property.
Park Avenue runs parallel along the front of our property.
The lower section of Main Street did not exist in any way when I purchased our

4
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home in 1974.
15.

Many years after I purchased our home, the lower section of Main Street was
approved and developed.

16.

The Town Lift plaza and Summit Watch plaza (collectively referred to herein as
the "plazas") are now located in the lower section of Main Street.

17.

The plazas are higher in elevation than our property.

18.

The plazas are surrounded on all four sides by residential activity: Park Station
Condominiums exist to the north, Caledonian Condominiums exist to the south,
Marriott Summit Watch timeshares exist to the east, and our home exists to the
west.

19.

Ms. Reif and I are the closest, permanent, year-round residents to the plazas.

20.

Our home is located less than 150 feet from the Town Lift plaza and less than 380
feet from the Summit Watch plaza.

21.

In the summer of 1998, the City began allowing live, amplified, outdoor music in
the lower section of Main Street.

22.

The music was so loud that Ms. Reif and I could hear it on our property and inside
our home.

23.

During the summer of 1998,1 complained to the Park City Planning Commission
that I could hear the noise from the outdoor concerts inside our home.

24.

I complained to the Park City Planning Commission because it is the chief
advisory board to the Park City Council regarding land use issues and because I
was well-aware oft!." 'Jity's desire to preserve the residential quality of the
5
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historic district.
25.

The City did nothing to resolve my concerns.

26.

In the summer of 1999, the City continued to allow live, outdoor, amplified music
in the lower Main Street area through permits and master festival licenses.

27.

Ms. Reif and I continued to complain to the City about the excessive volume
level, but the City still did nothing.

28.

The music from the 1999 summer concerts was so loud that Ms. Reif and I were
unable to enjoy any activities inside or outside of our home.

29.

Basic life activities, such as sleeping, resting, relaxing, working, studying,
reading, or doing anything that required concentration, were impossible due to the
loud noise created by the outdoor music concerts.

30.

Intrusions from the loud music occurred every day as well as every night, except
some Mondays, Wednesdays, and Thursdays.

31.

On Sundays, which are commonly reserved for rest, Ms. Reif and I were subjected
to ten (10) hours of disruptive, amplified music from 11:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m.

32.

On Tuesdays, while Ms. Reif and I prepared to relax and enjoy our evening meal
together, we were subjected to three (3) hours of disruptive, amplified music from
5:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.

33.

On Fridays, while Ms. Reif and I prepared to relax and enjoy our evening meal
together and to begin a restful and relaxing weekend, we were subjected to four
(4) hours of disruptive, amplified music from 5:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m.

34.

On Saturdays, from 2:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. and from 6:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m., hours
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that otherwise would have been productive or restful, Ms. Reif and I were
subjected to six (6) hours of disruptive, amplified music.
35.

During the summer of 1999, Ms. Reif and I made numerous calls to the Park City
Brewing Company & Smokehouse, and Dynamite Dom's, both of which held
permits from the City to play outdoor music. We politely requested that the
businesses lower the volume level; we explained that we could hear the music on
our property and within our home; and we informed the businesses that the noise
was disturbing and excessively loud. The businesses, however, refused to adjust
the volume level. As a result of the businesses' uncooperative and disrespectful
postures, Ms. Reif and I were forced to complain incessantly to the City police
department.

36.

During the summer of 1999, when Ms. Reif was preparing for the Utah Bar Exam,
she used earplugs and earmuffs (the kind that used for deafening sound), which
did not alleviate the noise created by outdoor music concerts. As a result, Ms.
Reif was forced to leave our home and to study elsewhere.

37.

While Ms. Reif was trying to prepare for the Utah Bar Exam, I walked over to the
Town Lift plaza upon her request and politely asked Steve Shluker, the business
manager of the Park City Brewing Company & Smokehouse, to lower the volume
level of the music. Mr. Shluker, however, refused to adjust the volume level. I
explained to him that Ms. Reif and I could hear the music on our property and
within our home, and I further informed him that Ms. Reif was trying to study for
the Bar Exam. He insisted he had a "business to run"; he maintained he had a
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permit from the City to play the music; and he referred to me in profane terms and
suggested that I should move if I did not like the noise.
38.

As a result of the loud, noxious noise created by the live, amplified, outdoor
music concerts during the summer of 1999, Ms. Reif and I had to leave our home
on several occasions.

39.

The music was so loud that Ms. Reif and I could not hear our television over the
noise.

40.

Meals and conversations were impossible or very unpleasant while the music was
playing, and we frequently left our home to escape the incessant noise and
returned after the music ceased.

41.

To be forced from our home by the noise was exhausting and very stressful for
both Ms. Reif and myself.

42.

We again asked the business owners to lower the volume of the noise, but they
again refused.

43.

We complained continuously about the volume level to the Park City Police.

44.

Occasionally, the police claimed they had asked business owners to lower the
volume level, but no relief resulted.

45.

Because we received no relief from the Park City Police, we called again and
again to report the loud, noxious noise, but still no relief resulted.

46.

We also complained to the City about the level of noise, the lack of cooperation
from the business owners, the number of hours of intrusion, and the business
owners' practices of playing before and/or after their permits allowed.

47.

On several occasions the Park City Police responded to our complaints, came to
our house, knocked on our door, and spoke to us in our backyard about the noise
issue.

48.

On at least one occasion, the police agreed that the music was too loud but said
that they could do nothing about it because the business had a "permit" to play the
music. When Ms. Reif asked the officer what he thought we should do to resolve
the problem, he suggested that legal action was our only remedy.

49.

Ms. Reif and I called the police repeatedly to voice our objections to the noise
level. Our voices became so familiar to police dispatchers that they began calling
us by our first names before we identified ourselves.

50.

No relief resulted despite our incessant complaints to the City.

51.

On numerous occasions during the summer of 1999, Ms. Reif and I voiced our
objections concerning the noise level to City Community Development Director,
Richard E. Lewis. We voiced our objections to Mr. Lewis in person, over the
telephone, and in writing. We notified Mr. Lewis of several violations regarding
the noise level and hours of operation. Mr. Lewis told us that he had spoken with
the business owners and they had agreed to lower the volume level of the music.
Mr. Lewis described Steve Shluker, the manager of the Park City Brewing
Company & Smokehouse, as "arrogant," and emphasized that the City Police
Chief, Lloyd D. Evans, Sr., was "real pissed" about the noise issue and the lack of
cooperation from the business owners. Mr. Lewis also told us that City
Councilman Hugh Daniels had gone on the record, saying "This noise is damn
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outrageous!" He also stated that City Councilman Roger Harlan had expressed
concern about the noise. Nevertheless, no noticeable volume adjustment or relief
resulted after our communications with Mr. Lewis.
52.

Mr. Lewis asked us to record the times of the performances that violated the
conditions of the permits. Ms. Reif recorded the times of the performances, and
Ms. Reif and I notified Mr. Lewis in writing of the dates and times of the
violations. Mr. Lewis told us that he and Chief Evans would recommend that the
City allow no more music in the lower Main Street area. Mr. Lewis promised us
that the City would revoke the permits if the complaints continued and told us that
he had sent letters to all three businesses (Brew Pub, Dynamite Dom's, and
Jambalaya) notifying them that their permits would be revoked effective August
20, 1999. Ms. Reif and I continued to complain, however, the City never revoked
the permits or licences as promised. Instead, Mr. Lewis informed us that the City
had entered into a private agreement with the business owners, whereby the City
allowed the business owners to continue playing music. With the City's blessing,
the business owners continued to play music at the same loud, noxious volume
level. When we continued to complain to Mr. Lewis and the City, the City did
nothing to resolve our concerns.

53.

On August 30, 1999, Ms. Reif and I expressed our concerns about outdoor music
in a letter to Mayor Bradley A. Olch.

54.

Sometime in the fall or winter of 1999, the City began considering whether to
allow another summer of outdoor music concerts in the lower Main Street area.
10
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55.

Upon learning of the possibility of the City allowing another summer of outdoor
music concerts, Ms. Reif and I voiced our objections to another summer of
intolerable intrusion.

56.

On March 2, 2000, Ms. Reif and I delivered a letter of intent to sue to Mayor Olch
and the City Council.

57.

On April 13, 2000, Ms. Reif and I delivered a notice of claim to Jan Scott, Park
City Recorder.

58.

Ms. Reif spent many hours reviewing drafts of the City's proposed ordinance
governing outdoor music (the "Outdoor Music Ordinance"), drafting changes, and
advising the City's legal staff about many issues.

59.

On May 18, 2000, Ms. Reif and I delivered an extensive letter to City Attorney
Mark Harrington, in which we explained our opposition to nearly every part of the
proposed Outdoor Music Ordinance.

60.

On May 18, 2000, Ms. Reif and I attended a public hearing held to discuss the
outdoor music issue. At that hearing, Councilwoman Candy Erickson made it
very clear that her primary focus was whether the decibel level would ruin the
quality of the performances. Councilwoman Erickson made no effort to
determine whether the decibel level would unreasonably interfere with our ability
to use and enjoy our property.

61.

At the public hearing on May 18, 2000, City Attorney Mark Harrington accused
Ms. Reif and me of being disingenuous and raising our concerns and objections
too late. Attorney Harrington made this accusation both verbally and in writing, a

00094

copy of which he presented to the City Council, others present at the hearing, Ms.
Reif, and me.
62.

On May 30, 2000, Ms. Reif and I delivered another extensive letter to City
Attorney Mark Harrington, in which we again explained our opposition to the
proposed Outdoor Music Ordinance.

63.

On more than one occasion, Ms. Reif and I explained to the City that the noise
was most problematic in the rear of our property, where we reside. We explained
to the City that the problem seemed to be exacerbated by the elevation of the
plazas and the noise bouncing off the hillside behind our home before invading
our home.

64.

On June 1, 2000, Ms. Reif and I attended another public hearing on the subject of
outdoor music and again raised our concerns and objections to the proposed 90
decibel level.

65.

At the public hearing on June 1, 2000, and in response to our adamant objections
to the proposed 90 decibel level, City Councilwoman Shauna Kerr assured us that
the City Council would amend the ordinance if problems arose.

66.

Despite our numerous and continued objections to outdoor music in the lower
Main Street area, the City Council voted to adopt the Outdoor Music Ordinance
on June 1,2000.

67.

Defendant Randy Barton ("Barton") has, on a number of occasions, made
unsolicited calls to our home and left messages on our voice mail. Barton, who
works at Park City Television and books bands under assumed business names,
12

The Wooden Dog and Mountain Town Stages, called to invite Ms. Reif and me
on Park City Television to "debate" the issue of outdoor music.
68.

Ms. Reif and I did not respond to Barton's harassing, uninvited, insincere, and
entirely self-interested calls.

69.

Barton instructed his female co-worker, who was working as a television reporter
at Park Television, to make unsolicited calls to our home, requesting to enter our
property to conduct an "on-site interview" on the "outdoor music issue."

70.

Ms. Reif and I did not respond to Barton's co-worker's calls and did not grant
permission to Barton or his co-worker to enter our property.

71.

During the summer of 2000, as a result of the Outdoor Music Ordinance, Ms. Reif
and I again experienced loud, live, amplified music on our property and within our
home on several days and/or nights during nearly every week throughout summer
and fall. Such intrusions occurred nearly every day and every night, except some
Mondays, Wednesdays, and Thursdays.

72.

On Sundays, which are commonly reserved for rest, Ms. Reif and I were subjected
to approximately six (6) hours of disruptive, amplified music from approximately
1:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. and approximately 5:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.

73.

On Tuesdays, while Ms. Reif and I prepared to relax and enjoy our dinner
together, we were subjected to approximately three (3) hours of disruptive,
amplified music from approximately 5:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.

74.

On Fridays, as Ms. Reif and I settled in for the evening, prepared to relax and
enjoy our dinner together and to begin a restful and relaxing weekend, we were
13
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subjected to approximately three (3) hours of disruptive, amplified music from
approximately 5:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.
75.

On Saturdays, from 1:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. and from 5:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m., hours
that otherwise would have been productive or restful, Ms. Reif and I were
subjected to approximately six (6) hours of disruptive, amplified music.

76.

Our ability to sleep, rest, relax, read or do anything that required concentration
was severely disrupted as a result of the loud, intrusive noise.

77.

Ms. Reif and I tried to watch the evening news, but were unable to do so because
the music was so loud.

78.

Ms. Reif and I could not enjoy our meals or conversation together as a result of
the loud, intrusive noise.

79.

Ms. Reif and I could not enjoy working or relaxing in our yard because the loud
music made such activities intolerable and unenjoyable.

80.

No appreciable relief resulted when Ms. Reif and I closed our windows and doors.

81.

The music was so loud that Ms. Reif could not concentrate and was thereby
prevented from working while the music was playing.

82.

The music was so loud that Ms. Reif could not practice her flute.

83.

Ms. Reif and I could not enjoy playing our own selection of music because the
bellowing noise created by the neighboring music was so loud.

84.

Ms. Reif and I were also disturbed by the clapping, yelling, and whistling of
concert attendees.

85.

Ms. Reif and I were disturbed by every aspect of the music, especially vocals,
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instruments, and drums.
86.

Ms. Reif and I were disturbed by every aspect of the music throughout the entire
concerts while we were at our home.

87.

Ms. Reif and I were unable to escape the noise except by leaving our home.

88.

Ms. Reif and I were able to seek relief only by leaving our home and then
returning after the music ceased. This form of self-help was enormously
inconvenient and stressful for both Ms. Reif and myself. Similarly, the loud,
noxious noise created by outdoor music in the lower Main Street area and the
uncooperativeness of Defendants was exasperating for both Ms. Reif and myself.
As a result of this undesirable and exhausting experience, we often felt irritable
and restless.

89.

Ms. Reif and I logged numerous general noise complaints with the City. When
doing so, we stated that the music is too loud and asked the City to request that
Barton lower the volume level. When our general complaints did not result in any
resolution, we repeatedly called with very specific noise complaints. Ms. Reif, for
example, complained to the City police dispatchers that we could hear the music
like it was being played right next door, that we could hear the music with our
television on and our windows and doors closed, that Ms. Reif was prevented
from working because the music was so loud, that we could hear every aspect of
the music in our home, including the vocals, instrumentals, and drums, and that
Ms. Reif could not enjoy basic pleasures such as taking a bath because the music
was so loud that she had to get out of the tub to call the police.
15
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90.

No matter how detailed Ms. Reif and I were when we made our complaints,
neither the City, Barton, nor the Arts Council did anything to resolve our
concerns.

91.

During the summer of 2000, the police did not come to our home as they had done
previously when responding to our complaints.

92.

On June 30, 2000, a single musician who resembled Berl Ives was playing at the
Town Lift plaza venue. The loud noise emanated clearly on our property and
inside our home. Ms. Reif and I walked our entire property line and noted that the
noise was most problematic in our backyard. We also walked the block of
Woodside Avenue, from our property line to Gary Kimball's house, which is
located at 662 Tramway Alley (the 600 block of Woodside Avenue). The music
was clearly audible the entire way; however, it was loudest in our backyard. Upon
returning home and while the concert was still ongoing, I called the City police
dispatcher and reported the following: (1) the music was too loud; (2) the
cumulative effect throughout the summer would be excessive; and (3) the complaint
was based on a lone musician, and the disturbance and excessiveness would likely
increase with a larger group of musicians. Thereafter, Ms. Reif and I left our home
and returned after the music ceased.

93.

Ms. Reif and I received so little attention and cooperation from the City that we
have, on numerous occasions, walked over to the venues and directly complained
to Barton and/or his assistant. Barton and/or his assistant, however, have refused
to adjust the noise level.
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94.

On July 1, 2000, at approximately 5:30 p.m., I called the police to register a noise
complaint about excessive noise coming from the outdoor music concert.

95.

Ms. Reif and I never received any documents from the City that were purportedly
delivered to us for our input in connection with a neighborhood monitoring
mechanism referred to in the City's report dated July 6, 2000.

96.

On July 2, 2000, Ms. Reif delivered a notice of intent to sue to the City, the Arts
Council, and Barton.

97.

The noise level did not improve after July 2, 2000, and Ms. Reif and I continued
to complain to the police.

98.

On August 8, 2000, after Ms. Reif reported that she received no cooperation from
Barton's assistant after asking him to lower the volume level of the music at the
Summit Watch plaza (in front of Dynamite Dom's), I called the police and
reported a noise complaint. No noise abatement resulted, however.

99.

The stages do not direct the noise away from our home. The stage located in front
of Dynamite Dom's, in particular, is situated in such a way that sound travels by a
direct line from the stage to and through our home.

100.

Our property value has significantly diminished due to the excessive and
disturbing noise created by live, amplified, outdoor music in the lower Main
Street area.

101.

The City did not amend the ordinance as promised.

102.

City Attorney Mark Harrington informed Ms. Reif that the City may allow the
same activity to continue next summer.
17
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103.

The City has not responded to our notice of claim dated April 13, 2000.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned affiant executeatftfe affidavit
(

onald R. Whaley
Affiant
Sworn and subscribed before me on this J>7

day of April, 2001.
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Notary Public
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"NOTASITF .

SUSAN A8BRUZZESE
16S0 Pork Atf9.. PO Sox 1230
Paris C*ly, Utah 84®g0
My Commission Expires
December SO, £004

STATE OF UTAH
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Exhibit J

Russell A. Cline (4298)
CRIPPEN & CLINE, L.C.

10 West 100 South, Suite 425
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)539-1900
Telefax: (801)322-1054
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

Ronald R. Whaley and Melanie A. Reif

AFFIDAVIT OF
MELANIE A. REIF

Plaintiffs,
vs.
Park City Municipal Corporation,
Randy Barton, d/b/a The Wooden Dog and
Mountain Town Stages, and
Park City Arts Council, a nonprofit
corporation

Civil No.:

__„_„_

Judge Robert K. Hilder

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
County of Summit

|
:ss
|

The undersigned, being duly sworn, hereby states the following:
1.

My name is Melanie A. Reif

2.

I am a plaintiff in the above named case; 1 have personal knowledge of the facts
contained in this affidavit; and I am competent to testify to the statements made

herein.
3.

I have a strong interest in the ails; I am an accomplished musician; 1 play the flute;
I am a member of the Utah Flute Association; I attended Interlochen Arts
Academy; I played in many prestigious groups, including the University of
Michigan Honors Band; I received a first1 in all competitions in which I have
participated; and I teach flute lessons.

4.

During college, I assisted the Utah Symphony with its fund-raising efforts; and I
contribute annually to my alma mater's public radio station.

5.

From 1996 until 1999,1 was a law school student.

6.

I am a licensed attorney in the State of Utah. My bar number is 8489.

7.

Until recently, 1 worked from home.

8.

Since 1991,1 have lived at 819 Park Avenue, Park City, Summit County, Utah,
together with Ronald R. Whaley.

9.

Our home is a duplex located on the west side of Park Avenue and facing east.

10.

Mr. Whaley and I live in the rear of our home.

11.

Our home is adjacent to the lower section of Main Street in the historic district of
Park City.

12.

Both Main Street and our property are located at the bottom of a steep mountain
canyon.

13.

A steep hillside abuts the rear of our property. Woodside Avenue is situated atop

1

The term "first" refers to the best rating possible and is denoted by an "I" on a scale of
I-V ("I being the best and V being the worst."), http://www.mit.edu/people/rlang/soloens.html
(explaining scoring system for solo and ensemble participants).
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that hillside and runs parallel to the rear of our property.
14.

Park Avenue runs parallel along the front of our property.

15.

The Town Lift plaza and Summit Watch plaza (collectively referred to herein as
the "plazas") are rather new developments that are located in the lower section of
Main Street.

16.

The plazas are higher in elevation than our property.

17.

The plazas are surrounded on all four sides by residential activity: Park Station
Condominiums exist to the north, Caledonian Condominiums exist to the south,
Marriott Summit Watch timeshares exist to the east, and our home exists to the
west.

18.

Mr. Whaley and I are the closest, permanent, year-round residents to the plazas.

19.

Our home is located less than 150 feet from the Town Lift plaza and less than 380
feet from the Summit Watch plaza.

20.

In the summer of 1998, Park City Municipal Corporation (wtCity") began allowing
live, amplified, outdoor music in the lower section of Main Street.

21.

The music was so loud that Mr. Whaley and I could hear it on our property and
inside our home.

22.

During the summer of 1998, Mr. Whaley complained to the City about the noise
level, but no abatement resulted.

23.

In the summer of 1999. the City continued to allow live, amplified, outdoor music
in the lower Main Street area through permits and master festival licenses.

24.

The permits were issued to three restaurants in the lower Main Street area,
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including Park City Brewing Company & Smokehouse (located at the Town Lift
plaza), Jambalaya (located at the Summit Watch plaza), and Dynamite Dom's
(located at the Summit Watch plaza).
25.

The master festival licenses were issued to two organizations known as the
Historic Main Street Business Alliance and The People Make the City Organizers.

26.

Throughout the summer of 1999, Mr. Whaley and I continued to complain to the
City about the excessive volume level and the number of days of interference, but
no abatement resulted.

27.

The music was so loud that we were unable to enjoy any activities inside or
outside our home.

28.

Basic life activities, such as sleeping, resting, relaxing, working, studying,
reading, or doing anything that required concentration, were impossible due to the
loud noise that was created by the outdoor music concerts.

29.

Intrusions from the loud music occurred every day as well as every night, except
some, Mondays, Wednesdays, and Thursdays.

30.

On Sundays, which are commonly reserved for rest, Mr. Whaley and 1 were
subjected to ten (10) hours of disruptive, amplified music from 11:00 a.m. to 9:00
p.m.

31.

On Tuesdays, while Mr. Whaley and I prepared to relax and enjoy our evening
meal together, we were subjected to three (3) hours of disruptive, amplified music
from 5:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.

32.

On Fridays, as Mr. Whaley and I prepared to relax and enjoy our evening meal
4
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together and to begin a restful and relaxing weekend, we were subjected to four
(4) hours of disruptive, amplified music from 5:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m.
33.

On Saturdays, from 2:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. and from 6:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m., hours
that otherwise would have been productive or restful, Mr. Whaley and I were
subjected to six (6) hours of disruptive, amplified music.

34.

During the summer of 1999, Mr. Whaley and 1 made numerous calls to the Park
City Brewing Company & Smokehouse and Dynamite Dom's, both of which held
permits from the City to play outdoor music. We politely requested that the
businesses lower the volume level; we explained that we could hear the music on
our property and within our home; and we informed the businesses that the noise
was disturbing and excessively loud. The businesses, however, refused to adjust
the volume level. As a result of the businesses' uncooperative and disrespectful
postures, Mr. Whaley and I were forced to complain incessantly to the City police
department.

35.

During the summer of 1999, when 1 was preparing for the Utah Bar Exam, I used
earplugs and earmuffs (the type designed to deafen sound). When those devices
did not alleviate the excessive noise that was created by the outdoor music
concerts, 1 was forced to leave our home and to study elsewhere.

36.

During the time that I was trying to prepare for the Utah Bar Exam, I asked Mr.
Whaley to walk over to the Town Lift plaza and politely ask the business manager
of the Park City Brewing Company & Smokehouse to lower the volume level of
the music. Mr. Whaley did so; however, no relief resulted.
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37.

Mr. Whaley reported to me that Steve Shluker, the manager of Park City Brewing
Company & Smokehouse, refused to lower the volume level; insisted he had a
"business to run'"; maintained he had a permit to play the music; and referred to
Mr. Whaley in profane terms and suggested that he move if he did not like the
noise.

38.

As a result of the loud, noxious noise created by the live, amplified, outdoor
music concerts during the summer of 1999, Mr. Whaley and I had to leave our
home on several occasions.

39.

The music was so loud that Mr. Whaley and I could not hear our television over
the noise.

40.

Meals and conversations were impossible or very unpleasant while the music was
playing, and we frequently left our home to escape the incessant noise and
returned after the music ceased.

41.

To be forced from our home by the noise was exhausting and very stressful for
both Mr. Whaley and myself.

42.

We again asked the business owners to lower the volume level of the noise, but
they again refused to do so.

43.

We complained continuously about the volume level to the Park City Police.

44.

Occasionally, the police claimed they had asked business owners to lower the
volume level, but no relief resulted.

45.

Because we received no relief from the Park City Police, we called again and
again to report the loud, noxious noise level, but still no abatement resulted.

46.

We also complained to the City about the level of noise, the lack of cooperation
from the business owners, the number of hours of intrusion, and the business
owners' practices of playing before and/or after their permits allowed.

47.

On several occasions, the Park City Police responded to our complaints, came to
our house, knocked on our door, and spoke to us in our backyard about the noise
issue.

48.

On at least one occasion, the police agreed that the music was too loud but said
that they could do nothing about it because the business had a "permit" to play the
music. When I asked the officer what he thought we should do to resolve the
problem, he suggested that legal action was our only remedy.

49.

Mr. Whaley and I called the police repeatedly to voice our objections to the noise
level. Our voices became so familiar to police dispatchers that they began calling
us by our first names before we identified ourselves.

50.

No relief resulted despite our incessant complaints to the City.

51.

On numerous occasions during the summer of 1999, Mr. Whaley and I voiced our
objections concerning the noise level to City Community Development Director
Richard E. Lewis. We voiced our objections to Mr. Lewis in person, over the
telephone, and in writing. We notified Mr. Lewis of several violations regarding
the noise level and hours of operation. Mr. Lewis told us that he had spoken with
the business owners and they had agreed to lower the volume level of the music.
Mr. Lewis described Steve Shluker, the manager of the Park City Brewing
Company & Smokehouse, as "arrogant." and emphasized that City Police Chief,
7

000,0

Lloyd D. Evans, Sr. was ureal pissed'1 about the noise issue and the lack of
cooperation from the business owners. Mr. Lewis also told us that City
Councilman Hugh Daniels had gone on the record, saying "This noise is damn
outrageous!" He also stated that City Councilman Roger Harlan had expressed
concern about the noise. Nevertheless, no noticeable volume adjustment or relief
resulted after our communications with Mr. Lewis.
52.

Mr. Lewis asked us to record the times of the performances that violated the
conditions of the permits. I recorded the times of the performances, and Mr.
Whaley and I notified Mr. Lewis in writing of the dates and times of the
violations. Mr. Lewis told us that he and Chief Evans would recommend that the
City allow no more music in the lower Main Street area. Mr. Lewis promised us
that the City would revoke the permits if the complaints continued, and told us
that he had sent letters to all three businesses (Brew Pub, Dynamite Dom's, and
Jambalaya) notifying them that their permits would be revoked effective August
20, 1999. Mr. Whaley and I continued to complain, however, the City never
revoked the permits or licences as promised. Instead, Mr. Lewis informed us that
the City had entered into a private agreement with the business owners, whereby
the City allowed the business owners to continue playing music. With the City's
blessing, the business owners continued to play music at the same loud, noxious
volume level. When we continued to complain to Mr. Lewis and the City, the
City did nothing to resolve our concerns.

53.

On August 30, 1999, Mr. Whaley and 1 expressed our concerns about outdoor
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music in a letter to Mayor Bradley A. Olch.
54.

Sometime in the fall or winter of 1999, the City began considering whether to
allow another summer of outdoor music concerts in the lower Main Street area.

55.

Upon learning of the possibility of the City allowing another summer of outdoor
music concerts, Mr. Whaley and 1 voiced our objections to another summer of
intolerable intrusion.

56.

On February 10, 2000,1 attended a City Council work session on the issue of
outdoor music. At that meeting, but before public comment was taken or
completed on the subject of outdoor music in the lower Main Street area,
Defendant Randy Barton ("Barton") polled each City Council member who was
present, asking whether they supported outdoor music in the lower Main Street
area. Council women Shauna Kerr, Peg Bodell, and Candy Erickson all voiced
their support.

57.

On March 2, 2000, Mr. Whaley and I delivered a letter of intent to sue to Mayor
Olch and the City Council.

58.

On April 13, 2000, Mr. Whaley and I delivered a notice of claim to Jan Scott,
Park City Recorder.

59.

I spent many hours reviewing drafts of the City's proposed ordinance governing
outdoor music (the "Outdoor Music Ordinance"), drafting changes, and advising
the City's legal staff about many issues.

60.

On May 18, 2000. Mr. Whaley and 1 delivered an extensive letter to City Attorney
Mark Harrington, in which we explained our opposition to nearly every part of the
9

proposed Outdoor Music Ordinance.
61.

On May 18, 2000, Mr. Whaley and I attended a public hearing held to discuss the
outdoor music issue. At that hearing. City Councilwoman Candy Erickson made
it very clear that her primary focus was whether the decibel level would ruin the
quality of the performances. Councilwoman Erickson made no effort to
determine whether the decibel level would unreasonably interfere with our ability
to use and enjoy our property.

62.

At the public hearing on May 18, 2000, City Attorney Mark Harrington accused
Mr. Whaley and me of being disingenuous and raising our concerns and
objections too late. Attorney Harrington made this accusation both verbally and
in writing, a copy of which he presented to the City Council, others present at the
hearing, Mr. Whaley. and me.

63.

On May 30, 2000, Mr. Whaley and 1 delivered another extensive letter to City
Attorney Mark Harrington, in which we again explained our opposition to the
proposed Outdoor Music Ordinance,

64.

On more than one occasion. Mr. Whaley and I explained to the City that the noise
was most problematic in the rear of our property, where we live. We explained to
the City that the problem seemed to be exacerbated by the elevation of the plazas
and the noise bouncing off the hillside behind our home before invading our
home.

65.

On June 1, 2000, Mr. Whaley and 1 attended another public hearing on the subject
of outdoor music and again raised our concerns and objections to the proposed 90
10

decibel level.
66.

At the public hearing on June 1, 2000, and in response to our adamant objections
to the proposed 90 decibel level. City Councilwoman Shauna Kerr, assured us that
the City Council would amend the ordinance if problems arose.

67.

Despite our numerous and continued objections to outdoor music in the lower
Main Street area, the City Council voted to adopt the Outdoor Music Ordinance
on June 1.2000.

68.

Barton has, on a number of occasions, made unsolicited calls to our home and left
messages on our voice mail. Barton, who works at Park City Television and
books bands under assumed business names, The Wooden Dog and Mountain
Town Stages, called to invite Mr. Whaley and me on Park City Television to
t%

debate" the issue of outdoor music.

69.

Mr. Whaley and I did not respond to Barton's harassing, uninvited, insincere, and
entirely self-interested calls.

70.

Barton instructed his female co-worker, who was working as a television reporter
at Park Television, to make unsolicited calls to our home, requesting to enter our
property to conduct an "on-site interview" on the "outdoor music issue."

71.

Mr. Whaley and I did not respond to Barton's co-worker's calls and we did not
grant permission to Barton or his co-worker to enter our property.

72.

During the summer of 2000. as a result of the Outdoor Music Ordinance, Mr.
Whaley and I again experienced loud, live, amplified music on our property and
within our home on several days and/or nights during nearly every week
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throughout summer and fall. Such intrusions occurred nearly every day and every
night, except some Mondays, Wednesdays, and Thursdays.
73.

On Sundays, which are commonly reserved for rest, Mr. Whaley and I were
subjected to approximately six (6) hours of disruptive, amplified music from
approximately 1:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. and from 5:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.

74.

On Tuesdays, while Mr. Whaley and 1 prepared to relax and enjoy our dinner
together, we were subjected to approximately three (3) hours of disruptive,
amplilled music from approximately 5:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.

75.

On Fridays, as Mr. Whaley and I prepared to relax and enjoy our dinner together
and to begin a restful and relaxing weekend, we were subjected to approximately
three (3) hours of disruptive, amplified music from approximately 5:00 p.m. to
8:00 p.m.

76.

On Saturdays, from approximately 1:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. and from 5:00 p.m. to
8:00 p.m., hours that otherwise would have been productive or restful, Mr.
Whaley and I were subjected to approximately six (6) hours of disruptive,
amplified music.

77.

Our ability to sleep, rest, relax, read or do anything that required concentration
was severely disrupted by the loud, intrusive noise.

78.

Mr. Whaley and I tried to watch the evening news, but were unable to do so
because the music was so loud.

79.

Mr. Whaley and I could not enjoy our meals or conversation together as a result of
the loi J, intrusive noise.
12
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80.

Mr. Whaley and I could not enjoy working or relaxing in our yard because the
loud music made such activities intolerable and unenjoyable.

81.

No appreciable relief resulted when Mr. Whaley and 1 closed our windows and
doors.

82.

The music was so loud that I could not concentrate and was thereby prevented
from working while the music was playing.2

83.

The music was so loud that 1 could not practice my flute.

84.

Mr. Whaley and I could not enjoy playing our own selection of music because the
bellowing noise created by the neighboring music was so loud.

85.

Mr. Whaley and 1 were also disturbed by the clapping, yelling, and whistling of
concert attendees.

86.

Mr. Whaley and I were disturbed by every aspect of the music, especially vocals,
instruments, and drums.

87.

Mr. Whaley and 1 were disturbed by every aspect of the music throughout the
entire concerts while we were at our home.

88.

Mr. Whaley and 1 were unable to escape the noise except by leaving our home.

89.

Mr. Whaley and I were able to seek relief only by leaving our home and then
returning after the music ceased. This form of self-help was enormously
inconvenient and stressful for both Mr. Whaley and myself. Similarly, the loud,
noxious noise created by outdoor music in the lower Main Street area and the
uncooperativeness of Defendants was exasperating for both Mr. Whaley and

2
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myself. As a result of this undesirable and exhausting experience, we have often
felt irritable and restless.
90.

Mr. Whaley and I logged numerous general noise complaints with the City. When
doing so, we stated that the music is too loud and we have asked the City to
request that Barton lower the volume level. When our general complaints did not
result in any resolution, we called repeatedly with very specific noise complaints.
I, for example, complained to the City police dispatchers that we could hear the
music like it was being played right next door, that we could hear the music with
our television on and our windows and doors closed, that I was prevented from
working because the music was so loud, that we could hear every aspect of the
music in our home, including the vocals, instrumentals, and drums, and that I
could not enjoy basic pleasures such as taking a bath because the music was so
loud that I had to get out of the tub to call the police.

91.

No matter how detailed Mr. Whaley and I were when we made our complaints,
neither the City, Barton, nor the Arts Council did anything to resolve our
concerns.

92.

During the summer of 2000, the police did not come to our home as they had done
previously when responding to our complaints.

93.

On June 30, 2000, a single musician who resembled Berl Ives was playing at the
Town Lift plaza venue. The loud noise emanated clearly on our property and
inside our home. Mr. Whaley and I walked our entire property line and noted that
the noise was most problematic in our backyard. We also walked the block of
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Woodside Avenue, from our property line to Gary Kimball's house, which is
located at 662 Tramway Alley (the 600 block of Woodside Avenue). The music
was clearly audible the entire way; however, it was loudest in our backyard. Upon
returning home and while the concert was still ongoing, Mr. Whaley called the
City police dispatcher and reported the following: (1) the music was too loud; (2)
the cumulative effect throughout the summer would be excessive; and (3) the
complaint was based on a lone musician, and the disturbance and excessiveness
would likely increase with a larger group of musicians. Thereafter, Mr. Whaley
and I left our home and returned after the music ceased.
94.

On June 30, 2000, during an outdoor concert, I saw a City Special Events
Department employee, Melissa Caffey, peering over the ledge of the Town Lift
plaza into our backyard where Mr. Whaley and I were talking with one another. I
also saw City Councilwoman Peg Bodell in the plaza area.

95.

Mr. Whaley and I received so little attention and cooperation from the City that
we have, on numerous occasions, walked over to the venues and directly
complained to Barton and/or his assistant. Barton and/or his assistant, however,
have refused to adjust the noise level.

96.

On July 1, 2000, at approximately 6:30 p.m., I called the Park City Police to check
the status of a complaint that Mr. Whaley had made approximately one hour
earlier. The police dispatcher laughed and said that an officer was just at our
home but that no one was home. I informed the dispatcher that I had been home
all evening and that there had been no officer at our home. The dispatcher then
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informed me that she had received a "directive from the Chamber of Commerce"
stating that someone would visit our home to mediate the issue. I asked the
dispatcher whom the City intended to send over to mediate the issue, and she
informed me that the City intended to send Barton. I indicated that Barton was
not an appropriate person to mediate this issue. I asked the dispatcher to inform
Barton that Mr. Whaley and I did not want him on our property. I also stated that
if Barton did not lower the volume of the music, we would seek a legal remedy.
97.

Despite my discussions with the police dispatcher, Barton trespassed on our
property on July 1, 2000, and thereafter called and left another harassing message
on our voice mail.

98.

On July 1, 2000, at approximately 6:31 p.m., after speaking with the Park City
Police, I retrieved a message from Barton. Barton stated that he had just been
over to our house. He said that he would really like Mr. Whaley and I to come
and "talk about" the issue on Park City Television where he works. He left his
cell phone number and said he would be at the Town Lift Plaza the following day.

99.

Neither Mr. Whaley nor I returned Barton's voice mail message of July 1, 2000.

100.

Sometime later, I requested a copy of the City's report dated July 6, 2000, and in it
discovered that the City's Special Events Department had accused Mr. Whaley
and me of bringing false complaints on July 1, 2000. The City's accusation is
false, slanderous, and libelous. Furthermore, with respect to the neighborhood
monitoring mechanism that is referred to in the report, I never received any
documents from the City that were purportedly delivered to me for my input. The
16
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City's report of July 6, 2000, at the very least, is evidence of the Cit> "s lack of
investigation into, and minimization of, our complaints.
101.

On July 2, 2000,1 delivered a notice of intent to sue to the City, the Arts Council,
and Barton. When I hand delivered the notice to Barton, he asserted that the City
would provide his legal counsel. I explained to Barton that I was an attorney and
that I was unable to provide him with legal advice. I did, however, suggest both
that it was highly improbable that the City would represent him and that he seek
his own counsel.

102.

Shortly after delivering the notice of intent to sue, I heard Joanna Charnes, a
layperson and spokesperson for the Arts Council, contend in a KPC W radio
interview that the Arts Council has a "right" to play music, thereby implying that
the Outdoor Music Ordinance protects the Arts Council from suit.

103.

The noise level did not improve after July 2, 2000, and Mr. Whaley and I
continued to complain to the police.

104.

On August 8, 2000, at approximately 5:00 p.m., I walked over to the band shell in
front of Dynamite Dom's at the Summit Watch plaza to ask Barton to lower the
volume level. The noise was so deafening that, as I approached the band shell and
looked for Barton, I had to cover my ears with my hands to alleviate the pain in
my ears. Barton was not there, but I found his assistant who told me that Barton
was at a "show." The music was so loud that I had to yell as loud as 1 could so
that Barton's assistant could hear me. I asked him to lower the volume but he
refused by stating that the music was playing at 89 decibels, which he alleged was
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in compliance with the Outdoor Music Ordinance. I told Barton's assistant that
Mr. Whaley and I could hear the music inside our home and that it was too loud. I
told him that if he did not turn the volume down, we would file suit. I later
returned with a camera to document the event. After I received no cooperation
from Barton's assistant, Mr. Whaley called the police and reported a noise
complaint. No volume adjustment ever resulted, however.
105.

The stages do not direct the noise away from our home. The stage located in front
of Dynamite Dom's, in particular, is situated in such a way that sound travels by a
direct line from the stage to and through our home.

106.

The City did not amend the ordinance as promised.

107.

City Attorney Mark Harrington informed me that the City may allow the same
activity to continue next summer.

108.

The City has not responded to our notice of claim dated April 13, 2000.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned affiant executed this affidavit.
_ U-« UcL

Mefeaie A. Reif
Affiant
Sworn and subscribed before me on this ^ - 7 day of April, 2001.

'UMA

IX

Notary Public

Lk-'iyj^oMJ-

w

NOTARY PUBLIC
SUSAfJ ABOTUIZESE
1650 Park Ave., PO Bos 1238
f>m* City, Utah 84060
My Commission Expir#i
December 20, 2004
STATE OF UTAH
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Exhibit K

Russell A. Cline (4298)
CRIPPEN & CLINE, L.C.

10 West 100 South, Suite 425
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)539-1900
Telefax: (801)322-1054
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

Ronald R. Whaley and Melanie A. Reif

AFFIDAVIT OF
ANTHONY R. SOLA

Plaintiffs,
vs.
Park City Municipal Corporation,
Randy Barton, d/b/a The Wooden Dog and
Mountain Town Stages, and
Park City Arts Council, a nonprofit
corporation

Civil No.:
Judge Robert K. Hilder

Defendants,

STATE OF ARIZONA
County of Maricopa

|
:ss
|

The undersigned, being duly sworn, hereby states the following:
1.

My name is Anthony R. (Tony) Sola. I reside in Mesa, Arizona.

2.

I have personal knowledge of the facts contained in this affidavit, and I am
competent to testify to the statements made herein.
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3.

I am a professional acoustical consultant. I have worked in the field of acoustics
and noise assessment for eleven years. The Institute of Noise Control Engineering
("INCE") is the national organization that certifies acoustical consultants. To
become a full member of the INCE, one must meet certain educational and
experience requirements, accept and abide by a code of professional ethics, and
pass a professional exam. I am a full member of both INCE and the Acoustical
Society of America.

4.

I have taught Acoustics at Arizona State University for the past seven years.

5.

I have worked as a noise expert for the City of Phoenix's Neighborhood Services
Department for the past three years. As the City of Phoenix's consultant, I have
investigated, measured, and assessed numerous noise complaints and zoning
violations for a variety of noise sources. Also, a variety of municipalities have
hired me to assess other acoustical consultants' reports.

6.

I have reviewed the noise study dated May 4, 2000, which was conducted by
Richard K. Fullmer of Spectrum Acoustical Engineers in Salt Lake City, Utah
("Noise Study"); I have reviewed the Outdoor Music Ordinance ("Ordinance"); I
have reviewed Title 6 of the Park City Municipal Code; and I am familiar with the
Town Lift and Summit Watch plazas and their locations in relationship to Mr.
Whaley and Ms. Reif s home.

7.

According to my research, neither Richard K. Fullmer nor Jim Fullmer is a
member of the INCE.

8.

Based on my review of the Noise Study, it appears that Spectrum Acoustical
2
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Engineers ("Spectrum") measured the sound level in the lower Main Street area of
Park City from 12:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. on April 26, 2000 through May 2, 2000.
9.

Spectrum reported that the average hourly decibel level during that period was
66.7 dBA (referred to in the Noise Study and herein as the "Leq").

10.

Spectrum also reported that the average decibel reading for the loudest 1% of each
hour was 75.3 dBA (referred to in the Noise Study and herein as the "IV).

11.

Spectrum also concluded that the sound of outdoor music played at or below the
90 decibel level as proposed by Park City would result in noise to nearby residents
in the 72-74 decibel range.

12.

Spectrum then concluded that music played at or below a 90 decibel level, as
contemplated by Park City, would not create an "unusually loud noise or sound,"
would not annoy or disturb a reasonable person with normal sensitivities, and
would not interfere with "comfort, repose, health, hearing, [or] peace" of nearby
residents.

13.

In reaching its conclusion, Spectrum found that the "expected sound levels from
the music plazas' activities are comparable to the loudness to the present traffic
noise." Spectrum compared the projected 72-76 decibel level of music to nearby
residents with the Lx level (75.3 dBA) and concluded that, since they were
approximately the same, nearby residents would have no cause to complain about
the noise from the music since it would be no louder than the loudest normal
noises measured in its study.

14.

In my opinion, Spectrum's conclusions are flawed for at least one major reason,
3
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and several other issues are in need of clarification.
First, even if the noise levels recorded by Spectrum were accurate, Spectrum
incorrectly focused on the highest L, measurement rather than the lowest
measurement. The L, reading measures the maximum noise. Comparing a noise
source to the ambient noise level is an appropriate method of helping to determine
the annoyance potential. Ambient has been defined differently by various
municipalities. It has been defined as "the lowest level," the level exceeded
ninety percent of the time (the lowest 10%), or the average noise level without
inclusion of the noise from isolated sources. I am not aware of any standard or
code that uses a measurement above the average noise level to define the ambient
noise level. The Noise Study relied on the L, measurement (the highest 1%) to
determine ambient noise levels. In so doing, the Noise Study relied on a
measurement far exceeding the average noise level. The Noise Study is
extraordinary in this respect. Furthermore, by focusing on the upper limit rather
than the lower limit, Park City has taken a complete opposite approach compared
to other municipalities.
Second, the conclusion that music played at 90 dBA is not excessive is entirely
inconsistent with accepted standards for noise throughout the country. Typical
municipal ordinances set not-to-exceed limits and consider instantaneous noise
levels below 50 to 55 dBA at night and 60 to 65 dBA during the day to be
acceptable. Some suburban and rural municipalities have set nighttime limits as
low as 45 dBA. Park City's general noise ordinance sets a not-to-exceed limit of
4
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65 dBA. The Noise Study indicates the expected impact on nearby properties will
be approximately 72 dBA and 74 dBA, and if both plaza venues have concerts at
the same time, the noise impact could be over 76 dBA. Under the most
conservative estimate, i.e., simultaneous concerts are not taking place, the impact
will be approximately 10-15 decibels higher than a typical ordinance allows. A
difference of 10-15 decibels is significant, e.g., 10 decibels sounds twice as loud
to the human ear and 15 decibels sounds three times as loud.
Third, the Noise Study does not adequately explain, nor does the Ordinance
adequately consider, the significant difference between 65 decibels (which is
allowed by Park City's general noise ordinance) and 90 decibels (which is
permitted by Park City's Outdoor Music Ordinance). When heard from 0-25 feet
from its source, 90 decibels sounds six times louder than 65 decibels.
Fourth, the Noise Study compares the noise impact from music to the existing
traffic noise, and fails to distinguish the two. The annoyance potential is
dependent not only on the level of noise but also the noise characteristics. Noises
that are impulsive, periodic, tonal, or shrill in nature are potentially far more
annoying than typical "brbad-band" traffic noise at the same noise level Music
contains all of these potentially annoying characteristics. Additionally, music or
speech that is identifiable is very difficult to ignore. I have investigated a number
of complaints resulting from music (live and recorded) measured at levels that did
not exceed 55 dBA during my tenure with the City of Phoenix. Even at this level
(50-55 dBA), songs are identifiable and every word is intelligible. Park City's
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Noise Study projects that nearby residents can be impacted by 74 dBA. This level
of impact is 20 dBA (four times louder) than levels that have prompted numerous
complaints to the City of Phoenix.
19.

Finally, Spectrum concluded that a "shell" in the back of the music stage would
reduce the noise by 10 decibels or more. Based on my review of the structure of
the shell, its position relative to residential areas and the geographical position of
the stage relevant to residential areas (including the canyon-like setting and/or
steep hillside behind some of the residential homes), I believe that Spectrum's
generalized conclusion is incorrect. Although the shell may reduce the sound of
the music to certain limited areas, the shells will not uniformly reduce the music
by 10 decibels to all residential areas. As to some residential locations the shell
will have no effect at all on the level of the sound and will actually funnel sound
directly into certain residential areas.

20.

In my opinion, the amplified music performed under the Ordinance has been and
will continue to be excessive and unusually loud.

21.

Even assuming that the amplified music reaches nearby residents at 72-76 decibel
level, that level of music will, in my opinion, based on a person with normal
sensitivities, deprive nearby residents of the reasonable and comfortable
enjoyment of their homes.

22.

Furthermore, in my opinion, the level of amplified music would likely interfere
with "the comfort, repose, peace, health, and enjoyment" of persons residing in
nearby residential areas, such as Mr. Whaley and Ms. Reif
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23.

The amplified music will emanate beyond the boundaries of the immediate
business establishment from which the music originates to nearby residents,
including Mr. Whaley and Ms. Reif, and the level of noise reaching such
individuals will likely interfere with residents' ability to sleep, study, read,
converse, concentrate or otherwise carry on normal activities around one's
property.

24.

Based on my review of this matter, it is neither surprising nor unreasonable that
Mr. Whaley and Ms. Reif have complained numerous times of experiencing
excessive noise on their property and inside their home.

25.

Furthermore, Mr. Whaley and Ms. Reif s complaints that the problem is most
severe in the rear of their property is perfectly normal. I have encountered
complaints similar to Mr. Whaley and Ms. Reif s. Many factors explain these
type of complaints: reflection (caused from canyon-like setting or a steep hillside
behind the home), atmospheric conditions, changes in ambient noise, elevation
differences, etc.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned affiant executed this affidavit.

Anthony R^&ola
Affiant

Sworn and subscribed before me on this / /

day of April, 2001.

^ P^gy M.Jones
Notary Public* Arizona
Maricopa County
My Commission Expires
December 31,2003
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Exhibit L

Russell A. Cline (4298)
CRIPPEN & CLINE, L.C.

10 West 100 South, Suite 425
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)539-1900
Telefax: (801)322-1054
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

Ronald R. Whaley and Melanie A. Reif

AFFIDAVIT OF RUSSELL A. CLINE

Plaintiffs,
vs.
Park City Municipal Corporation,
Randy Barton, d/b/a The Wooden Dog and
Mountain Town Stages, Mountain Town
Stages, a nonprofit corporation, and
Park City Arts Council, a nonprofit
corporation

Civil No.: 010600122-PR
Judge Robert K. Hilder

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Russell A. Cline, being duly sworn, does say and depose as follows:
1.

I am attorney of record for plaintiffs in the above-captioned matter.

2.

On Thursday, July 18, 2003,1 had a telephone conversation with Kevyn Dem.

3.

Mr. Dem said that he was a musician that played at the Town Lift Plaza in Park

0Uilb4

City, Utah in the summer of 1999.
4.

Mr. Dem said that he was booked that summer by Randy Barton, dba The

Wooden Dog.
5.

Mr. Dern said that during the performances he recalled that complaints were made

by some neighbors as to the volume of the music.
6.

Mr. Dem said that Randy Barton provided the sound system for the concerts at

which he performed.
7.

Mr. Dem said that Randy Barton was the person that adjusted the volume of the

music prior to and during the performances.
8.

Mr. Dem said that Randy Barton was present during the concerts and handled the

complaints relating to the volume of the music.
9.

Mr. Dem said that Randy Barton adjusted the volume of the music during the

concerts at which complaints were made in an effort to resolve complaints about the volume of
the music.
10.

Mr. Dem said that Randy Barton, d/b/a Mountain Town Stages, had also booked

him to perform at Town Lift Plaza during the Summer of 2000.
11.

I have requested that Mr. Dem voluntarily provide an affidavit as to the

foregoing. However, to date he has not done so.
12.

Rule 26(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure prevents any discovery prior to

an Attorney Planning Conference being held.
13.

Because of the various dispositive motions (and motions for reconsideration) that

have been before the court since the Complaint in this case was filed, no Attorney Planning
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Conference has been held.
14.

I request that the Court vacate its prior ruling so that an Attorney Planning

Conference Report can be filed and Mr. Dern's deposition can be taken.
15.

Attached hereto as Exhibits B, C, D and E are true and correct copies of the

following newspaper articles: Happening Today, Salt Lake Tribune, Aug. 7, 1999, at C6; Utah
Marquee: Music, Salt Lake Tribune, Aug. 6, 1999, at E6; Weekend Entertainment Calendar,
Deseret News, July 2, 1999, at C2; and Park City Divas (Wooden Dog Annual Benefit Concert),
Park Record, May 1, 1999, at B-6.
DATED this

I/O

day of September, 2003.

//

iCussell A. Cline

Sworn and subscribed before me this ' ^

,,<6rf«>^

N OTARY PUBLIC

$%0lm\
SHAUNA L ROGERS
^ ^ l | e \
Temple, 5th Floor
i*lm»¥ft
)c£ Salt Lake C i t y > U T 84133
x
10 East S o u t h

^^tHm^
vCtJJJS^y
^.i"»,V'"

day of September, 2003.

S^&-^

£

Notary Public

My Commission Expires
June 11, 2006
STATE OF UTAH
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EXHIBIT "B"
{Happening Today, Salt Lake Tribune, Aug. 7, 1999, at C6)
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Happening Today ... 08/07/1999

The Salt Lake Tribune
Date: 08/07/1999 Edition: Final
Keywords: Events Schedul

Section: Religion

Page: C6

Happening Today
The Wooden Dog Plaza Concert Series
Town Lift Plaza; Between Main Street and Park Ave at 8th Street; David Hahn, 2 p.m.; Shane Jackman, 6
p.m.; free.
Utah Symphony with
Michael Martin Murphey
classical/country; Deer Valley Resort, Park City; 7:30 p.m.; 355-ARTS.
Utah Festival Opera
Opera; Ellen Eccles Theatre; "The Tales Of Hoffmann," "The Student Prince," and Carousel"; Logan; $15
to $45
Barbara and Gerhardt Suhrstedt
keyboardists; Assembly Hall, Temple Square; 7:30 p.m.; free.
"The Reluctant Dragon,"
City Rep Theater; 638 S. State St.; 7:30 p.m.; tickets, $7, 532-6000.
"I Do! I Do!"
Provo Theatre Company; 105 E. 100 North, Provo; 8 p.m., tickets, $12.50 to $15 with discounts available;
call (801) 379-0600 between 6 and 9 on performance evenings.
"The Masque of Beauty
and the Beast"
Lighthouse Theatre; 4991 S. Highland Drive, behind Cottonwood Mall; 7 p.m.; adults $7, seniors $6 and
children $5; call 274-9404, presented by Academy Theatre Company.
Tributary Theatre
Star Hall; Moab; "Gulliver's Travels," 7 p.m.; tickets, $4 to $8; (800) 413-8164.
"George Washington Slept Here"
Hale Center Theater Orem, 225 W. 400 North; 7:30 p.m.; through Aug. 16; tickets, $7-$ 10; 226-8600.
"Showdown at Sugar Cane Saloon"
Heritage Theatre; 2505 S. Highway 89, Perry; 8 p.m.; through Aug. 14; tickets, $5 and $6; (435) 7238392.
"The Farley Family Reunion"
with James Arrington, Villa Playhouse; 254 S. Main, Springville; 7:30 p.m.; tickets, 489-3088.
"Tons of Money"
Springville Civic Center, 50 S. Main St., Springville (below Springville Public Library); 7:30 p.m.; $5, $4
for students and seniors.
"Quick Wits"
Off Broadway Theatre; 272 S. Main, Salt Lake City; 10 p.m.; tickets, $8 adults, $6 students and seniors;
355-4628.
"Mission Improbable"
Terrace Plaza Playhouse; 99 E. 4700 South, Ogden; 10:30 p.m.; tickets, $5 adults, $3 students with ID;
393-0070.
"Waiting for Godot"
Margetts Theatre; Brigham Young University, Provo; 7:30 p.m.; tickets, $9, $7 for students or faculty,
(801)378-4322.

"Comedy of Errors"
Alder Amphitheater, Salt Lake Community College Redwood Campus; 4600 S. Redwood Road; 7 p.m.;
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EXHIBIT "C"
{Utah Marquee: Music, Salt Lake Tribune, Aug. 6, 1999, at E6)
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Utah Marquee MUSIC

08/06/1999

The Salt Lake Tribune
Date 08/06/1999 Edition Final Section Calendar
Keywords Events Schedule
Subject Arts Culture and Entertainment

Page E6

Utah Marquee: MUSIC
The Wooden Dog Plaza Concert Senes
Town Lift Plaza, Between Mam Street and Paik Ave at 8th Sheet, James Scott, tonight 6 p m , David
Hahn, Saturday, 2 p m , Shane Jackman, Satin day, 6 p m , Pat Carnahan Trio, Sunday, 2 p m , Mi
Whoopee, Sunday, 6 p m , free
The Park City
International Music Festival
St Mary of the Assumption Catholic Church, Paik City, tonight, 8 p m , $15 legulai admission, $10
students/seniors
Utah Symphony
with Michael Martin Murphey
classical/country, Abiavanel Hall, 123 W South Temple, tonight, 7 30 p m , also Deei Valley Resort, Park
City, Satuiday, 7 30 p m , 355 ARTS
Utah Festival Opera
Opera, Ellen Eccles Theatre, "The Tales Of Hoffmann,' "The Student Prince," and Caiousel", Logan,
tonight thiough Aug 7, $15 to $45
Ammaha Concert
Homeless animal fund-raiser concert, featuimg the Munay Concert Band, Cliff Millwaid, conductor,
arrive early for a camel ride at 6 30 p m , Munay Park Amphitheater 5100 S State Street, 8 p m , Concert
$5, Children $3, Camel nde $3
Barbara and Gerhardt Suhistedt
keyboaidists, Assembly Hall, Temple Square, Satuiday, 7 30 p m , free
Kathy Kalhck Band
contemporary, Randall L Jones Theatie, Southern Utah University, Cedar City, Sunday, 7 p m
Park City International Music
Festival and Young Artist Institute
classical, Paik City Community Church, Sunday, 8 p m , $15 legulai admission, $10 students/seniois
On the Mark
bluegiass, Sundance Village Sundance Resoit, Piovo Canyon, Sunday, 2 to 5 p m , free
Alumni Band
Kent Concert Hall, Chase Fine Arts Center, Utah State University Logan, Sunday, 7 p m , fiee
Biown Bag Concert Senes
City Cieek Park, North Temple and State Street, Monday Cieighkey, Celtic, Tuesday, Juliet Convention,
folk, Wednesday, Julie Hill, Smger/songwntei, Thuisday, Eddy Zenn, rock, 12 15 p m free
Elbo Finn
lock, Trolley Square, 500 S 700 East, 6 3 0 p m
Spirit of Unity World Tom
reggae, Hellenic Center, 279 S 300 West, Salt Lake City, Tuesday, doois open at 3 30 p m , music from 5
to 10 p m
Chamber Strings
rock, ABG's, 190 W Center, Provo 9 p m
Twilight Concert Series
concert and outdoor maiket, featuring Petei Rowan and dobio mastei Jeiry Douglas bluegrass Galhvan
Utah Centei, 36 E 200 South, Thuisday, 7 30 p m , fiee
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EXHIBIT "D"
(WeekendEntertainment Calendar, Deseret News, July 2, 1999, at C2)
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Deseret News Archives,
Friday, July 2, 1999
Edition: All
Section: Leisure
Page: C02
Length: 244 lines

Weekend entertainment calendar

MUSIC/DANCE
Music of the Night a Broadway Medley, July 1-August 14, 6:30 p.m., the Little London Dinner Theater, Pleasant Grove,
tickets at the door.
The Utah National Guard 23rd Army Band, July2-3, 7:30 p.m., Assembly Hall, Temple Square, free.
Tlie Utah Music Festival, July 2, 8 p.m., St. Luke's Episcopal Church, Park City; 7 p.m., New St. Mary's Catholic Church,
Park City ; 5 p.m., Sai-Sommet Restaurant Terrace, Deer Valley Club. Tickets for all shows are at the door.
Folk Concert, July 3, 7 p.m., DUP Building in downtown Torrey, Ut. Free.
Tir na n'og, July 3, 8 p.m., Westminster College Malmsten Amphitheater, tickets at the door.
"Yesturday-A Salute to the Beatles," July 3, 8 p.m., Murray Softball Field, free.
Fireworks Concert, July 4, 9 p.m., Layton Heritage Park, free.
Kirkmount, July 4, 2 p.m., Sundance Village, Sundance resort, free.
Shanahy, July 4, 7 p.m., Southern Utah Umversity Randall L. Jones Theater, Cedar City, tickets at the door.
Utah State Umveisity Alumni Band, July 4, 7 p.m., Utah State University Main Hill Amphitheater, fiee
United States Air Force Band, July 5, 7 p.m., Bngham City Chamber of Commerce Historic Building, free.
Celtic Dance Theater "Fire and Grace", July 6, 8 p.m., Kingsbury Flail, tickets at the door.
Tlie Duttons, July 6, 7:30 p.m., Kenley Centennial Amplntheater, tickets available at all First National Bank offices, Olde
Samt Rose Gift Shop, Layton.
Howard Jones, July 6, 7 p.m., Snow Park Lodge Outdoor Amphitheater at Deer Valley, tickets at the gate
Am DiFranco, July 7, 7 p.m., Snow Park Lodge Outdoor Amphitheater. Deer Valley, tickets at the gate.
Avenues Jazz Trio, July 7, 7:30 p.m., Anderson-Foothill Branch Library Amphitheater, free.
Ruth Ellis, July 7, 7"30 p.m., Assembly Hall Temple Square, free.

GUJ.172

Utah Symphony, July 7, noon, Gallivan Center Plaza, free.
Dynatones and the Tempo Timers, July 7, 7 p.m., Gallivan Center Plaza, free.
Amy Jackson and Paul Noyce, July 8 , 7 p.m., Riverton Music Recital Hall, donations accepted at the door.
Cat Van Natter & Friends, July 8, 6:30 p.m., MTC Park, Ogden, free.
Charlie Musselwhite Band, July 8, 7:30 p.m., Gallivan Center Plaza, free.
Judith Stillman, Maria Lambros, and Guest, July 8, 8 p.m., St. Mary's Catholic Church, Park City, tickets at the door.
Members of the Muir Quartet, July 8, 8 p.m., St. Mary's Church, Park City, tickets available at the door.
Paul Whelan, July 9, 7:30 p.m., Assembly Hall, Temple Square, free.
Murray Ballet Theaterb, July 9-10, 8:30 p.m., Murray Park Outdoor Amphitheater, tickets at the door.
Rock U2 the Top, Carousel Theatre, Lagoon, daily except Thursdays through Labor Day weekend.
BROWN BAG CONCERT SERIES
Underpaid Professors, July 2
Phil Taylor, July 6
Shanahy, July 7
Kairo by Night, July 8
Anke Summerhill, July 9
All concerts begin at 12:15 p.m., Eagle Gate Plaza at South Temple and State Street.
CONCERTS IN THE PARK
Castleview Cloggers, July 2
Salt Lake Symphony, July 6
Intimate Opera, July 9
All concerts will begin at 8 p.m., Brigham Young Historic Park, free.
THE WOODEN DOG CONCERT SERIES
James Scott, July 2, 6 p.m.
David Halm and Leraine Hortsmanshoff, July 3, 2:30 and 6 p.m.
Mr. Whoopee, Megan Peters, Leraine Hortsmanshoff, July 4, lp.m.-6 p.m.
All concerts will be at Park City's Town Lift Plaza. They are free.
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EXHIBIT "E"
{Park City Divas (Wooden Dog Annual Benefit Concert), Park Record, May 1, 1999, at B-6)
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Medicine and Spine specialist
C h a r l e s L Beck, M D
V e r n o n J Cooley, M D
Leslie J Harris, M D
Thomas D Rosenburg, M D
2200 Park Ave Suite D-100

U n i v e r s i t y of Utah Park City
Family h e a l t h Center
649-7640
Adult and Pediatric Medical Care
Family Planning Medical
Emergencies and Trauma
Dtp}ornate, American
Board
of Family Practice
R o b e r t W Barnett, M D
Cress R B o h n n , M D
R o b e r t J Evers, M D
P a m Farmer, M D
Dave G r e e n b e r g , M D
J o s e p h Feniter, M D
J o h n Hanrahan, MD

Terry P S m i t h M D Ptodfafcy
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Family
Nurse-Practitioner
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Medicine
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